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“I never held a public office in my life during which I was not under some 
kind of threat of removal or impeachment from the day I went into politics 
until the present day. I have never held one, and I do not expect to hold 
one.”  
Huey P Long, American Progress, 8 February 1934 
When, in March 1929, just ten months after he was inaugurated as governor of Louisiana, 
Huey P Long had been impeached by the state’s Legislature, he was one of only a handful 
of state governors to have been censured in this way in United States history. Despite the 
rarity of impeachment, the action against Long has been under-examined by academics and 
historians, with previous work focussing solely on a recitation of events and speculation that 
the action may have wrought a possible alteration in his personality. However, the 
impeachment had a more profound and transformational impact on Long and his subsequent 
career, leading as it did to actions which, without this tipping point, may not have occurred in 
quite the same way. Therefore to dismiss the impeachment as a simple vignette in the 
sometimes controversial career of Long, is to under-estimate the importance of the action 
and its subsequent impact. To redress this omission, it is necessary to examine the genesis 
of the impeachment in 1929 and to determine whether the action was a predictable event 
based on a broad view of Long, his character and his techniques, his personal and political 
belief systems, his position within the state of Louisiana and the South, and the environment 
in which he emerged to prominence. Through this wider approach, it has been possible to 
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Historically, impeachment has always been a potential threat to the career of any US 
politician, whether it is triggered in response to alleged criminal activity or misdemeanours or 
as a result of partisan hostility. For Louisiana Governor Huey Pierce Long, investigation and 
impeachment were recurring threats overhanging his entire political career. As a Public 
Service Commissioner, he faced removal after accusing the incumbent state governor of 
being in thrall to Standard Oil and claiming his fellow commissioners had taken bribes from 
the Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company. As governor, he faced impeachment 
early in his term of office and, as US Senator, he was the target of two US Senate 
investigations, the first by the Special Committee on Investigation of Presidential and 
Senatorial Campaign Expenditure into corruption during the 1932 Overton-Broussard US 
Senate campaign, and the second by the Judiciary committee into a petition by Governor 
John M Parker that Long was “personally dishonest, corrupt, and immoral, and his 
continuance in office [was] repulsive to the respectable and law abiding citizens of Louisiana 
and the nation” and should be incarcerated as a “dangerous paranoiac” as a matter of public 
safety.1 Such was the prevalence of impeachment and censure efforts during Long’s career 
that he became more and more preoccupied with the threat, particularly after his 
impeachment as governor in March 1929. Increasingly, he began to perceive such 
investigations as validating of his political programmes and activities. 
                                                          
1 “Seek Removal Of Huey Long From Senate – Home Citizens File Charge of Graft” Chicago Tribune 





The Impeachment of Governor Huey P Long 
On 15 March 1929, Long issued a call for the Louisiana Legislature to meet in special 
session, for no more than six days from 18 March, to pass legislation on six subjects, 
including an occupational tax on oil refining.2 When it became evident to Long that his oil tax 
would not be approved, he adjourned the session and called for a second special session to 
commence on 20 March lasting no more than eighteen days, ending on 6 April 1929. The 
bills for discussion at this session again included an occupational oil tax.3 The opposition 
was more organised during this second session, causing Long to seek to adjourn this 
session too. However, the anti-Longs were determined that the governor should accept the 
defeat of his programme. On Monday, 25 March, John Fournet, the speaker of the house, 
recognised the motion of J Cleveland Fruge, a Long supporter, over that of Cecil Morgan. 
Where Fruge’s motion called for an adjournment, Morgan’s sought an investigation into an 
accusation made by Harry ‘Battling’ Bozeman, Long’s former bodyguard, that the governor 
had asked him to murder J Y Sanders Jr. A vote on the adjournment motion was called. 
However, despite a number of anti-Longs objecting that their vote had been recorded 
incorrectly, Fournet ruled that the vote had been in favour of the motion. He declared the 
session adjourned sine die and left the chamber. The subsequent scuffle between pro- and 
anti-Long legislators was brought to an end when Representative Mason Spencer called for 
calm, took the speaker’s chair and, in Fournet’s absence, held a voice vote on the 
adjournment motion. The resulting vote was 71 to 9 against adjournment sine die. Spencer 
then moved that the House adjourn until 11am the following morning.4 
When the session continued, Fournet apologised for mis-calling the adjournment, blaming 
the error on a “mechanical difficulty” with the voting machinery which had failed to clear the 
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results of the previous vote.5 Led by Morgan, the anti-Long opposition forces demanded 
Long’s impeachment, citing 19 separate charges.6 Testimony on the charges was heard in 
the House from 3 April, with the first charge put to the vote on 6 April. Listed as article 14 in 
the impeachment charges, the Manship charge, as it was commonly known, claimed that 
Long had sought to silence Charles Manship, the publisher of two daily newspapers in Baton 
Rouge, by threatening to reveal publicly that Manship’s brother, Douglas, was a resident of 
an insane asylum. Since it required the fewest witnesses, the Manship charge was voted on 
first. In a farcical incident, Representative George Delesdernier attempted to prevent the 
vote with a speech which compared Long to Jesus of Nazareth,  
“Today we have a creature relieving the sick and the blind, aiding the lame 
and the halt, and trying to drive illiteracy from the State, and he is being 
shackeled [sic] with paper to a cross.” 
When Lester Lautenschlaeger suggested that Delesdernier’s statement was irrelevant to the 
case, he responded “Take my life but give me my character,” fainted and was carried from 
the chamber.7 Subsequently the House voted by 58 to 40 to impeach Long on this charge, 
with Delesdernier’s vote recorded as nay.8 Six members of the House, Charles B Roberts, L 
Mason Spencer, J Y Sanders Jr, George J Ginsberg, Cecil Morgan, George K Perrault, A P 
Frymire, Paul A Chasez, Lavinius L Williams, were selected as managers to prosecute the 
impeachment of the governor, to present to the Senate the adopted article of impeachment 
(the Manship charge) and the pledge that the House “will in due time exhibit other and 
particular articles of impeachment against him, the said Huey P. Long, Governor, and make 
good the same; and that the managers do demand that the said Senate take order and 
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require the appearance of said Huey P. Long to answer said impeachment.”9 The Senate 
transformed itself into a Court of Impeachment.10 
While the House continued to investigate each of the remaining eighteen articles of 
impeachment, Long became depressed. He could not see a way out of the crisis; the night 
the impeachment bill was passed, he had wandered the streets of Baton Rouge trying to 
antagonise someone into shooting him.11 His brother, Julius, later recalled that their father 
was concerned Long might commit suicide.12 However, he rallied and went on the offensive, 
seeking popular support by issuing circulars blaming Standard Oil for the impeachment, and 
calling a mass meeting of his supporters, at which he also attributed the crisis to legislators 
funded by the oil company. Posters advertising the meeting warned Louisianians to  
“Watch Out for the Lying Newspapers. They may announce that this 
Meeting will be called off or they may say that the Governor has resigned. 
Pay no attention to anything they say - - - Come to Baton Rouge DON’T 
TAKE TIME TO DRESS UP- - - A MAN’S A MAN.”13  
Long’s defence was funded by a number of supporters, but most significantly by Robert 
Maestri, a New Orleans businessman, who contributed $40,000 to the fund.14 His legal team 
was led by John H Overton, and included Leander H Perez, who devised strategy for Long’s 
team. Long’s brother, Earl, worked on a one-to-one basis persuading individuals to support 
the governor.15 In defence of his brother, Earl was as ready to use force as he was to speak. 
When he saw Maestri speaking with Harney Bogan, one of the anti-Long forces, he 
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10 Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Louisiana at the Fifth Extra Session 
of the Legislature, Under the Adoption of the Constitution of 1921: Begun and Held in the City of 
Baton Rouge, March 20, 1929 p101 
11 Jerome Beatty “You Can’t Laugh Him Off!” The American Magazine January 1933 p118, Long 
(Russell B) Collection  Long family Huey Long series box 4 folder 4-22 Huey Long Series: Magazine   
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Papers, Research Material HPL: Oral History Interviews (1952 - 1966, n.d.) Box 19 Folder 104 p2 
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14 “Maestri Gift Creates Stir – Many Want All Facts On His Giving $40,000 to Long Campaign Fund” 
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challenged Maestri and fought Bogan, biting his face and neck.16 In the tense atmosphere 
pervading Baton Rouge after the impeachment bill was passed, and with many on both sides 
of the impeachment carrying weapons, observers expected violence to break out.17   
The investigatory sessions in the House attracted spectators, including Long’s wife, Rose, 
who, at his instigation, sat in the gallery each day. Her presence and her clothing attracted 
comment. When she wore a white dress, another woman commented “doesn’t Mrs Long 
have cheek, wearing white when she should have on black.”18 Witness testimony ranged 
from the dull and technical to the shocking. Some witnesses were reluctant to repeat the 
profanities used by Long in the presence of the women in the gallery, which led Morgan to 
apologise, 
“I will ask Mr. Huckaby to repeat verbatim what the Governor said, and I 
make this statement first because there are ladies present and I want to 
apologize to the ladies and to the gallery for having to ask the question of 
Mr. Huckaby to have him repeat verbatim what the Governor said, but I 
think it is the essence of this charge and it should be done.”19  
While Mason Spencer later acknowledged he did not believe Bozeman’s story, the former 
bodyguard’s claim that Long had asked him to kill Representative J Y Sanders Jr made him 
a “wonderful witness”20 for the anti-Long case. Not all witnesses produced such sensational 
testimony, others were of interest simply because they failed to provide the evidence the 
impeachers were seeking. Seymour Weiss’s testimony frustrated legislators when he 
refused to answer specific questions relating to the entertainment provided for the 1928 
Governors’ Conference held in New Orleans, particularly with regard to the supply of alcohol. 
Under the provisions of the Volstead Act, Weiss’s refusal to answer questions was not 
                                                          
16 “Teeth Weapon Of Earl Long, Gnaws Bogan – Caddo Representative Strikes Governor’s Brother 
for Using Vile Epithet” Shreveport Times 27 April 1929 p1 
17 Notes from J Y Sanders Jr interview by T Harry Williams on 6 Nov 1959 in Baton Rouge La. T Harry 
Williams Papers, Research Material HPL: Oral History Interviews (1952 - 1966, n.d.) Box 19 Folder 
147 p 14 
18 Williams (1969) p371 
19 Cecil Morgan quoted in Official Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana 
on 5 April 1929 pp218-219 
20 Notes from Mason Spencer interview by T Harry Williams on 20 January 1960 in Tallulah La. T 
Harry Williams Papers, Research Material HPL: Oral History Interviews (1952 - 1966, n.d.) Box 19 





simply an attempt to protect Long and the other governors, it was self-defence in line with 
Fifth Amendment protections.21 Ultimately a further seven articles of impeachment were 
presented to the Senate by 26 April: that Long bribed or attempted to bribe members of the 
Legislature;22 that he refused to account for the state funds ($6000) appropriated for the 
Governors’ Conference held in New Orleans in November 1928;23 that he illegally removed 
school officials;24 that he misused funds appropriated for the maintenance and repair of the 
state house and the governor’s mansion to purchase a car;25 that he misused funds 
appropriated for the maintenance and repair of the state house and the governor’s mansion 
to purchase law books for his personal use;26 and that he paid $4000 to a highway 
contractor for defective culverts.27 The final charge, that Long was incompetent and 
temperamentally unfit for office, was a catch-all article of impeachment which cited a series 
of offences. These were that the governor had required state officials to sign undated letters 
of resignation, some of which were later dated by Long and used to announce the 
resignations of officials; that he had forced the retirement of V L Roy, president of the 
Louisiana State Normal College; that he had subpoenaed a false witness in a court case; 
that he had used obscene language to, and about, a telephone operator, whom he later 
discharged from her job; that he had verbally abused men representing Caddo Parish; that 
he had appointed a Parole Officer, who had failed to carry out his duties and had been paid 
expenses which had not been incurred while performing his duty; that he had subsequently 
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refused to dismiss the employee and, in doing so, had forced the resignations of the 
president and another member of the parole board.28    
In an order issued on 27 April, Long was called to present himself for trial before the Senate, 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment, on Tuesday, 14 May 1929. The recess allowed not only 
the Senate chamber to be converted into a court room, with a temporary viewing platform 
erected at the rear, it also allowed both sides to prepare, with a distinct advantage being 
gained by the defence team. Having declared the governor ready to make his response to 
the articles of impeachment, the Long team’s first action was to file exceptions and 
demurrers in respect of articles two to eight. The defence argued in exception and demurrer 
number 1 that by sitting beyond 6 April, the Legislature had exceeded the terms of the 
special session called by Long, which was scheduled to run no later than 6 April. As such, 
they claimed, the Legislature had met illegally.29 It was claimed in exception and demurrer 
number 2 that the first article of impeachment, the Manship charge, was a personal matter 
undertaken as a private citizen and as such was not subject to the purview of 
impeachment.30 On 15 May, the Senate voted to overrule exception and demurrer number 
131 and to sustain exception and demurer number 2.32 
On 16 May, Philip Gilbert, a pro-Long senator, presented a Round Robin letter to the 
Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, which stated that since the impeachment charges 
preferred after 6 April were “unconstitutional, illegal, null and void,” the undersigned fifteen 
senators would not convict Long on the remaining charges. As such, they stated, to proceed 
as a court of impeachment was “ineffectual, vain and [would] incur a useless cost and 
expense to the State”33 and they, therefore, moved for adjournment sine die. In the face of 
this unexpected action, Senator Delos R Johnson proposed that each of the fifteen senators 
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32 Demurrer 2 to be sustained, yeas 21, nays 18 – sustained; Ibid p264 





be called upon to confirm that their signature on the letter was, indeed, genuine. Once all 
signers had confirmed, Senator Donald Labbe called for a short recess. When the Senate 
reconvened, a written declaration signed by twenty four senators was read out deploring the 
actions of the fifteen ‘robineers’ to “vote against conviction on any and all impeachment 
charges regularly made and filed by the House of Representatives regardless of any 
evidence that may be introduced and heard.”34 Despite this condemnation, the motion to 
adjourn sine die was passed.  
Post-impeachment 
While the fifteen ‘robineers’ may have saved Long’s governorship and potentially his political 
career, and as such were rewarded by Long, he made no effort to appease, compensate or 
otherwise establish better relations with his opponents. Instead, he instigated recall motions 
against nine of the anti-Long legislators, although eight retained their seats. He also began 
to utilise patronage as punishment for opposition, especially state jobs. The anti-Long 
Constitutional League, formed in June 1929, had successfully targeted Long officials for 
‘double-dipping,’ the practice of simultaneously holding more than one state job.35 Long used 
this tactic to remove from office any opponents or supporters of the anti-Long faction, and, 
as demonstrated with the removal of Arthur B Hammond from his two posts, as a way of 
controlling those who sought to work alongside him.36 
As a result, when the Legislature met in the biennial regular session in May 1930, the anti-
Long opposition was determined to block the governor’s bills. In response, the governor 
vetoed appropriations bills passed by the Legislature, specifically including expenses for the 
lieutenant governor and the chairman of the Public Service commission, both of whom had 
sided against him during the impeachment.37 In a move which highlighted Long’s frustration 
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36 See Steps to power p151 





with the Legislature, his inability to implement his political programme and also his continued 
resentment over the impeachment, he made a move which contradicted the self-articulated 
logic of his preferred career pathway. Five days after the end of the session, he formally 
announced that he would challenge incumbent US Senator Joseph E Ransdell, in the 
upcoming US Senate race. A bad tempered Democratic primary campaign resulted in a win 
for Long by over 38,000 votes. In a special session of the Legislature, called one week after 
his primary victory, Long’s programme was easily passed, including legislation to remove the 
impeachment charges, which, due to the nature of the adjournment of the session in 1929, 
remained outstanding. While this move was consistent with Long’s goal of progression from 
the governor’s office, via the United States Senate, to the White House, his subsequent 
actions suggest that the timing of the Senate run was an entirely reactive response to a 
triggering event – the impeachment combined with the failure of his programmes at the 1930 
regular session – rather than the next step on an established career plan.  
Despite this victory, which appeared to secure his dominance of the state, Long remained in 
Louisiana for almost another two years, continuing his term as the state’s governor. While 
this response was in part due to his determination to ensure that his lieutenant governor, 
Paul Cyr, who had sided with the Long’s enemies during the impeachment, would not 
succeed him in the office, it also demonstrates a determination to reinforce his control over 
the state by refusing to adhere to conventional expectations of behaviour. A consistent 
feature of Long’s tenure in political office was his determination to challenge the status quo 
by overtly acting in ways which contradicted established and expected norms of personal 
and political behaviour. Additionally, rather than appearing relieved or contrite at the 
outcome of the impeachment, his actions in going on the offensive demonstrated an intent, 
not only to re-establish and extend his control in the state, but also to actively keep his 






United States Senator 
Once Cyr’s activities, in attempting to force Long from the governor’s office, had effectively 
eliminated him from the succession,38 and with Alvin King installed as acting governor and 
Oscar K Allen as governor-elect, Long belatedly travelled to Washington DC to take up his 
seat on 25 January 1932.39 In actions designed to simultaneously attract public attention and 
antagonise members of the Louisiana cohort in Congress, Long began his term of office. 
Having established an iconoclastic strategy when dealing with the political elites of 
Louisiana, Long did not seek to ameliorate his behaviour in respect of the national political 
establishment. In a tactic which echoed his previous support and then opposition to senior 
members of the Louisiana Democratic Party, Long supported and actively campaigned for 
Franklin D Roosevelt during the 1932 presidential campaign. Although in his autobiography, 
Every Man A King, Long claimed to have become convinced that Roosevelt was “the best 
chance for a solution of America’s difficulties”40 following the New York governor’s 
commencement speech at Oglethorpe University in May 1932,41 his support was based as 
much upon political expediency as upon any genuine feelings of affiliation. At the 1932 
Democratic National Convention, for example, the demand of Roosevelt’s campaign team 
that each delegation vote by the unit rule,42 offered the greatest chance for Long’s delegation 
to be seated. In a repeat of events during the 1928 Democratic Party National Convention,43 
Long’s delegation was opposed by another from Louisiana. Led by three former governors, J 
Y Sanders Sr, Ruffin G Pleasant and John M Parker, the competing delegation also sought 
to replace Long as the Democratic national committeeman for Louisiana with John D Ewing, 
the son of the previous national committeeman, Colonel Robert Ewing. Displaying, what 
William Ivy Hair called, “unaccustomed dignity,” Long’s presentation of his delegation’s case 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt, Master Speech File, 1898-1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & 
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to the convention was clearly and persuasively argued. As a result, the convention voted by 
over 100 votes to seat his delegation rather than that led by the former governors.44  
While Long’s support for Roosevelt had more to do with defeating his Louisiana rivals than 
with any personal loyalty, his influence at the convention in persuading the Arkansas and 
Mississippi delegations to remain with Roosevelt on the third ballot was crucial in keeping 
the New York governor in the race.45 However, any assumptions that Long held that he 
would be able to convert his support at the convention and, subsequently, during the 
election campaign, into influence over the Roosevelt administration rapidly disappeared as it 
became evident that Roosevelt was a significantly more adept politician than anyone Long 
had come across in Louisiana.  
 “Such were my hopes – my dreams – some say my imaginations, and 
others claim, my hallucinations; but none the less, before and after the 
nomination of our candidate, before and after his election, I drank of the 
fountain of a new life as I saw, heard and read of his expounding the 
principles which had guided my activities throughout my public career. To 
my heart, such pronouncements were relighting the lamp of ‘America’s 
dream.’”46     
Just as Governor Parker’s alleged failure to deliver on campaign promises had fuelled 
Long’s opposition and enmity to the governor,47 so, in the weeks after Roosevelt’s 1933 
inauguration, Long claimed that the new president was betraying the people who had 
elected him by aligning himself with Wall Street.48 The subsequent feud saw Long overtly 
attacking the New Deal, while the Roosevelt administration bypassed Long when allocating 
federal funds to Louisiana. 
Despite the move to Washington DC, Long retained political control of Louisiana, with his 
successor, Oscar K Allen, effectively a figurehead managed and manipulated by Long, either 
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receiving his instructions by telephone or in person. Long spent a greater proportion of his 
time as US Senator in Louisiana, rather than in Washington DC. As a senator, his actions 
were designed to create the greatest publicity and to increase his profile at the national level. 
By antagonising various members of the US Senate, resigning his committee memberships 
in protest at the lack of support for his wealth redistribution legislation,49 and conducting 
filibusters trying to prevent the passage of the Roosevelt administration’s legislation, he 
created for himself a reputation for fighting against the establishment as a ‘champion of the 
people.’ In the meantime, his actions in remaining in control in Louisiana were designed to 
ensure that there at least the impeachment crisis could not be repeated. However, Long’s 
control of Louisiana was increasingly dependent not just on his control of his forces, but also 
on his physical presence in the state, a necessity determined by the lack of effectiveness of 
his people, particularly Governor Allen. In 1934, the anti-Long opposition endeavoured to 
overthrow his control by planning a series of parliamentary strikes. Buoyed by the election of 
J Y Sanders Jr as congressman for the sixth district, they first intended to unseat Allen 
Ellender, speaker of the house, to remove John Fournet as lieutenant governor by 
‘addressing him out of office,’50 and finally to instigate impeachment actions against 
Governor Allen. The attempted plot failed when it was leaked to Long’s supporters and he 
returned to Baton Rouge to oversee its defeat. Having left Allen with specific instructions on 
                                                          
49 Long’s proposal to limit personal fortunes failed to find support in Senate when he proposed 
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the legislation to be passed, Long returned to Washington DC, only to have to return as 
opposition grew to the legislation and Allen appeared willing to compromise over bills would 
be passed. Within hours of his return, Long’s programme was passed by a cowed 
Legislature.51 Increasingly, in a mark of his personal control, Long’s presence in Baton 
Rouge began to signal that there would be a call for another special session.     
In 1935, Long began to express his intention to either run in the 1936 presidential race or to 
support a third party candidate. This could, potentially split the Democratic vote and facilitate 
a Republican victory, allowing, newspapers speculated, him to run as a Share Our Wealth 
candidate in 1940.52 On 4 September, he returned to Baton Rouge and, through Governor 
Allen, called a special session to enact a series of twenty one items, including a bill targeting 
federal interference in the state and one to rearrange judicial districts. The first was aimed as 
snub to the Roosevelt administration and the second sought to remove the anti-Long judge, 
Benjamin Pavy, from his office.53   
On the evening of 8 September, Long left the floor of the House to join Chick Frampton in 
the governor’s office to discuss an emerging news story. A hurricane in Florida had stranded 
Civil Conservation Corps workers and Frampton wanted a quote from Long on the 
incompetence of the administration’s relief efforts.54 In the corridor outside the governor’s 
office, Long was approached by Dr Carl Austin Weiss and was shot. Since Weiss was killed 
by Long’s bodyguards before he could be interrogated, speculation persists over his motive. 
Commentators generally agree that he wanted to confront Long over the gerrymandering 
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proposition which would unseat his father-in-law, Judge Pavy. It has also been suggested 
that Long was accidently shot by his bodyguards as they gunned down Weiss.  
Long was taken to the Our Lady of the Lake hospital, where he was examined by Dr Arthur 
Vidrine, the superintendent of the Charity Hospital in New Orleans, who had been in Baton 
Rouge to attend the special session. Long asked for three other doctors, Urban Maes55 and 
Russell Stone from New Orleans and E L Sanderson from Shreveport. In their absence, 
Vidrine operated and, initially, it appeared that the operation had been successful. When the 
requested doctors arrived, they questioned Vidrine on the procedure and noted he had 
omitted to check Long’s bladder for blood. On carrying out this test, it was discovered that 
Long was bleeding internally from a damaged renal duct. The doctors determined that Long 
was now in too weakened a state to undergo another operation to repair the damage. 
Despite blood transfusions, Long died in the early hours of Tuesday, 10 September 1935.56  
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis for this piece of work is that the impeachment of Huey P Long in March 1929 
was of greater significance – both to Long personally and to the unfolding of his political 
career – than has previously been recognised and discussed. This work will show that 
Long’s impeachment had its basis not just in the events of March 1929, it was instead a 
response to the cumulative effect of his personal and political actions, behaviours and 
programmes throughout his career and personal life, before and during his time in politics. 
As such, it will be argued that, based on his actions throughout his personal and public life, 
impeachment was, for Long, not just a potential event, it was a predictable one. While 
hindsight may suggest that impeachment was inevitable for Long, since it occurred in March 
1929, the adjective ‘inevitable’ suggests that impeachment was unavoidable. However, 
Long’s impeachment in 1929 was dependent on the actions and reactions of others, not just 
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on his actions and behaviours. Without the activities of his political opponents in bringing the 
impeachment charges, and the support for the action within the Legislature, Long would not 
have been impeached. Equally, Long could have made adjustments to divert the threat of 
impeachment such as altering his behaviours or amending his legislative programme into a 
less controversial format, which may have encouraged a sense of collaborative exercise 
rather than confrontation. Therefore to suggest that the impeachment was inevitable assigns 
a sense of pre-destination to these events, which preclude the necessity of human 
interaction. Instead this thesis will argue that based on his actions, behaviours and political 
programmes, impeachment was a predictable event in Long’s political career. Based on 
previous events, impeachment can be determined to have been an unsurprising, even 
expected, outcome for Long at some stage in his political career and that the events of the 
special sessions of the Louisiana Legislature in March 1929 brought that expectation to 
fruition.   
While T Harry Williams has argued that the impeachment had no impact on Long, that he 
simply continued on as if it had never occurred,57 this work will argue that the impeachment 
of 1929 had a far greater impact than has been previously examined and understood. Rather 
than being of limited effect, the impeachment had such a significant influence on Long, his 
reactions and responses to opposition and to his career pathway, that it can be described as 
a transformational event in his political career. In the immediate aftermath of the 
impeachment, Long altered his modes of engagement with the populace of Louisiana. 
Instead of relying on the state’s daily and weekly newspapers to carry his messages, 
especially when so many of the daily editions had opposed him during the impeachment, he 
launched his own publication, the Louisiana Progress, in March 1930. By initially funding the 
newspaper through ‘voluntary’ contributions or ‘deducts’ from state employees, he also 
established a regular financial resource which would remain active even after the Progress 
became self-funded. The most distinctive transformation in Long’s post-impeachment career 
                                                          





was his reactive run for the United States Senate just one year after the impeachment. At 
the next regular session in May 1930, the Legislature refused to endorse Long’s programme. 
Two weeks later Long announced that he was running for the US Senate seat in opposition 
to the veteran senator Joseph Ransdell. While Long had planned his political career as 
progression from a local state office, followed by the Louisiana governor’s office, via US 
Senate to the presidency, he did not specifically identify a timeline for each stage of the 
progression, but he also did not waiver from this pathway. When, in 1924, Long’s run for 
governor failed, he did not seek to pursue alternative routes and instead worked to achieve 
the office at the next available election in 1928. This rigid adherence to his prescribed career 
plan, suggests that Long was more likely to remain faithful to his route to the presidency than 
change direction when challenges occurred or circumstances changed. As such, his run for 
the US Senate in 1930, just two years into his term as governor, represents a significant 
deviation from his planned career pathway. In further confirmation that this run was not a 
departure from his plan, but a reaction to events, Long remained as Louisiana’s governor for 
almost his full term of office. At this stage in his career, Long had also begun to reframe the 
context of his defeats, with the impeachment increasingly being formulated as validation and 
vindication rather than condemnation.  
Significance of work 
In a time when impeachment is a significant feature in the zeitgeist of United States politics 
at all levels, this work offers a perspective on the causes and impacts of impeachment on a 
significant character in US political history. Over a two month period in the spring of 1929, 
Huey P Long joined the very small group of US governors to be impeached. A rarely used 
political tool, impeachment is nonetheless a formal and crucial form of censure for US 
politicians. The serious outcomes of impeachment are not restricted to ending the term of 
office of a politician, they are potentially career-limiting and possibly risk criminal indictments. 
As such, the impact of the 1929 impeachment is of greater consequence than the mere 





Previously, work on the history and political impact of Long has largely ignored his 
impeachment, reporting only the timeline of events and speculating superficially that the 
impeachment may have had an impact on his subsequent character. This work fills a gap in 
the historiography by examining the 1929 impeachment in the context of Long’s personal 
and political career, rather than simply as a minor diversion which occurred during the first 
year of his governorship. To ignore such a significant aspect of Long’s career as his 
impeachment is to underestimate the impact that the crisis had on him, personally and 
politically, and on his subsequent career. This work examines both the factors which caused 
the impeachment, and the influence the impeachment had on his subsequent activities and 
career, and uses archive materials from the papers of Huey P Long, and other contemporary 
political actors in Louisiana, as well as materials from the collections of Long’s son, Russell 
B Long and Long’s principal biographer, T Harry Williams. These materials have either not 
previously been published or have not previously been used in any detailed examination of 
Long’s impeachment. 
Legacy 
Long remains a legendary figure in Louisiana political history, of whom stories continue to be 
told by the taxi drivers of Baton Rouge, as well as by tour guides. A fundamental character in 
the mythology of the Pelican state, Long continues to cast a shadow over state and national 
politics into the twenty-first century. A significant aspect of the Long historiography is the 
mythology that has emerged and surrounded Long since his death. A mythology that 
encompasses his status as a legendary figure, not just in politics in Louisiana, but also in 
state and national history. For many, he was a heroic figure who worked for the poor and 
disadvantaged in the US, but for others, he was a demagogic threat to fundamental political 
structures in the state, and at the national level. This mythological interpretation also 





at LSU do without me?” or “God, don’t let me die. I have so much to do;”58 as well as the 
mystery of the unknown location of the ‘deduct box.’59 Long’s funeral attracted a large crowd 
of 175,000, and he was buried in “a hermetically sealed casket-within-a-casket” in the 
garden outside the state capitol building.60 His grave is marked by a statue of Long standing 
over a carved replica of the capitol building, which is inscribed: 
“Here lies Louisiana’s great son Huey Pierce Long. An unconquered friend 
of the poor who dreamed of the day when the wealth of the land would be 
spread among all the people.”61 
Part of Long’s legacy lies not only in such binary interpretations of him, but also in those 
American politicians in whose tactics and behaviours are exhibited degrees of commonality 
with those of Long. Amongst his contemporaries, parallels may be drawn specifically with 
Governor William ‘Alfalfa Bill’ Murray whose own ideological beliefs were unexpressed in a 
coherent manner and who also sought to position himself as a champion of the people.62 
Analogous relationships may also be drawn to two US senators who, while they came to the 
chamber after Long’s demise, had cultivated aspects of the Louisianian’s techniques, 
Lyndon B Johnson (D-TX, 1949-1961) and Joseph R McCarthy (R-WI, 1947-1957). 
However, the analogies have significant limits. While Long sought to change aspects of 
American life and politics by seeking to break the existing system and, in effect, overthrow 
an entrenched establishment, Johnson and McCarthy both worked from within the system.  
As an aide to Congressman Richard Kleberg during Long’s time in the US Senate, Johnson 
would watch whenever the Louisiana senator addressed the chamber, bribing a page to alert 
him when Long was going to speak. T Harry Williams, author of the pro-Long biography 
Huey Long, identified several points of comparison between the two men, most notably their 
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methods of governing. Both men “prided themselves on their knowledge of detail, of 
everything going on around them, but especially of people, enemies and friends.” It was this 
knowledge that both used to persuade, coerce or control others.63  Both, as Theodore H 
White put it, had a style of communication which would “out-shout, out-dramatize, out-
campaign, out-smile, and out-entertain” his opposition;64 a technique which was 
supplemented by an eclectically broad vocabulary ranging from the poetic to the crude and 
obscene. Both were also inveterate breakers of social and behavioural conventions as well 
as political ones, in order to discomfort or disarm allies and opponents. 
While both Long and Johnson aspired to the presidency, their approaches to achieving their 
goal were significantly different. While Long worked against the establishment, seeking to 
overturn it, Johnson rose from within the system. He was elected to Congress in 1937. He 
served five further terms, with the exception of 1941-42, when he volunteered to serve in the 
US Navy, becoming the first member of Congress to volunteer for active duty when the US 
entered World War II.65 This was in stark contrast to Long who sought a deferment to serving 
during World War I, citing his marital status and his position as a notary public. In 1948, 
Johnson was elected to the US Senate, and in 1953, became the youngest person to serve 
as minority leader at the age of 44.66 Johnson was a party man and Senate insider, whose 
political skills, expertise, hectoring style and ability to work across the aisle made him a 
powerful leader in the party and in Washington. In 1960, Johnson was invited to run as the 
vice presidential candidate to John F Kennedy, thereby balancing the ticket, not just with a 
Southern candidate, but also with experience. Johnson’s relationship with the Kennedys 
echoed that of Long’s with the elites of Louisiana and Roosevelt. Johnson succeeded to the 
presidency on the assassination of Kennedy in 1963. 
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Johnson and Long’s son, Russell, were freshmen senators together, and friends, so when, in 
January 1965, Russell discovered that his election promise to deliver a post office to 
Shreveport had been blocked by the White House, he called the president. On speaking to 
Johnson, he found that the rejection of the project was, in a move reminiscent of Long, in 
retaliation for the failure of Louisiana to vote for Johnson in the 1964 presidential election. In 
a taped recording of their conversation Johnson is heard haranguing Russell, “Those are 
some of the meanest, most vicious people in the United States. Now you help those folks 
that vote for you and stay with you. Let’s don’t reward Shreveport . . . I know your daddy’d 
turn over in his grave and every other Long. He didn’t reward people that way.”67 
Later in this conversation Johnson expounded on how he saw himself as following a similar 
political path to Long, detailing not only his intentions to introduce legislation that would 
benefit poorer Americans, but also his inclination to emulate both Long’s tactics in punishing 
those who opposed him, and his legacy of a political dynasty, 
“I’m a populist just like he was, by God I’m for the poor people, I’m gonna 
pour the education to ‘em, I’m gonna pour the roads to ‘em, I’m gonna pour 
the health to ‘em, and that’s why that every Long that ever put his name on 
the ballot has been elected and that’s what I’m gonna do for the Johnsons 
the rest of my life. I’m for the people and he was but I’m sure as hell not for 
that Shreveport crowd, when they talk about me that way, and you can’t be 
either, you just can’t!”68 
Later that year, when Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans causing eighty-one deaths and a 
quarter of a million people to be evacuated, Russell contacted Johnson to convince him to 
go to Louisiana. On this occasion, Russell positioned his argument as one that would better 
appeal to the president’s ego: 
“Just pick one state up like looking at it – you lost it last time . . .  Just make 
it a stopover. . . . You go to Louisiana right now, land at Moisant Airport. 
[Imagining a news story] ‘The President was very much upset about the 
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horrible destruction and damage done to this city of New Orleans, lovely 
town. The town that everybody loves.’ If you go there right now, Mr. 
President, they couldn’t beat you if Eisenhower ran.”69 
Joseph R McCarthy’s senatorial career was largely unremarkable until, like Long, he 
adopted a single issue which brought him to prominence. While Long’s focus on the 
inequality of the distribution of wealth had led to the Share Our Wealth movement and, with 
it, popular appeal and a national profile which could, potentially, deliver the presidency, 
McCarthy’s focus on un-American activities, notably the threat of communism and 
communist sympathisers, created an environment of fear in Washington and throughout the 
country. In common with Long, McCarthy’s focus on a single issue was designed to bring to 
the attention of the wider public and the press, when, in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, 
in February 1950, he claimed to have a list of 205 names of individuals, then working in the 
State Department, who were known to be members of the Communist Party. Despite 
ultimately being unable to substantiate his accusations against a single government official,70 
McCarthy’s wide-reaching crusade, characterised by aggressive tactics and rhetoric, 
expanded to encompass academia, the entertainment industry and any perceived anti-
American behaviours or traits. The televised hearings of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities accentuated the paranoia of the era, with those appearing before the 
committee condemned by public opinion, irrespective of guilt, simply for refusing to 
incriminate themselves. It is believed that over 2000 government officials lost their 
positions71 and around 1500 people working in the entertainment industry were blacklisted72 
as a result of the investigations. When McCarthy turned his attention to the US Army, public 
support eroded as he “badgered witnesses while ignoring parliamentary procedures and 
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rules of common courtesy.”73 McCarthy was censured by the Senate on 2 December 1954. 
As with Long, McCarthy was affected by the censure vote. Having dominated the political 
environment for four years, the vote removed both his power and his status.74 An alcoholic, 
who had engaged in a brawl with journalist Drew Pearson in 1950 in a cloakroom of the 
Sulgrave Club,75 McCarthy died of liver failure in 1957.  
The legacy of Long’s impeachment is that it demonstrated what was possible and what could 
be achieved by working against the expectations and conventions of politics as normal. 
Conventional wisdom suggested that Long would be cowed by the attempts to chastise him, 
but on each occasion he emerged invigorated. While the 1929 impeachment represented the 
closest point at which he came to admitting defeat, his subsequent success in overturning 
the crisis was not the sole aspect which remained with him. For Long, the lasting impact was 
his ability, thereafter, to turn each attempt at opposition to his advantage, instead he 
portrayed efforts by the entrenched establishment to censure him into vindication and 
validation for his programmes and activities. 
Since Long’s death, there have been a number of US politicians who have adopted aspects 
of his techniques and behaviours, and, increasingly there have been those who have, 
wittingly or unwittingly, adopted his position that to achieve change it is necessary to work 
against the traditions of the establishment. Since the beginning of the 2016 presidential 
campaign, commentators have drawn analogies between both Bernie Sanders76 and Donald 
J Trump,77 and Huey P Long. Certainly both Trump and Long espoused political populistic 
messages designed to appeal to the masses at times in United States history when the 
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country appeared to be more divided than ever before. In their proclivity to emotive and 
populistic rhetoric, their appropriation of the latest in technological systems of 
communication and their unbridled ambition to hold the office of the President of the United 
States of America, Long and Trump appear to have a number of areas of commonalty, 
including their dysfunctional relationship with the news media, their difficulties in 
implementing their legislative agenda, and the cloud of investigation and threat of 
impeachment which permeates their tenures.  
Long’s ideology 
The most significant problem for commentators, historians and biographers has been how to 
contextualise Long within the spectrum of ideological tropes. This issue has led to him being 
characterised as anywhere along the spectrum from fascism to communism and socialism, 
via populism and progressivism. Long, however, was not inclined to adhere to a system of 
belief which necessarily tied him to the beliefs, structures and programmes of others, 
claiming instead not to have any ideological affinity. Rather than a specific adherence to one 
ideology, Long cannibalised aspects of a variety of belief systems as personally suited his 
agenda. He claimed he was sui generis, one of a kind who, by that definition, could not be 
pigeonholed with others. This explanation, in part, provides the context for his membership 
of the Democratic Party in Louisiana. As with others in the South, Louisiana was a one-party 
state in which the only route to political success was through membership of the Democratic 
Party. However, Long’s iconoclastic approach to the traditional, elite-led structures and 
factions of the party demonstrated a determination to challenge the status quo. He was 
inclined to challenge the elite leadership, aligning instead with the people of the state who 
were essentially unrepresented by those in power. This much vaunted sympathy for the 
masses had its basis in his upbringing in Winn Parish, in the north of the state. While Long 
never acknowledged that his beliefs were in any way influenced by the political preferences 
which had been prevalent in Winn Parish, a populist stronghold in the 1890s, his 





progressive tropes. Instead of an articulation of an ideology, Long’s was a practical 
demonstration of a personal belief system, one which worked for him and for the voters who 
would deliver him his electoral goals. 
Key to understanding Long’s belief system, is his lack of tolerance for the restrictions of 
systemic ideological thought. While there is a strain of populism running through his politics, 
Long was inclined to a more flexible approach to ideology, adopting only those aspects of 
doctrinal thought that best suited him and his agenda. Throughout his career, Long had two 
primary focuses, self-promotion and his appeal to the masses. As such, an adherence to a 
specific ideology was a disadvantage and restrictive. His appeal to the people of Louisiana 
was tied to their perception that he would get things done, and not bound to an 
understanding that his ability to do things was limited by ideological ideals. The freedom to 
interpret the needs and wants of the people ensured that Long could not only circumvent any 
limiting restrictions imposed by the Democratic Party in Louisiana or any other organisation, 
but it also allowed him free rein to translate those needs as best suited him, and offered him 
the opportunity to utilise his unique skill-set to break through the entrenched establishment 
to create a real impact.  
Although not an anti-capitalist when it came to his personal business activities, Long 
consistently opposed big business and corporations throughout his career. As the Public 
Service Commissioner, while his primary goal was the need to create and expand his 
political image across the state to promote his political career, his work was consistently anti-
corporation. The outcomes of these actions did much to raise his profile with the people of 
the state, who had, to a degree, benefited from his interventions with the Cumberland 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, the railroad companies and the oil companies. As 
governor, his infrastructure programme for the state, focussing on highways, bridge building, 
the erection of a new capitol building, and a replacement governor’s mansion as a way to 





school book programme, while controversial, targeted all children in the state irrespective of 
creed or colour. Such progressive programmes were as much for the development of the 
state as they were vanity projects for Long. The capitol building was to be the tallest 
skyscraper in the country, while the new governor’s mansion resembled the White House, 
only larger, and the school book programme became a tool with which to blackmail 
recalcitrant opponents when he opposed their programmes.78 
The most constant aspect of Long’s political programme was his vocal support and 
promotion of a wealth redistribution agenda. Throughout his career, from the early 
suggestion, in a letter to the Shreveport Times in January 1919, that the concentration of 
wealth was the “greatest asset to Bolshevism in America,”79 to the call for a “Share Our 
Wealth” scheme on national radio in February 1934, enforced wealth limitation and 
redistribution was Long’s signature policy. While economically impractical, the lure of a 
home, car and radio and a guaranteed annual income of $2000, to be funded by capping 
personal fortunes at $5million and annual incomes at $1million, was enticing to masses in 
America suffering poverty, homelessness and starvation as a result of the Great Depression. 
Such was the appeal of the movement that individual Share Our Wealth clubs were set up 
across the nation, enrolling over 3 million members in its first year.80 While these clubs were 
not politically aligned to Long, the movement was considered to be a sufficiently broad and 
serious political threat to prompt Roosevelt to nullify it by passing a second raft of New Deal 
proposals: the Social Security Act, signed in August 1935, guaranteed pensions and 
introduced a system of unemployment insurance and support to care for dependent children; 
the Works Progress Administration (WPA) created in April 1935, provided jobs for the 
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unemployed, including on public building projects; and the National Labor Relations Board 
was created in July 1935 to oversee union elections and ensure fair treatment for workers.81 
In tandem with this individualistic sense of self, whether encapsulated as a personal belief 
system or as an iconoclastic challenge to the establishment, grew Long’s increasingly 
dominant obsession with personal and political power. He claimed that to achieve anything, 
he had to be more ruthless than his opposition; a position which was both cyclical and self-
perpetuating. However, it was this position that increasingly became the core modus 
operandi of Long’s activities. The need to control and dominate others, to acquire and retain 
political power ultimately superseded any ideological style of commitment that he had 
previously held.  
Thesis Structure 
While utilising a chronological structure for this thesis would provide a sequential exploration 
of Long’s life, and politics, up to his impeachment, it would also have replicated the 
biographies which have previously under-examined the significance of the impeachment. 
The structure of this thesis uses a thematic model to identify, examine and characterise the 
factors which combined to create the environment in which Long faced impeachment in 
1929. 
First, this thesis examines the status of Long studies and impeachment studies, particularly 
gubernatorial impeachment, to contextualise this work. The following chapters focus on each 
of the factors which combined to create an environment in which, in March 1929, 
impeachment became the only option for Long’s opponents.  
Chapter two addresses Long’s self-designation as sui generis and the assumption that he 
was an exceptional politician in a series of case studies, which provide a frame of reference 
for Long’s governorship as a Louisianian and Southern politician. The case studies chosen 






as comparators for Long as a Southern governor come from two states which had recently 
impeached their governors, Texas and Oklahoma. These states also produced governors 
who exemplify the term ‘character,’ that is a distinctive and original individual whose life and 
term in political office may present as unusual for their time period and location. Texas’s 
Miriam ‘Ma’ and James ‘Pa’ Ferguson and Oklahoma’s Henry S Johnston and William 
‘Alfalfa Bill’ Murray will be used to provide context and comparison to Long. As both a 
political ally and, then virulent, opponent, Governor John M Parker of Louisiana also 
provides a notable juxtaposition to Long. 
In chapter three, Long’s climb to prominence is explored through his self-determined career 
pathway and through his accumulation of political and personal power. As a young man, 
Long declared both his intention to become president of the United States and his intended 
route to the White House. His career was characterised by his adherence to this pathway, 
the local state office (Public Service Commissioner), governor of Louisiana, United States 
Senator and, in the year of his death, he appeared to be preparing for a run for the 
presidency. Until 1930, Long’s career progression reflected his pre-determined career 
ladder. With two years remaining on his term of office as governor, Long announced that he 
would run in the 1930 US Senate race against the incumbent, Senator Joseph Ransdell. 
However, Long’s determination to remain in Louisiana as governor, adopting the title 
“Governor and Senator-elect,” suggests that this race was statement on the opposition he 
had faced and a reassertion of domination, rather than an attempt to escape the scene of his 
embarrassing defeats.  
During his lifetime and in subsequent assessments of Long, commentators, biographers and 
historians have attempted to categorise him as adhering to one single ideological tenet, 
ranging from fascism, communism, socialism, and populism. Chapter four examines Long’s 
motivations behind his political career and determines that Long’s personal sense of 





ideological beliefs systems supported by others. This is not to suggest that he did not 
incorporate aspects of contemporary ideological tropes in his political programmes; his 
programmes and actions drew from aspects of different contemporary ideologies, a 
technique which contributed in no small part to the confusion amongst commentators and 
academics. His political activities demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism in its approach, 
most notably through his membership of the Louisiana Democratic Party. Long’s code of 
belief lay primarily in his perception of his own uniqueness and his perspective that he 
embodied the beliefs of the masses of Louisiana, whose views had not been represented by 
the political elites who had previously held the power in the state. 
Throughout his life and career, Long exhibited a propensity to attract, encourage, and 
develop enmities and enemies beyond the conventional expectations of politics in Louisiana 
and on the national scene in the United States. Chapter five examines Long’s proclivity to 
interpret opposition, however constructive or well-intentioned, as enmity. While he did 
demonstrate the ability to work within the traditional factional norms of Louisiana politics, he 
disregarded accepted practices and established himself as a challenge to the status quo. 
This tendency to antagonise others was not limited to the political sphere. Long’s 
relationships with his siblings indicate a long-seated disposition to place himself as separate 
from any restrictive organisation that may have imposed controls upon him, whether this was 
as a family member or as a member of the Louisiana Democratic Party. 
By structuring this thesis on a thematic basis, each of the factors which coalesced to bring 
about Long’s impeachment in March 1929 are fully examined as individual aspects of Long, 
his life and his political career. Each recurring characteristic is explored and is demonstrated 
to be a pattern of behaviour which is repeated throughout Long’s life. The biographical 
perspective of Long’s career, while presenting a chronological report of the story of his life, 
has failed to recognise the repetition of these patterns, and, as such, has mistakenly 









Historians and the Impeachment of Huey P Long 
 
For a politician who was a single term governor and served fewer than four years as US 
Senator, Huey P Long had a wider impact than the status of his political offices infers, and 
he remains a significant factor in Louisiana politics more than eight decades after his death. 
While the direct effects and ramifications of his time as governor have waned, specifically 
with one-party factional politics giving way to a two party system in the state, politicians and 
commentators continue to refer to his legacy as having an influence on the political, 
economic, structural, and cultural condition of the state through to the twenty-first century.1 
Although a great deal has been written about Long, aspects of his life and career remain 
under-examined. In general texts on United States history, exceptionally for a Louisianian 
politician with his level of experience and milieu, Long continues to be mentioned either as a 
factor, with Father Charles Coughlin and Dr Francis Townsend, in influencing the leftwards 
swing of the New Deal in 1935 or as a force for an emerging dictatorship in the US.2 By 
contextualising Long in these ways, general historical reports have effectively limited the 
portrayal of him to a potential threat to President Franklin D Roosevelt’s re-election 
                                                          
1 In an appeal for a new state constitution which would be more conducive to the economic 
development of the state, Stephen Waguespack, president of the Louisiana Association of Business 
and Industry, claimed the state had been “handcuffed since 1932 by the ‘share the wealth’ politics of 
Huey P Long.” Drew Broach “Forget the Legislature; what Louisiana needs is a new Constitution, 
business activists say” Times-Picayune 28 February 2018 
https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2018/02/louisiana_constitutional_conve_1.html 
2 Philip Jenkins A History of the United States 2nd edition (2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke & 




campaign in 1936.3 While, James A Farley would later minimise this specific risk as more 
likely to have been “a source of annoyance rather than a threat,” he did acknowledge that a 
third party movement might have been the balance of power in the election.4 Despite this 
generalised assessment, specific episodes in the career of Long, including the impact of his 
Senatorial filibusters and the influence of his Share Our Wealth movement on the 
programmes of the Roosevelt administration, and his unprecedented level of control in his 
home state, have garnered academic attention; however, in order that Long may be fully 
assessed and understood within his political and historical context, other facets of his life 
and career still require further examination. One feature of Long’s history which has not 
previously attracted academic attention, and which will be examined here, is his relationship 
with impeachment, specifically his impeachment as governor in 1929.  
The majority of academic work on Long has underplayed the importance of his impeachment 
as governor of Louisiana in March 1929. Since the major focus of these studies is within the 
realm of biography, the impeachment has previously been treated as a minor episode in his 
gubernatorial career; one which has been discussed purely in the context of whether or not 
the impeachment had an impact on his character and personality. As such, examinations of 
the impeachment have previously failed to consider whether it was predicated not just on 
Long’s actions during the March 1929 special sessions of the Louisiana State Legislature but 
in combination with the cumulative effect of his actions and behaviours throughout his 
career. This study will focus on this gap in the Long historiography, using previously 
unpublished archive materials relating to this under-explored area, to offer an alternative and 
wider perspective on the causes of the impeachment. It will address the impeachment of 
Long as an episode which had its origins in Long’s previous actions and behaviours and it 
will argue that for Long, not only was impeachment a predictable outcome of his political 
career, but that in March 1929 it had become inescapable, as the confluence of events had 
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provided his opponents in Louisiana with the most opportune moment for a potentially 
successful outcome. A retrospective assessment could suggest that it was inevitable that 
Long would be impeached, as that eventuality occurred in 1929. Since ‘inevitable’ suggests 
that something is predestined, and an impeachment requires a number of factors to coincide 
and for individuals to collaborate to bring about the action, there is an implicit degree of 
uncertainty tied to the potentiality of such proceedings. However, Long’s history of facing 
criticism and censure, prior to and after the 1929 action, combined with his behaviours and 
actions infer a career in which impeachment, if it was not inevitable, was at the very least a 
predictable outcome.  
While the threat of impeachment has been used as a politically motivated tool of censure 
throughout United States political history, actual incidents of impeachment have remained 
relatively rare. When, in a speech to the United States Senate in early 1934, Long said that 
he had never held a political office without being under the threat of removal or 
impeachment, and that he did not expect to be, it was not simply, as T Harry Williams stated, 
a frustrated expression of Long’s modus operandi and his cyclical pattern of behaviour, that 
he had to be ruthless because the opposition were ruthless.5 It was a statement which 
articulated the degree to which Long saw the threat to remove him from the US Senate as a 
continuation of a persistent pattern of opposition which had been present at all stages of his 
political career, from the threat to remove him as a member of the Public Service 
Commission in 1921, via his impeachment as governor in March 1929, to the investigations 
into alleged fraud in the Broussard-Overton Senate campaign in 1932. Long is often 
described as an experienced political operative and yet throughout his career he made 
errors of both judgement and policy which suggest either inexperience or a wilful disregard 
for the accepted norms and traditions of American politics. When he spoke to the US Senate 
in 1934, he appeared to be railing against the constant challenges and investigations of him 
by his opponents. However, an alternative interpretation of Long’s behaviour, is that by this 
                                                          




point in his career, he had come to expect the threat of impeachment and had come to 
regard it as a vindication and validation of his actions and programmes. He could, therefore, 
demonstrate to his constituency across the nation that the persistent and vituperative attacks 
of his opponents meant that he had been justified in his actions; if his opponents were trying 
to stop him then he must be doing something right.  
When the Legislature of Louisiana impeached Long after only ten months in office, not only 
did it bring to a crisis point his political and personal career, it also represented the 
culmination of his career and activities thus far. This thesis examines those factors which 
had created, in Long, a state executive officer so reviled by his political and personal 
opponents that, early in his term of office, impeachment had become the only solution. In 
isolation each of these factors provided potential causes for impeachment in 1929. Together 
these factors ensured that impeachment was, if not inevitable, it was predictable.  
Historiography 
While books and articles specifically about Long or about Louisiana emphasise his 
importance in Louisiana’s politics, society and history, he fares poorly in general books on 
American history. In his review of Huey Long, William G Carleton questioned why “a one-
term governor and one-term senator of a state not usually conspicuous in national politics” 
had been accorded what he calls a biography  
“exhaustive in its coverage and definitive in its scholarship, and it is of a 
size usually reserved for famous national statesmen of long standing, 
including the more notable of the presidents.”6  
In more generalised historical and political texts, Long is often reduced to a caricature, the 
flamboyant buffoon who concealed, behind a façade, the “shrewd lawyer and consummate 
politician.”7 As part of his work on political families, Stephen Hess describes Long as being 
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“designed for writers and cartoonists.”8 Hess’s work explores Long and his family in greater 
detail than many of the non-specialist works, and he identifies Long as “the colossus; without 
him there could have been no dynasty,”9 although a less likely example of a dynastic 
‘founding father’ than Long it is difficult to imagine. 
However, it is in David Reynolds’ America - Empire of Liberty (2009) that Long’s impact at 
the national level of American politics is both simultaneously contextualised and 
acknowledged. It is only by implication, through the positioning of his two sentences on Long 
(including the chorus to Ev’ry man a king) immediately before his comment  
“[so] in 1935 the president shifted leftward to reflect the mounting pressures 
in Congress and the country”10  
that Reynolds demonstrates a sense of the degree to which Long’s Share Our Wealth 
campaign had forced Roosevelt’s administration to move to counter the threat of alternative 
popular financial solutions to the Depression. It is in this aspect of Long that Carleton’s query 
regarding the size of Williams’ biography is answered. It is Long’s influence and impact at 
the state and national level, especially as a member of the triumvirate of proponents of 
economic redistribution and critics of Roosevelt’s New Deal with Father Charles Coughlin 
and Dr Francis Townsend, albeit in a relatively small way with wide consequences, which 
justifies the fascination with his life and politics. 
The ‘autobiographies’ of Huey P Long 
Two key pieces of the Long historiography are his 1933 autobiography, Every Man A King 
and his posthumously published ‘predictive’ My First Days In The White House (1935). Both 
are pieces of political theatre and were written solely as campaign tools. While both texts are 
credited to Long, there is anecdotal evidence that he used a ghost writer. Chick Frampton 
claimed that while Long had dictated most of Every Man A King, he had also used Eleanor 
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Roosevelt’s ghost writer for the book, a connection which he gleefully boasted about, but 
with the caveat that Frampton was “pledged to secrecy.”11 Frampton is also the source that 
identified Ray Daniel, a journalist with the New York Times, as the author of My First Days In 
The White House.12 
In his conclusion to “The Veto of the Imagination – A Theory of Autobiography,” Louis A 
Renza proposes that autobiography is “an endless prelude: a beginning without middle (the 
realm of fiction), or without end (the realm of history); a purely fragmentary, incomplete 
literary project.”13 When Every Man a King was published in 1933, Long was 40 years old 
and a United States Senator; certainly at that time it would have been reasonable to assume 
that Long’s life, if not necessarily his political career, had some time yet to run. As such, the 
publication of an autobiography, which would inevitably portray only the start of national 
political career, must have had a purpose other than a reflective review of a life. A possible 
key to the publication of an autobiography is in the timing; while Long had now taken up his 
seat in the US Senate and was simultaneously retaining control of power in Louisiana, he did 
not yet have the truly national persona that would be necessary to propel him to the White 
House. In the context of an intended presidential campaign, the purpose of Every Man a 
King was both to widen Long’s constituency (something which would be aided by the Share 
Our Wealth campaign) and also to promote to this new audience a more sympathetic version 
of his life and career than may have been published previously. In the national media, stories 
such as his championing of the dunkers’ side in the potlikker debate in the Atlanta 
Constitution14 and his meeting with the commander of the German cruiser, Emden, while 
dressed in green silk pyjamas, had served only to present Long to the wider United States 
as clown or buffoon. His image was not that of someone with the dignity appropriate to hold 
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the office of president of the United States of America. As Renza concludes, autobiography 
“is neither fictive nor non-fictive, [it is] a unique, self-defining mode of self-referential 
expression;”15 Long’s autobiographical definition of himself is a political campaign tool which 
was designed to solicit the sympathy and support of a constituency against their mutual 
enemies, such as big business. In his assessment of Every Man a King, Williams concurs 
with Renza’s concept of autobiography as prelude,  
From the point of view of literary artistry, it had a shortcoming it was 
incomplete. . . The author was obviously going to write another 
instalment.16 
That Long intended his autobiography as a piece of campaign material to enhance his 
reputation across the country is confirmed in part by the way in which the book was released 
in October 1933: despite being “sold-out in two hours” on a Chicago newsstand, the book 
was only distributed to “a few friends” in Louisiana and no date was set for when it would be 
available to his fellow Louisianians.17  
Long’s second book was even more clearly meant to be propaganda. My First Days in The 
White House offers a predictive account of Long’s acclaimed ascension to the presidency in 
1936, with the foreword stating,  
“This book has been published in good faith, without malice, but with a 
desire to present to its readers a future America under the guidance of its 
Author.”18  
Long’s utopian vision of himself reuniting the country with a bipartisan cabinet, including 
Franklin D Roosevelt (Secretary of the Navy), Herbert Hoover (Secretary of Commerce)19 
and Alfred E Smith (Director of the Budget, which Long would elevate to a Cabinet post),20 
was presumably designed to support his proposed strategy to be elected as the Share Our 
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Wealth candidate.21 The book itself, with its illustrations of Long’s opponents taking up their 
new roles, was designed as a challenge the status quo of the US. It suggests that through 
Long’s leadership, Depression era problems could be solved by reimagining US politics 
beyond partisan agendas, with Long, the country’s saviour, at the helm of government and 
those who had preceded him in the office portrayed as reluctant allies who are persuaded to 
accept the posts in his cabinet because they were no longer in positions of power or 
influence: 
“‘Why, I am a former President of the United States, and it’s a terrible step 
down for me to be asked to serve in your cabinet,’ he replied. 
‘Now let me put you straight,’ I said. ‘You say you are being embarrassed 
because, as a former President of the United States, it would be a step 
down for you to serve as a cabinet officer under another President. Just 
what is your position in public life today, Mr. Hoover?’”22  
While the humiliation implicit in his proposals, to make former presidents his subordinates, 
was balanced by the suggestion that they were being appointed “as men with vision and 
capacity to administer big jobs,”23 Long makes it clear in this tale that these men were 
working for him. “What do I care whether they agree with one another?”24 he wrote, 
indicating that any animosity that existed between them would be irrelevant since they would 
be working to his agenda and under his direction. 
Biographical assessments 
The historiography and academic study of Huey P Long is reflective of the dichotomous 
relationship that Long had with the people of Louisiana during his terms in political office. 
Just as there were those who revered him and those who abhorred him, so academic 
assessments of him also fall into two camps. The orthodox assessment designates Long as 
a power-hungry corrupt official, whose domination of Louisiana was that of a dictator. The 
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revisionist view assesses him as an essentially benevolent politician who worked for the 
good of the people of Louisiana, and whose tactics were justified by his achievements, and 
by the unique environment of Louisiana politics. An additional factor which exists within the 
Long literature is the dominance of T Harry Williams’ biography Huey Long (1969). Based on 
oral history methodology, Huey Long tends to be used as the standard work on Long. The 
predominant revisionist piece on Long, Huey Long has established its approach as the 
orthodoxy, and is disproportionately influential in the academic discourse. It is the standard 
work against which all subsequent works are compared and contrasted.25 However, the 
book’s importance lies not only in its detailed contents, but also in the response to it and the 
influence it continues to hold over studies of Long. The emergence of the neo-orthodox 
assessments in reaction to Williams’ sympathetic thesis, which have dominated the 
discourse since the 1980s, are testament not only to the persuasiveness of the original 
assessments of Long but also to the creation of a second historiography within Long 
literature: the historiography of T Harry Williams’ Huey Long.  
Chronologically, it is the orthodox interpretation of Long which dominates the historiography 
until the late-1960s and the revisionism introduced by Williams’ Huey Long. That the anti-
Long discourse was so prevalent for over 30 years following Long’s death, is not unexpected 
when one considers the demographics and resources of pro and anti-Long supporters. Long 
owed much of his electoral popularity to the poor and uneducated. Many of Long’s 
opponents came from the political elite in Louisiana; especially those who had dominated 
politics in the decades prior to Long’s ascendency.   
When it was first published on 1 April 1933,26 six months before Long’s own autobiography, 
Webster Smith’s The Kingfish – A Biography of Huey P. Long had the subtitle: The curious 
tale of the life and adventures of Huey P. Long, which suggested, to at least one 
contemporary reviewer, that the author had put “his tongue in his cheek and a so help me, 
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it’s true expression on his face”27 in order to tell the story of Long’s life to date. While not the 
work of one of Long’s admirers, the tone of the book is an almost gossipy recitation of Long’s 
activities rather than a purely antagonistic one, but Smith does seek to alert his readers to 
the potential danger that he believed Long appeared to represent. Despite its tone, Smith 
does dedicate almost one hundred pages of his 286 page work to a report of the events 
during the 1929 impeachment. However, while Smith recognised that the impeachment and 
its immediate aftermath had caused a “terrible strain on Huey,” it was his opinion that once 
elected as US Senator, Long had begun to make “overtures, unexpectedly generous, to his 
political enemies,” because he now “felt safe, and he wanted peace.”28 Despite this 
assertion, Smith’s reports on Long’s activities in the period after the Senate election 
emphasise instead that his intention was to consolidate his control in the state rather than to 
initiate a reconciliation. In his summary, Smith appears ambivalent about Long’s future, 
questioning whether he would “continue his meteoric rise.” He counters Long’s success thus 
far with a catalogue of the “cries from people and press, cries of demagogue and crook and 
boor and communist,”29 which had been raised against him, thereby suggesting that a 
continuation of what had gone before was indicative of a possible future. Smith addresses 
the question of a President Long to his readers, demanding that they consider whether 
“hundreds of thousands of Louisianians cannot all be wrong.”30    
One of the first texts on Long to be published after his death, Harnett T Kane’s Louisiana 
Hayride – The American Rehearsal for Dictatorship 1928-1940, not only reviews Long’s 
career and time in power but it also attempts to contextualise the impact of and experience 
of the post-Long era from the viewpoint of 1941. As an academic text it is journalistic in style 
and frustratingly short on references and sources for quotes, but it offers a clear example of 
the contemporary status of the Long historiography – virulently negative. Kane also suggests 
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that Long gained power because of the failures of the Louisianian state system and clearly 
links Long’s political iconoclasm and mass popular appeal to the European fascist dictators 
of the 1930s.  
T Harry Williams’ biography created a new academic discourse and debate about Long by 
offering an alternative assessment of the Louisianian senator, his politics, life and activities 
to that which had dominated the discourse since his death in 1935. Williams’ work echoes 
Long’s personal and political popularity, by having its basis in almost 300 interviews with 
individuals who had known him. Part of the praise for Williams’ book is for his exemplary use 
of oral history techniques to collect and collate his information, a methodology made 
necessary due to the unavailability of Long’s papers. As an introductory text on Long, 
Williams’ Huey Long presents the reader with a puzzle. The text is detailed, extensive and 
overwhelmingly pro-Long and yet there is a sense that the author is not entirely convinced 
by his own arguments. The background to the writing of this book may explain this apparent 
lack of conviction when one takes into account the interactions between Williams and Long’s 
son, Senator Russell B Long, over access to interviewees and funding for the project. A 
number of critics have suggested, without openly claiming collusion, that this connection 
does, to some degree, taint the independence of Williams’ work. In his preface, Williams 
addresses the issue, detailing the interactions and agreements he had with Russell prior to 
the commencement of his work, in an attempt to dispel any accusations of a collaboration. 
Yet, despite these claims, Williams’ statement made it clear that he was indebted to Russell 
in both monetary terms (contributions to research grants)31 and for the encouragement he 
had given to Long’s followers to cooperate with Professor Williams.32 The degree to which 
Williams was beholden to Russell, however, is made more clearly evident through the letters 
exchanged between them. The letters, including those discussing the financial arrangements 
for Williams’ work on the biography, form part of the Russell B Long Collection held at 
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Louisiana State University and have not previously been published. In October 1955, 
Williams clearly articulated the problem and proposed a solution:  
“The reason for having an agency disburse the finances is to place an 
intermediary between you and me for our mutual protection . . .  Again, if 
you were to advance me financial assistance and I should return part of it, 
the impression would gain credence that you had engaged me to express a 
particular viewpoint. Neither of [us] can afford to let that happen. I think we 
are agreed that a biography of your father will have to be objective. We 
must not give any possible critics the smallest chance to charge 
otherwise.”33   
This letter is one of a series between Williams and Russell in 1955 and 1956 regarding the 
arrangements for the financing of Williams’ work. The text suggests that Williams wanted to 
avoid any suggestion that Russell had, by providing funding of $10,000, influenced the 
content, tone and discussion in the work. The solution, which was agreed upon by early 
1956, sought to circumvent the allegation of collusion and placed the fund with the American 
History Research Center, which would “select” T Harry Williams to carry out the work: 
First, you would deposit a sum with the Center to have somebody do a life 
of your father. The Center would then pick me to do it. In this way I would 
be financed by the Center instead of by you, and nobody could charge that 
you and I were in cahoots to do a cooked up work.34 
Other letters in the collection demonstrate the degree to which Russell actively acted as an 
intermediary to persuade his father’s associates to work with the biographer. In March 1961, 
Williams wrote that he wanted to meet with Judge Tom Hood and William Burton and asked 
if “a letter from [Russell] to them [would] help?”35 In his letter to Hood, Russell urged him “to 
give Harry Williams your full cooperation because I am satisfied that it will, in all likelihood, 
result in something of enduring value to the Long name.”36 In this letter, Russell is explicit in 
his condemnation of previous biographies of his father, which had “failed miserably, primarily 
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because their source of material was limited to the biased newspaper accounts of the 
period.”37 This letter also confirms the degree of influence that Russell had over the process 
in which the idea of the biography was cultivated. He stated 
“I went to considerable effort to encourage the University to permit 
Professor Williams to have sufficient time that he might undertake this work 
because I believe it is likely to be the first fair and impartial biography of 
Huey Long that has been written.”38 
When Williams carried out the work for his biography, Russell believed that a substantial 
body of his father’s papers did not exist. As a result, the oral history methodology was used 
to collate the memories of almost 300 people. While impressive in the detail extracted, the 
limitations of this methodology can be found not only in the accuracy of the memories of 
these interviewees, it was also impacted by their personal biases and their willingness, or 
lack thereof, to participate in the exercise. Opinions and memories are subjective, in 
particular those stated at a remove of, at least, 20 years from the events under discussion, 
when hindsight and retrospective assessments have potentially skewed perspectives.   
As Williams was coming to the latter stages of his research, it was revealed that four filing 
cabinets of Long’s papers did exist and were held in archives at Louisiana State University. 
Having reviewed the contents of these folders, Williams recommended that they be 
“classified as Huey P. Long Papers, Public Service Commission File; and Huey P. Long 
Papers, Private Law Cases File,” and he recorded the existence of these papers in his 
biography.39 However, in August 1969, with the manuscript of Huey Long at the printers, 
John M Price, a graduate student at Louisiana State University, discovered several more 
filing cabinets in the basement of the Hill Memorial Library on campus, containing a much 
larger collection of Long papers. Williams and Price’s assessment of this collection reported 
on its contents, including the observation that although many of the folders in this collection 
bore “intriguing titles,” they were empty, the contents having been “removed and probably 
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destroyed.”40 The contents listed included, family correspondence, items relating to both of 
Long’s gubernatorial campaigns, correspondence about the severance tax plus items and 
correspondence relating to the impeachment in 1929. Despite acknowledging that their 
report was based on a preliminary assessment and that the materials required processing 
and further study, Williams declared that while  
“some of the new items [were] of genuine worth. They would not have 
caused [him] to alter materially any section of the account of Long’s career 
or to change any of [his] conclusions.”41  
Although it is likely that Williams’ stance was in part constrained by the knowledge that the 
biography had already been published, in the context of subsequent works on Long, this is a 
crucial statement, especially since, as discussed earlier, assessments produced after 1969 
had been strongly influenced by the tone, direction and content of Williams’ biography.  
One of the benefits of Williams’ detailed approach to biography is that his text contextualises 
his subject matter. In Huey Long, not only does Williams provide detail regarding the 
environment and people surrounding and influencing Long, he supplies assessments of 
contemporary characters and their activities, albeit in a Long-centric format. While the detail 
in the biography is a notable and praiseworthy characteristic, it is also demonstrates one of 
its major faults. Tied by the confidentiality agreements to protect his informants, Williams’ 
reports of conversations and opinions of Long, and the attribution of many of the key details 
of Long, his behaviours and tactics are limited in the footnotes to the catch-all phrase 
“confidential communication.” Williams risked devaluing his own work and minimising the 
credibility both of his informants and his text to protect his sources. This frustration for 
readers and academics was mitigated by Williams, who placed his transcripts into the 
archives at Louisiana State University under a “time seal” that they may “eventually . . . be 
available to other scholars.”42 It is perhaps now time for a revised version of Huey Long to be 
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published with all of Williams’ sources identified, but that is a project outside of the remit of 
this study. 
Williams’ work, though flawed, is such a detailed exploration of the life and death of Long, 
based on oral history methodology, that Max Beloff was led to argue, “it is doubtful whether 
anyone will feel that he has much of importance to add to the portrait.”43 However, Beloff’s 
argument compounds the assumption that Williams’ biography is the recognised standard 
work on Long, while simultaneously failing to recognise the gaps and misinterpretations 
inherent in the piece. Due to perceptions such as Beloff’s, subsequent biographies were 
required to be positioned in the context of, and are inevitably judged against, Huey Long. To 
successfully avoid being defined by the Huey Long historiography, it is necessary for 
academics to focus their attention on specific aspects, incidents or trends of the Long 
experience, rather than on the full length biographical assessments. As David H Bennett and 
Richard Lowitt observed of Alan Brinkley’s Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin 
and the Great Depression, Brinkley is not telling a new or an original tale.44 Instead, by 
positioning both Long and Coughlin in the social context of the Great Depression and by 
taking the unusual step of contrasting the movements and aims of the two men rather than 
simply linking them as a pair of anti-New Deal demagogues, Brinkley has developed a study 
of “radical politics of the thirties”45 which takes Long out of the confines of Louisiana state 
politics and positions him in the national arena. Since Brinkley’s work is not a biography of 
Long, he was able to move the debate on Long forward. 
However, the biography’s lens casts a long shadow which influences even those pieces of 
work focusing on specific incidents. Matthew J Schott identifies Garry Boulard’s 1998 study 
Huey Long Invades New Orleans: The Siege of a City, 1934-36, as an example of the 
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persistent influence of Williams’ Huey Long. Schott argues that the distortion of the Long 
narrative produced by Williams influences academic judgements, to the extent that the 
brutality of Long’s actions are underplayed. Boulard appears to conclude that “if only the 
anti-Longs had wisely and with foresight surrendered all power to the Kingfish, he would 
have been someone other than himself.”46 Michael L Kurtz is equally critical of Boulard’s 
failure to “convey the atmosphere of fear and terror that the man had generated in many 
parts of the state by 1935,”47  a critique which echoes that of Cecil Morgan’s 1970 review of 
the Williams book, that “the pro-Long slant of the author further minimizes the impression of 
fear to the point of its practical obliteration,”48 a fact which Morgan believed to be a major 
error in Williams’ telling of the Long story. However, despite the influence of Williams’ 
biography on the positioning of his work, Boulard’s piece itself, by focussing on this single 
incident, expands the knowledge of the Long era, of Long’s dominance of Louisiana, of his 
interactions with other players of the era and of the New Orleans machine. 
Another work which focusses on a specific aspect of Long, is Richard C Cortner’s The 
Kingfish and the Constitution: Huey Long, the First Amendment, and the Emergence of 
Modern Press Freedom in America. This work is, primarily, an examination of the relevance 
of Grosjean vs American Press Co (1936)49 in the development of constitutional law in 
respect of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although one of the few texts dealing 
specifically with Long’s relationship with the newspapers, Cortner’s work adds little to the 
Long canon, repeating much that has been explored elsewhere, in particular in the Williams 
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text. The strengths of his book, however, lie in Cortner’s examination of the specifics of the 
Grosjean case. Cortner has established what Roger Handberg calls a “research niche” by 
examining in depth landmark cases in constitutional law,50 and his argument is that Grosjean 
vs American Press Co (1936) is a landmark case in the development of the freedom of the 
press and first amendment constitutional law. However, it is instead a case which, while 
important, built on the precedent setting decisions of Near vs Minnesota (1931)51 and which 
then forms the basis for the continuing debate about freedom of expression.52 
In his examination of the Grosjean case, Cortner places it in the context of 1930s Louisiana 
and specifically the Louisiana ruled by Long.53 In reviews of his book, there is a great deal of 
praise for Cortner’s detailed examination of the Louisianian newspapers (especially every 
edition of the Louisiana/American Progress) and legal records;54 an attention to detail which 
is diminished by Cortner’s reliance on secondary sources for his contextual material, 
especially biographies of Long. Long had attracted the support of some of the state’s daily 
newspapers in his early years in office but when the mutual antipathy with the daily papers 
grew, he had retained the support of the weekly newspapers.55 Cortner fails to explore both 
Long’s popularity and this disparity in his relationship with the daily newspapers and the 
weekly editions, and the differences between the city publications and those from the 
country. In an in-depth assessment of the Grosjean case, Cortner attempts to place the case 
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in the context of the wider relationship between Long and the newspapers of Louisiana. His 
vignettes of the personalities involved in each stage of the events both add and detract from 
his overall messages. While it is useful to get a sense of the backgrounds and political 
motivations of the actors, this technique does give an impression of padding the story as if 
the main topic lacks sufficient substance. In his preface, Richard Cortner acknowledges that 
his research for his book had brought him to the conclusion that the orthodox assessment of 
Long was the correct one, an acknowledgement which is generally backed up by the tone of 
his book. This perspective detracts from Cortner’s work in one of the under-examined areas 
of Long’s political life – his relationship with the Louisianian daily press. While some 
reviewers recognised the limitation of Cortner’s arguments resulting from his negative view 
of Long, others, such as Timothy S Huebner, accept the analysis and perpetuate the 
designation of Long as “one of the great despots of American history.”56  
The historiography of T Harry Williams’ Huey Long 
The contemporary reviews of Huey Long are indicative not only of the debate which would 
emerge in the 1980s as a counter to the revisionist assessment presented by Williams; but 
also of the strong feelings which the work generated in many commentators, especially 
those who had been political opponents of Long in Louisiana. Cecil Morgan, one of the 
leaders of the impeachment proceedings against Long in 1929, reviewed the book for the 
Tulane Law Review. Morgan’s status as a political opponent of Long is acknowledged on the 
third page of the article but it is immediately evident from his opening sentence in which he 
characterises the book as “a story” of Long.57 In his exploration of the weaknesses of 
Williams’ work Allan Sindler echoes Morgan’s categorisation when he too criticises the work 
as “the story”58 of Long and condemns it as an historical account, which does not analyse 
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Long’s term in politics or his impact and influence on the politics of Louisiana;59 a weakness 
which can also be applied to other biographical assessments of Long.   
Glen Jeansonne is one of the most emphatic of the anti-Williams interpreters of Long. In 
“The Apotheosis of Huey Long,” published in 1989, Jeansonne proposes a retrospective 
review of Huey Long arguing that Williams was looking for a way to rehabilitate Long, and 
that the political and academic context of the 1960s offered support for that endeavour.60 
Jeansonne challenges Williams’ assertions about Long by basing his arguments in the 
context of both evidential material, not available to Williams, and on the political and social 
context of the 1970s, which he argues had made Americans less forgiving of a flamboyant 
and “unchecked executive.”61 In comparing Long to Richard M Nixon, Jeansonne perhaps 
takes his analogy too far, although the comparison does serve to demonstrate how unlikely it 
is that Long would have been able to successfully replicate his hold on Louisiana’s power in 
the national context, especially from within the confines of the presidency.  
William Ivy Hair’s The Kingfish and His Realm: The Life and Times of Huey P. Long (1991) is 
perhaps the most easily accessible of the Huey Long historiography. Where Williams’ book 
was written against the background of the scholarly climate of the 1960s which assessed 
historical figures against the ‘great men’ theory irrespective of the immorality of their 
activities;62 for many Hair’s work redressed the balance, re-emphasising the case that Long’s 
obsession with power and control over Louisiana was, in fact, a dictatorship. As Robert E 
Snyder argues, Williams’ benign interpretation of Long “set off colleagues to revise his 
appraisal.”63 As well as using additionally available materials, most notably Long’s papers, 
Hair offers a clear rebuttal of Williams’ thesis, assessing many of the same sources as 
Williams and reaching conclusions about Long which echo the evaluations which had 
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prevailed prior to the publication of Huey Long in 1969. Yet, this reversion to the orthodox 
view did not bring an end to the debate created by Williams. Instead it set the scene for 
further debates and explorations of Long. A fundamental weakness of the Williams book, 
which is repeated by the Hair text, and which further emphasises the link between the two, is 
the lack of assessment of the impact of Long beyond his death. Both books end with the 
assassination and fail to take a broader view of Long’s, and his machine’s, influence on 
Louisiana politics in the decades which followed. 
The most recent biography of Long, Richard D White Jr’s Kingfish: The Reign of Huey P. 
Long (2006) adds so little to “the colourful and familiar story”64 that there are few academic 
reviews of the text. White’s interpretation of Long owes much to the Williams revisionist work 
and was published to coincide with the release of the re-make of All The King’s Men 
(2006).65 The film is an adaptation of Robert Penn Warren’s 1946 novel of the same name. 
Warren always denied that Willie Stark was based on Long, although the fictional governor 
pursues a pathway which echoes that of Long to such a degree that, as Hamilton Basso 
observed, “he may not be intended to represent Huey Long, but it is hard to see how he 
could represent anybody else.”66 As Ladell Payne reports, Warren did acknowledge in 1963 
that without Long “the novel would never have been written.”67 One of the repeated criticisms 
of the revisionist assessments of Long is that they perpetuate a mythology or fictionalisation 
of the Long era which has sanitised the reality. The linking of White’s book to the film of All 
The King’s Men further reinforces the mythology with the inclusion of a special feature on the 
DVD version entitled The Legend and Lore of Huey Long. Commentators on this feature 
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include academics such as White, Alan Brinkley and John C Rodrigue as well as the political 
commentator and Democratic Party strategist, James Carville.68  
From Walt Disney in 1937 to The Simpsons in 2000, Huey P Long has remained a source of 
inspiration for animators in the American film and TV industry.69 During Long’s lifetime there 
is evidence that his charismatic personality was an attraction for the film industry, as can be 
seen in letters regarding a film of Long’s career and life proposed by Warner Brothers in 
1933. Amongst the papers held in the David R McGuire memorial collection in the archives 
at Tulane University are a series of letters relating to a couple of proposed and competing 
film projects about Long’s life and political career: the proposed collaboration between Lin 
Bonner, writer of the “Hollywood Call Sheet” column, Clarke Salmon, editor of the Item-
Tribune, and Long, and another from Warner Brothers. The Warner Brothers project is the 
focus of these letters, with Bonner and Salmon seeking to encourage Long to prevent the 
release, if not the actual making, of the film. While Bonner advised Clarke to get “our friend” 
to stymie the Warner Brothers production by “an attitude of righteous indignation,” 
threatening libel if they “hold an individual up to public scorn etc;”70 Salmon appears to have 
been resigned to the possibility that Long would agree to the Warner Brothers film. Although 
he did suggest to Long that he insist Warner Brothers change their leading man from 
Edward G Robinson to James Cagney since “Cagney is Warner’s best bet just now,” and, 
Salmon wrote 
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“He is red headed and more the type. Robinson has almost always played 
racketeer roles, and his selection for the part is, to my mind, an indication 
that the picture they plan is not in any way complimentary to you.”71   
It is not entirely clear whether this was a sincere, ironic or mischievous suggestion on the 
part of Salmon, as Robinson and Cagney, both then on contract to Warner Brothers, were 
known for playing shady characters and crooks at that time. However, Salmon does appear 
to have been genuine in his advice to Long that the proposed film may be a derogatory 
treatment of him. While a letter and telegram from Warner Brothers’ screenwriter William 
Rankin does not clarify the intent or direction of the film, letters from John D Stephon, the 
editor of Film Opinion and William V Gale do seem to infer that the Warner Brothers film was 
not likely to be entirely favourable to Long;72 both Stephon and Gale proposed alternative 
and separate projects, with Stephon suggesting that this was necessary to make it apparent 
to the public “throughout the country precisely what you stand for in government and other 
aspects of political philosophy.”73  
In the absence of further correspondence, a draft of a script for Kingfish written by Long’s 
secretary Earle J Christenberry and William Rankin, held in the McGuire collection, suggests 
that not only did Long go along with the Warner Brothers’ project, but that a degree of control 
of the project had been negotiated about Hollywood’s representation of Long’s reputation. 
While this film was not made, a sanitised version of the Long story was utilised in a later 
Cagney film, A Lion is in the Streets, including a reference to the rain on election day in 1924 
and a variation of his meeting with Rose McConnell.74 This film was based on Addria Locke 
Langley’s 1945 book of the same name. 
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At every level of federal and state politics in the United States, politicians are subject to the 
constitutional restrictions of their office. Failure to adhere to these conditions puts the office 
holder at risk of removal through formal constitutional processes, such as recalls or 
impeachment. While all American politicians are subject to this oversight, for some 
impeachment may retrospectively be seen as an almost inevitable consequence of the way 
in which they conducted their political careers. Whether the impeachment charges ultimately 
focus on perceived dereliction of duty or alleged criminal behaviour, it may be argued that 
the manner in which a politician interacts with their political environment, the intensity of their 
rhetoric, the scope of their legislative agenda, their treatment of political opponents and 
vested interests, and the way in which they create, shape and present a particular self-image 
will combine to influence their political destiny. The character, behaviour, activities and 
programmes of Huey P Long ensured that impeachment was always a likely consequence of 
his life in politics.  
Long appeared to acknowledge this reality in his own career when, in response to the 1934 
US Senate judiciary committee investigation,75 he wrote in the American Progress: 
“I never held a public office in my life during which I was not under some 
kind of threat of removal or impeachment from the day I went into politics 
until the present day. I have never held one, and I do not expect to hold 
one. I have tried for about sixteen years to have it some other way, and it 
has never been any other way, so now I have stopped trying to have it any 
other way.”76 
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Williams called this “a revealing statement,” a bitter response to the investigation and, he 
further claimed, that Long “had to be ruthless because his enemies were ruthless.”77 It is a 
statement, however, which when brought into the context of Long’s other references to the 
impeachment attempts brought against him, emphasises both the degree to which he 
resented the 1929 impeachment, and the extent to which it was a transformational event in 
his career. Perhaps, more importantly, it is also a piece of political posturing, a deliberately 
disingenuous attempt by which he could utilise the apparently overwhelming opposition to 
him in Louisiana in order to justify his actions and programmes to his supporters. 
Long’s impeachment should first be examined within the frame of reference of impeachment 
in the United States, specifically at gubernatorial level, as well as the history of impeachment 
in Louisiana.  
Definition of impeachment 
As has been discussed elsewhere, notably by Raoul Berger, the federally constituted 
provisions for impeachment are based on the determination of the Framers of the 
Constitution that the American model would not directly replicate the broad provisions of 
eighteenth century English law. So, while the process at both federal and state level in the 
United States of America owes its origins to the English law of impeachment, by separating 
impeachment from criminal proceedings, the Framers took the decision to restrict both its 
scope and its reach.78 In its broadest definition, impeachment in the United States is a 
political procedure to remove an elected official from office. Constitutional limitations restrict 
the process by which this removal is enacted, by whom and for what offences. At the federal 
level, the phraseology of the impeachment clause may retrospectively suggest that the 
Framers intended that impeachable offences are limited to those understood contemporarily 
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as “treason, bribery or high crimes and misdemeanors,” however, as Berger argues, since 
Congress has resisted the need to “supply a code of impeachable offenses” it is clear that 
the intention has since been interpreted to ensure that each incident would be determined 
on a case-by-case basis.79  
The constitutions of the United States of America, at both the state and the federal level, 
detail the broad processes and procedures by which removal may occur, including, to a 
greater or lesser degree, the offences for which impeachment may be deemed to be 
appropriate. The severest punishment available is removal from office, with the corollary 
penalty, disqualification from holding office in future. As such, a political official faces two 
direct outcomes if the impeachment charges against him are upheld:80 removal from office 
and disqualification from holding office in the future. Ancillary outcomes may include criminal 
charges with the subsequent possibility of penal sentencing, and the debasement of one’s 
personal and political reputation and character. If politics is perception,81 then it is not just 
the official sanctions which hold the greatest threat to an elected officer, it is the latter 
outcome which holds possibly the greatest penalty for one who conducts his life in the public 
and political sphere. In the United States of America, impeachment is a rarely utilised 
political tool reserved to remove officials from office. Its rarity does not preclude its use, or 
the threat of it, as a partisan political weapon. At the executive level, there have been two 
impeachments – Andrew Johnson (1868) and William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton (1998-99), 
although the threat of impeachment was sufficient to induce President Richard M Nixon to 
resign in 1974. At the state level, across all 50 states, 238 years and with 2350 holders of 
the office of governor, there have been 17 gubernatorial impeachments.82 Impeachment may 
be a rarely utilised tool but it is not an archaic tool. These seventeen impeachments took 
place from the early nineteenth century through to the twenty first century. 
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While the primary focus of impeachment studies is high profile presidential impeachments, 
studies of gubernatorial impeachments tend to be limited to either a study of an individual 
case or of impeachments within a single state. Comparative or collective studies of 
impeachment at state executive level are few in number. Amongst these few texts, there is a 
lack of consensus on precisely how many gubernatorial impeachments have occurred. 
Andrew McNitt, in his 2011 paper, puts the figure at thirteen.83 A research response for the 
Illinois General Assembly on “Governors’ Impeachments in U.S. History” from July 2008 
states “Fourteen governors have been impeached, including two who were impeached 
twice.”84 McNitt, despite asserting a total of 13 gubernatorial impeachments, lists 14 
governors, including Rob Blagojevich of Illinois, who was impeached in 2009 after the Illinois 
report was published, but excludes William Kellogg of Louisiana, who is included in the 
Illinois report. A cumulative assessment of these two articles suggests that the total of 
governors impeached to 2009 is 15, including Henry S Johnston (Oklahoma) and Harrison 
Reed (Florida), both of whom were impeached twice - a total of seventeen gubernatorial 
impeachments. One possible explanation for the difficulty in determining exactly how many 
cases of gubernatorial impeachment have occurred in United States history is perhaps due 
to the way in which cases are reported. A search of the National Governors Association 
(NGA) website (www.nga.org) for the word “impeach” reveals 43 references on that site.85 A 
review of these references indicates the complications inherent in summarising 
impeachment cases. It is difficult to determine from the brief profiles of governors on the 
NGA website whether the references to impeachment mean that the governor was 
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impeached in the strict sense of the state’s constitution or if impeachment was only 
threatened. There is also a recurring misunderstanding about when an official has been 
impeached, with some observers conflating the impeachment with a guilty verdict. The 
specific definition of the term means that the state’s House of Representatives has brought 
impeachment charges against the governor. A broader examination of the official journals of 
each state Legislature would reveal, at a minimum, how many governors have faced 
impeachment charges and the possibility of a trial by the state senate. Such an examination, 
while outside the purview of this work, if carried out across all of the fifty state Legislatures 
may also reveal how often impeachment or the threat of impeachment was utilised as a 
partisan political tool.86 
The following table lists the twenty seven incidents of threatened, initiated and actual 
gubernatorial impeachment recorded on the National Governors Association website as at 
August 2013. Of these twenty seven incidents, seventeen cases of gubernatorial 
impeachment are listed, including two each for Johnston and Reed. An overview of the 
academic study of impeachment reveals that such articles are primarily published within law 
journals, rather than political science or history publications. One explanation for this trend 
may be the relative rarity of impeachment cases at all levels of United States government, 
which necessarily reduces the possibility for the comparative study of events. Another 
explanation is that arguments regarding the language of impeachment, in particular that of 
constitutional texts, are limited, by this rarity of cases, to discussions of the original text 
rather than interpretation via legal precedence. As such, it is the discussion of the legal 
language which dominates academic study rather than the examinations of the details of 
specific cases. 
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Name State Date Impeachment status Outcome of 
impeachment 
Thomas McKean Pennsylvania 1807 Unsuccessful attempt to impeach None 
William Findlay Pennsylvania ~1817 Investigation into years as State 






Pennsylvania ~1844 Unsuccessful attempt to impeach None 
Charles Lawrence 
Robinson 
Kansas 1862 Impeached Not guilty 
James Madison 
Wells 
Louisiana ~1865 Calls for impeachment None 
Harrison Reed Florida 1868 Impeached Legislature adjourned 
before Senate could 
conduct an impeachment 
trial; Supreme Court of 
Florida ruled had not 
been impeached as 




North Carolina 1870 Impeached Removed from office 
Powell Clayton Arkansas ~1870 Impeached Charges dropped 
David Butler Nebraska 1871 Impeached Removed from office 
Robert Kingston 
Scott 
South Carolina 1871 Impeachment resolution dropped None 
Harrison Reed Florida 1872 Impeached Acquitted 
Henry Clay 
Warmoth 




Louisiana 1876 Impeached Senate dropped charges 
Adelbert Ames Mississippi 1876 Impeached Made a deal to resign & 
charges dropped 
William Sulzer New York 1913 Impeached Removed from office 





Texas 1917 Impeached Removed from office 
William Lloyd 
Harding 
Iowa 1920 Impeachment proposal initiated but 




Oklahoma 1923 Impeached Removed from office 
Henry Simpson 
Johnston 
Oklahoma 1927 Impeached Acquitted 
Henry Simpson 
Johnston 
Oklahoma 1929 Impeached Removed from office 
Huey Pierce Long Louisiana 1929 Impeached Senate adjourned; 
Charges dismissed by 
the special session of 
Louisiana state 




Tennessee ~1930 Articles of impeachment returned, House 
voted against impeachment 58:41 
None 
Evan Mecham Arizona 1988 Impeached Removed from office 
John G Rowland Connecticut 2004 Resigned after House of 
Representatives began investigations 
into possible impeachment 
None 









Perhaps not unsurprisingly, there is a parallel between the timing of the academic debate on 
impeachment and impeachment cases. Raoul Berger concludes, in his 1973 book 
Impeachment: the constitutional problems, “the lion’s share of the debate about 
impeachment in the last forty years has revolved about . . . bar removal of judges,”88  so 
linking his arguments to the most recent cases. This observation also provides a possible 
explanation for the gap in gubernatorial impeachments between the 1930s and 1980s: the 
process had become perceived to be a tool for the removal of the judiciary, that is, it went 
out of fashion and only regained cognisance amongst the legislative and executive branches 
during and after the Watergate scandal. Berger necessarily omitted from his book reference 
to Watergate and the yet-to-develop calls for presidential impeachment, since the book itself 
was published in February 1973, the same month the United States Senate established the 
Watergate Committee.89 Berger did refer to the Nixon case in the epilogue of the enlarged 
edition of his book published in January 1999, the publication of which coincided with the 
then on-going impeachment of President Bill Clinton. 
The Louisiana State Constitution and impeachment 
Many state constitutions are modelled on the United States Federal Constitution. The 
framework and division of powers envisaged by the Framers is replicated across the 
individual constitutions of the fifty states. While the Federal constitution has been further 
developed by only a limited number of amendments and by its interpretation, the states’ 
constitutions have developed through revision as well as amendment. The 1921 version of 
Louisiana’s state constitution was subject to numerous amendments prior to its revision in 
1974, but the manner by which the state executive officer may be removed from power is the 
same as provided by the federal constitution – impeachment. As Berger expounded, the 
impeachment process, as defined at the federal level, was specifically structured as a 
political tool rather than a judicial or criminal one, explicitly to remove an offending officer 
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from office, and to allow the possibility of criminal charges if appropriate.90 Despite not being 
a criminal charge the perceived penalty for impeachment seems to reach far beyond the 
actuality of removal from office. At the presidential level, Richard Nixon resigned from office 
rather than face an impeachment charge. While his “crimes” were later pardoned by his 
successor in office,91 it is questionable whether his resignation alone would have prevented 
the pursuit of impeachment proceedings, had the House of Representatives been so 
inclined. The 2017 case of Governor Robert Bentley (Alabama) demonstrates that Nixon’s 
precedent of resigning one’s office to avoid impeachment is now an entrenched tactic, 
although Bentley did not avoid criminal investigations and had pleaded guilty to two 
misdemeanour charges immediately before resigning.92 For Long, the impact and effect of 
the impeachment case in 1929 had a complex set of outcomes, which go beyond the 
perceived changes to his personality which some contemporary observers had identified.  
While not a universal trait, many of the fifty states of the United States have adopted more 
than one constitution during their history. To date, Louisiana has had eleven state 
constitutions since the first was adopted in 1812, the highest number of any state in the 
Union.93 Such has been Louisiana’s propensity for constitutional change that Mark Carleton 
suggests that  
Constitutional revision in Louisiana . . . has been sufficiently continuous to 
justify including it with Mardi Gras, football, and corruption as one of the 
premier components of state culture.94 
The first constitution and declaration of statehood of 1812 consisted of thirty two pages and 
six articles. By its tenth iteration in 1921, the constitution had been developed into a 131-
                                                          
90 Berger, pp78-80 
91 Gerald R Ford granted a “full, free, and absolute pardon” to Nixon for “all offenses against the 
United States, which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during 
the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974.” http://watergate.info/1974/09/08/text-of-
ford-pardon-proclamation.html   
92 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/robert-bentley-alabama-governor.html?_r=0  
93 Texas Politics, The Constitution, 3.1 State Constitutions; 
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/7_3_1.html;Texas Politics: © 2009, Liberal Arts Instructional 
Technology Services; University of Texas at Austin  3rd Edition - Revision 46, 26 June 2013 





page document of twenty five distinct articles. As reported by Carleton, the historically active 
tendency of Louisiana to develop its constitution by constitutional convention was due to the 
powerful political elite who were determined to “construct or maintain a governmental 
apparatus conforming to their own specifications.”95 The unusually long fifty-plus year gap 
between the tenth and eleventh (1974) constitutions resulted from the relative stability of 
single party politics which dominated Louisiana in that period. Political contests in the 
intervening period, he notes, 
“usually involved only Democratic factions that often disagreed completely 
on substantive matters, but united on the usefulness of constitutional 
revision by amendment . . .  all found the amending process equally 
satisfactory when their particular interests had to be protected.96 
However, the 536 amendments to the 1921 constitution made during this period resulted in 
an unwieldy document, incomprehensible to all but a few legislative experts. 
In the original version of the Louisiana constitution, which was modelled on that of the state 
of Kentucky,97 the process of impeachment was covered in the three sections of Article V, a 
total of sixteen lines. In common with the federal constitution, the power of impeachment 
was located in “the House of Representatives alone” and it was decreed that “all 
impeachments shall be tried by the Senate . . . and no person shall be convicted without the 
concurrence of two thirds of the members present.” Section 3 offers broad and non-specific 
criteria for impeachment, stating only that the “governor and all the civil officers shall be 
liable to impeachment for any misdemeanour in office.”98 By the 1921 version of the state’s 
constitution, the impeachment article (Article IX) had been expanded to nine sections and 
specified impeachable crimes as: “high crimes and misdemeanors in office, incompetency, 
corruption, favoritism, extortion, or oppression in office, or for gross misconduct, or habitual 
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drunkenness.”99 The majority of these criteria were used in the impeachment charges 
against Governor Long in 1929. 
The history of impeachment in Louisiana 
Prior to the impeachment of Long in 1929, Louisiana had impeached two governors since its 
statehood in 1812: Henry Clay Warmoth in 1872 and William Pitt Kellogg in 1876. Both of 
these impeachments of Republican governors were as a result of partisan politics, and both 
men survived the impeachment procedures. Warmoth was impeached during the 1872 
election campaign, ultimately for supporting the Democratic Party’s candidate; when his term 
ended in 1872, before a trial had been convened, the charges were expunged. Kellogg was 
impeached on misappropriation charges by the Democratic controlled House, but the 
charges were dropped by the Republican controlled Senate.  
Henry Clay Warmoth (1868-1872) has been described as a model for Long. Certainly, the 
terms used by Joseph G Dawson III to describe Warmoth, in his introduction to Louisiana 
governors – From Iberville to Edwards, could be applied to Long as easily as they are to 
Warmoth: “one of the most detested and, undoubtedly, one of the most controversial men 
elected to the state’s highest office. Warmoth remains enigmatic to historians.”100 Williams 
reports on Long’s admiration and fascination for his predecessor in office and directly 
compares his accumulation of power to that of Warmoth. However, despite Warmoth’s 
residency in New Orleans until his death in 1931, Long does not appear to have attempted 
to meet with him. Williams suggests that this was because he may have considered it “risky 
politics to fraternize with a man who had been a carpetbagger, who in the Southern 
mythology of Reconstruction had been a force for evil.”101 It is, perhaps, more likely that 
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Long, who perceived himself as sui generis,102 would be equally reluctant to draw attention 
to the similarities between the tactics used by the two governors. Long utilised many of 
Warmoth’s signature techniques to maintain his hold on power in the state, most notably his 
requirement that newly appointed office holders should sign undated letters of resignations 
when appointed to their posts. Entries from Warmoth’s diaries demonstrate that he was as 
aware of Long, as Long was of his predecessor. Warmoth closely followed Long’s 
impeachment and condemned his behaviour and tactics as disgraceful.103 
Warmoth’s impeachment, in the final days of his term of office, has been attributed to a 
combination of his racial prejudices, the enmity of President Ulysses S Grant and splits in 
the Republican Party at state and national level. During the 1872 gubernatorial election, 
Warmoth (a Liberal Republican) had supported the Democrat candidate, John D McEnery, 
against the Republican candidate, William Pitt Kellogg. With “no fewer than three returning 
boards” in action, as Joe Gray Taylor has proposed, it is likely that “no one will ever know 
who won this election, or who would have won if fraud and intimidation had been eliminated.” 
Grant, by recognising the result “reported by a board that had no returns to work with,”104 
determined that Kellogg had won the election. Warmoth was impeached and, in accordance 
with the 1868 constitution, was suspended from office pending trial by the senate. 
Warmoth’s term ended thirty five days later, before a trial was convened and, as a result, the 
charges were expunged from the record.105  
The second target of a gubernatorial impeachment in Louisiana was also a Republican and 
the winner of the disputed 1872 election which had led to Warmoth’s impeachment. William 
Pitt Kellogg’s entrance into office was inauspicious. His appointment had been dependent on 
                                                          
102 Harnett T Kane Louisiana Hayride - The American Rehearsal for Dictatorship, 1928 – 1940, (1941 
(1998), Pelican Publishing Company, Gretna Louisiana) p140 
103 See An Exceptional Southern Governor? chapter p105  
104 Joe Gray Taylor “Henry Clay Warmoth” in Joseph G. Dawson III (ed) The Louisiana governors - 
From Iberville to Edwards p167 
105 Warmoth’s impeachment and suspension from office led to P.B.S Pinchback being sworn in as 
acting governor “the only black to serve as governor in United States history prior to 1990.” Dawson 




an executive order issued by President Grant, a circumstance which heralded a troubled 
term in the seat. Partisanship, racism, violence, a national depression, and an assassination 
attempt, together with an impeachment, allowed state Democrats to castigate Kellogg’s 
“inability to govern” as “the evils of ‘black-Republican’ rule.”106 A particularly damning phrase 
which, C Howard Nichols suggests, had a great deal to do with the subsequent decline of 
the Republican Party in Louisiana. However, in common with many of the Southern states, 
Louisiana’s Democratic Party dominated state politics and it was over a century before a 
Republican governor would again be elected in the state, David C Treen (1980-1984). 
The 1898 state constitution, which imposed literacy and property restrictions on the voters of 
Louisiana, had effectively disenfranchised both blacks and poor whites. In 1897, the 
numbers of whites registered to vote stood at 164,088, the number of black voters at 
130,344; in 1904, the numbers stood at 91,716 and 1,342 respectively. In 1922, 598 black 
voters were reported to be registered, while white voters, buoyed by an influx of women, now 
permitted to vote by the ratification of the 19th Amendment, numbered 191,789.107 The 
disenfranchisement of black voters had effectively nullified the Republican Party in 
Louisiana. Louisiana was a single party state, with the different factions within the 
Democratic Party periodically resembling a multi-party political system. The alliance of 
“upriver cotton planters and courthouse politicians with the Democratic machine in New 
Orleans”108 (the Old Regulars); the Good Government League; and the Progressive 
Democrats, maintained, between them, the elitist rule of Louisiana until Long first ran for the 
governorship in 1924.109 Although Long failed at this first attempt, his portion of the vote 
signalled a change in gubernatorial politics in the state.110 He was successful in 1928 and it 
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was members of this political elite alliance who formed the anti-Long contingent that sought 
to impeach him in 1929. 
Archival material 
In order to rectify the under-examination of the 1929 impeachment, it was necessary to 
approach the subject from a broader perspective than simply a catalogue of the events of 
the impeachment itself. By focussing on Long’s approach to the governorship of Louisiana in 
comparison to his predecessors and contemporaries; his adherence to his personal career 
pathway; his personal and political motivations; together with his attitude toward, and 
perception of, political opposition, a greater understanding of the causes of the 1929 
impeachment may be defined. As such, a wider examination of archive material was 
required than would perhaps have been considered if the focus had been restricted to the 
impeachment itself. This exploration included the papers of Huey P Long, and of his 
contemporaries – James B Aswell, Harley B Bozeman, Hermann B Deutsch, Harvey G 
Fields, Hilda Phelps Hammond, Henry Jastremski, Cecil Morgan, John H Overton and Scott 
Wilson – together with other archive collections, such as the David R McGuire memorial 
collection at Tulane University and the Russell B Long collection at Louisiana State 
University, which have collated materials relating to Long, his personal and political careers, 
including items of correspondence. Materials in these collections have either previously not 
been published or have not been used in connection with an examination of Long’s 
relationship with impeachment.  
As previously mentioned, Long’s papers were not used by Williams. Despite the biographer’s 
assertion that the material discovered late in 1969 did not offer any new insights into his 
subject, the forty nine linear foot collection of letters, papers and memorabilia, which relates 
not just to Long’s time in elected office but also to family matters and his law practice, this 
material instead offers the opportunity to pursue a study of Long which does not follow the 




family members and with his family friends allows a perspective on his developing 
personality and character to be revealed, specifically the creation of the political operative. In 
particular some of these personal letters more clearly articulated Long’s agenda and his 
political and personal ambitions than was exhibited in later documents. Items, such as 
correspondence relating to his early political offices, allow the scope to examine from a new 
perspective, the impeachment and its origins, his personal and political development, and 
the factors which drove him. The use of materials from collections belonging to Long’s 
contemporaries has also offered the opportunity to contextualise this work, so permitting a 
broader perspective of events to emerge than would be revealed by an examination of the 
Long papers alone. In particular, the papers of his political opponents in Louisiana offer a 
view of events which balances the Long-centric perspective. Cecil Morgan’s papers at 
Tulane University include a catalogue of material related to Long’s career as governor of 
Louisiana. These items have not previously been examined in the context of a study of Long 
and as such offer a new frame of reference for this new interpretation of the impeachment.  
When in 1934 student journalists on Louisiana State University’s student newspaper, 
Reveille, published a letter implicitly critical of Long, he arranged for them to be expelled. All 
seven students were offered places at the University of Missouri which were funded by an 
anonymous group of New Orleans residents.111 The collection of one of these students, 
David R McGuire, is held at Tulane University and is supplemented by his son’s collection of 
archive materials. Jack B McGuire’s expansive archive of Louisiana political materials 
includes a wide-ranging collection of Huey Long papers including correspondence relating to 
Long’s terms as governor and US senator, as well as contemporary articles, propositions for 
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films of his life and campaign materials.112 This archive includes documents which are not 
held in any other collection and which have not previously been published.  
The Russell B Long Collection at Louisiana State University contains a broad spectrum of 
materials relating not only to Russell’s life and political career, it also includes an archive of 
his father’s papers and the records relating to T Harry Williams’ work on the Huey Long 
biography. The materials relating to the biography offer a previously unexamined record of 
the process by which this work was produced, thus allowing a greater insight into the 
circumstances under which Williams wrote the book than has previously been understood. 
Russell’s collection of Long family papers, in particular those relating to his father, contains a 
broad range of correspondence, speeches, financial documents, clippings and memorabilia, 
which have not previously been used in a study of Long. The use of these materials allows 
for a more nuanced approach to the origins of the 1929 impeachment and its critical impact 
on the career of Long. By examining new materials, and by reviewing materials previously 
used, it is possible to examine the 1929 impeachment from a new perspective, which will 
allow a new understanding of Long and his impeachment experience to emerge.     
Conclusion 
The 1929 impeachment was a key event in the political career of Huey P Long. The impact 
of the impeachment has previously garnered only limited attention from academics, with 
primarily biographical assessments reviewing the incident in the context of a possibly 
character-altering event. Academics disagree on the degree to which the impeachment had 
an influence on both the character and the methods of Long. White’s suggestion that the 
impeachment may have represented a turning point in Long’s career, a point at which he 
became obsessed with power and more ruthless in his methods in obtaining power, is 
couched in equivocal terms which fail to reach a definitive assessment:  
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“Huey promised to do great things for the poor people of Louisiana and for 
the first few years of his reign he kept his promise. . . But somewhere along 
the line, possibly after he came so very close to being impeached, 
something went wrong. Huey began to take power and then to do more 
good he seized still more and finally the means and ends became so 
twisted in his mind that he no longer could tell them apart.”113  
In contrast Hair is emphatic in his renunciation of the concept of the benevolent Long 
character, noting that he was always ruthless; the impeachment simply made him more so. 
White has suggested that there were in fact two Huey Longs, the politician who worked for 
the poor and disenfranchised, using methods appropriate to the time period and location, 
and the power-obsessed moral degenerate, whose own need to dominate overtook all other 
causes. He proposed that these two characters existed consecutively with the change 
possibly being linked to a single defining incident, the 1929 impeachment.114 While Hair 
argued that Long’s character was always inherently ‘bad,’ implying, although he does not 
actually state it, “that Caledonia Tison Long must have given birth in 1893 to the world’s 
most conniving baby,”115 White’s thesis assumes that Long’s obsession with power changed 
following the impeachment. Hair’s assumption is that Long’s character was fully formed and 
did not develop in response to any events, especially the impeachment. Despite his overall 
favourable interpretation of Long, Williams was less convinced that the impeachment had a 
fundamental impact on Long. Basing his findings on interviews with those who knew Long, 
he summarised the debate 
“For every Long intimate who says that impeachment changed Huey, there 
are a dozen who say it did not.”116 
To suggest, as Williams did, that Long carried on after the impeachment in the same way as 
he would have done had it not occurred is an untestable hypothesis. The impeachment 
occurred and by that fact alone, it had both a cause and an impact. As a result, it is not 
possible to look at the impeachment as a discrete and isolated event within the career of 
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Long. The impeachment must, therefore, be examined within a broader context, of Long, his 
career and his personality, as well as the milieu of Louisiana and the southern states of the 
US.  
Past academic assessments of the impeachment in March 1929 have been located within 
the context of broad biographical treatments of Long, with the events reported as simply 
another entertaining Long vignette and interpreted in terms of its short term impact on Long’s 
personality. Williams’ rather throwaway conclusion was that “the experience affected him but 
did not alter him appreciably.”117 However, the impeachment was a much more significant 
event in his life and career than this assessment suggests. Subsequent to the 1929 action, 
Long began to express his expectation that his enemies would now embark on a perpetual 
campaign to remove him from office. As a consequence, after 1929, Long began to frame, 
not only the impeachment, but all subsequent propositions regarding the necessity of 
removing him from office as validation for his past and future actions and rhetoric. Under 
these conditions, the standard response of the pragmatic party politician – a scaling back of 
provocative oratory, attempts at appeasement, or to compromise with his opponents – 
became impossible, even if it had ever been likely, for Long. Years of antagonistic language 
aimed at all groups and individuals who had stood in his way, had, in Long’s view, effectively 
closed off all recovery strategies bar one. He was, therefore, forced to escalate the very 
activities and rhetoric which had brought him to impeachment in the first place. Since after 
1929, Long expanded the scope of his activities beyond Louisiana politics to the national 
stage, his changed perspective, which saw opposition as evidence of corruption and vested 
interests, also broadened to encompass the national political environment. Therefore, 
limiting the examination of the impeachment to an assessment of character, significantly 
underplays the importance of the events of March 1929, which became fundamentally 
integral to the development of Long’s political personality. 
                                                          




The purpose of this thesis is to explore the 1929 impeachment of Long in a way in which it 
has not previously been examined. By focussing on a number of factors, notably Long’s 
behaviour, his actions and his politics, this study looks at the ways in which the 
impeachment was influenced and affected by Long’s career to that date, his interactions with 
contemporaries, and his methods.  
Glen Jeansonne has observed that Louisiana is both an atypical Southern and American 
state, because of its racial, economic and religious complexity bound to its history as both a 
French and a Spanish colony.118 It is Jeansonne’s contention that Long was personally as 
complex as the state, that he reflected its intricacies.119 However, just as Louisiana cannot 
be considered to have developed in isolation – irrespective of its complexities, the state’s 
development was influenced by its interactions with the rest of the nation – so Long cannot 
be considered without reference to his contemporaries among the governors of the southern 
states and his predecessors as governor of Louisiana. To determine the degree to which 
Long was exceptional or if he was, in his words, sui generis, it is essential to compare his 
experience as governor of Louisiana with that of his predecessors in the office, and with his 
contemporaries amongst the governors of the Southern states. A comparison of Long’s term 
in office with those of his contemporaries and predecessors will offer a perspective on his 
impeachment and the degree to which it was predictable. By comparing Long with his 
contemporaries in the two states which had recently impeached governors, Texas and 
Oklahoma, the similarities and differences between Long and the other governors may be 
explored, as can his propensity to impeachment. By contrasting Long with his predecessors 
as Louisiana’s governor, it should also be possible to determine whether he represented a 
continuation of or a break from tradition, and if this perspective had an impact on the 
likelihood of impeachment. 
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Long’s obsession with the acquisition of political office appears to have developed, from a 
childhood idée fixe,120 into a determination to both acquire and retain the power of these 
offices. By exploring this apparent change of focus in Long’s climb to political power, from 
the attainment of progressively more influential political offices to a resolution to dominate, 
subjugate and control, the circumstances which led to his impeachment should be revealed. 
Throughout contemporary, and subsequent, reviews and examinations of Long there has 
been speculation regarding the true nature of his personal political ideology, with 
suggestions placing it anywhere along a spectrum from Fascism through Populism to 
Socialism. Since Long stated that he had no ideological affinities121 and that he believed that 
the means were justified by the outcome, it will be necessary to determine whether political 
ideology, an obsession with power, a personal belief system or a combination of some or all 
of these, was the driving force of Long’s political career. The factionalisation of Louisiana 
and its impact on Long’s career trajectory will be examined to determine the degree to which 
his use of political affiliation was expedient, rather than a personal affinity to shared ideology, 
designed to allow him to achieve his career goals.  
It is evident that Long did not subscribe to Abraham Lincoln’s belief that one destroyed one’s 
enemies by making them friends. Indeed, throughout his political career Long appeared to 
have adhered to the opposite mantra, converting many of his political friends into implacable 
enemies. In Louisiana, and later at the national level, reaction to Long was never ambivalent. 
Responses to him were mutually exclusive and polarised; he was either reviled or adored. 
By examining the enmity and enemies of Long throughout his life and career, it will be 
possible to use these interactions as a means to underline the extent to which the 
impeachment in 1929 was foreseeable. If, as Joseph Conrad suggests, one should “judge a 
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man by his foes as well as his friends,”122 then Long’s accumulation of enemies throughout 
his career provides a method by which his development as a political operative can be 
assessed.  
This study follows on from those academics whose work had moved the debate on Long 
from the biographical to examinations of specific incidents from his career. Previous 
examinations of this topic have been cursory and limited to narrative descriptions for the 
purpose of biography. Those biographers who have subjected the impeachment to further 
consideration have limited their discussion to whether it had had any effect on Long’s 
personality or character, as befits biographical examinations. As has been discussed, the 
penalties for a political official found guilty of impeachment charges could be, not only 
removal from their current office, but also disqualification from holding any future political 
office. For a politically ambitious man like Long, an outcome like this would have been 
devastating. As such, to restrict the interpretation of the effects of the impeachment simply to 
a discussion of possible changes in Long’s personality is to underestimate the event, its 
causes, and Long himself. By exploring and contextualising the impeachment, this thesis 
seeks to examine an area of Long’s career which has previously been under-explored.
                                                          









An exceptional Southern Governor? 
 
“Louisiana,” Glen Jeansonne observes “has never been a typical Southern state, or a 
typically American state. Ethnically, geographically, economically, and religiously, Louisiana 
is the most complex state in the South.”1 To Jeansonne, the personality of Huey P Long was 
as complex as the state itself, “he was Louisiana in microcosm.”2 If Jeansonne’s assessment 
of Long can be extended beyond a simple assessment of his personality, be applied to his 
tactics and style of politics in office, and also be said to accurately represent his 
governorship, then a comparative study of contemporary Southern governors may be used 
to determine whether Long, his governorship, including the impeachment, was as unique as 
he himself once claimed, “just say I’m sui generis, and leave it at that.”3 Alternatively, he may 
have been simply a member of a cohort of similar state executive officers, typical in 
character and political personality for his time, his region or both. Long’s sui generis claim 
was all encompassing, suggesting that he certainly believed that he and his activities were 
unique. He consistently rejected efforts by journalists to define his personality or political 
philosophy or to credit other, external influences for his rise to power. 
In a period when celebrity- or personality-led politics were less prominent in the United 
States than would later become the norm, individuals whose political careers and experience 
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seemed tied to their often larger-than-life characters may have appeared to be exceptional. 
From the perspective of the twenty-first century the brash, self-publicising style of politician 
does not appear as a particularly unusual character in American politics. While not an 
isolated case in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s, Long was a sufficiently 
unusual character that to apply the epithet “exceptional” is not wholly inappropriate. Specific 
case studies of a Louisiana governor, John M Parker, and contemporary Southern 
governors, Oklahoma’s Henry S Johnston and William ‘Alfalfa Bill’ Murray, and Texas’s 
Miriam ‘Ma’ and James ‘Pa’ Ferguson, will be used to provide context and points of 
comparison to Long as a Southern governor and as a governor of Louisiana.  
While not common, enough extraordinary characters occupied gubernatorial offices across 
the South to preclude the application of the term “unique” to Long; Murray and the 
Fergusons offer examples of other unconventional individuals, or ‘characters,’ in 
gubernatorial offices. In Louisiana, Long’s predecessors in the governor’s office generally 
maintained a standard and example of gubernatorial politics which, while in no way free from 
corruption or graft, certainly proffered an image of what many among the established political 
elite believed a governor of Louisiana should look like, and imbued the office with a standard 
of dignity, which they had embodied. This standard was one which essentially reflected their 
social status in the upper echelons of Louisiana society. Long provided the people of 
Louisiana with a revised gubernatorial model, which took the precedents of the past and 
shaped them into a system which had a long lasting effect, and primarily a cumulative 
detrimental impact, on the political, social and economic state of Louisiana for the decades 
that followed.4 
Long’s term as governor included one of the most vulnerable parts of his career, his 
impeachment. Since the action occurred during his gubernatorial term, it is necessary to 
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consider how Long compared to the other governors of his period and section, his 
predecessors in Louisiana, and his contemporaries among the Southern governors. 
Comparative study: Southern governors 
Cortez A M Ewing’s 1948 article “Southern Governors” compared the governors of twelve 
southern states in office during the ten year period 1938 – 1948. For the purpose of clarity, 
Ewing defined the South as “the eleven secession states and Oklahoma”5 and used the 
following criteria to compare the 46 men who held the governors’ offices in that period: 
constitutional provisions; age when first inaugurated; education; profession; and prior 
experience in public office. Although old, Ewing’s work still offers a useful analytical 
framework with which to compare those individuals in the governors’ offices of the Southern 
states during Long’s time in power in Louisiana. His study provides a valid model for an 
initial examination of Long’s contemporaries as well as a comparative data set from the 
same political era.  
First, it is necessary to determine the length of the time to be used for this comparison, and 
also to determine the duration of Long’s term as governor of Louisiana. Officially, Long held 
the office of the governor from his inauguration on 21 May 1928 until he took up his United 
States Senate seat in January 1932, almost the complete four year single term permitted 
under the 1921 Constitution of Louisiana. However, since he retained control of the office 
through his puppet successor, Governor Oscar K Allen, his period of direct or indirect 
executive influence could be said to have spanned the seven years from 1928 to his 
assassination in September 1935.6 
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Of the twelve “strictly southern states,”7 eight mandated four year gubernatorial terms8 
during this period, while the others all had two year terms.9 Texas was the only one of the 
twelve states which did not impose a limit on the number of terms a governor could serve.10 
From 1928 to 1935, 36 individuals held the office of governor in the twelve southern states. 
Their average age at their first inauguration was 48¾ as compared to an average of 50¼ in 
Ewing’s study of the period 1938-1948.11 At least twenty four of these individuals held an 
academic degree; the majority, 63.9% (23), were members of the legal profession and 
almost all had experience of public office before being elected as governor. Reflecting the 
traditional dominance of the Democratic Party across the South since the late nineteenth 
century, every governor during the period 1928-1935 was a member of the Democratic 
Party. Only one was female, Miriam Amanda ‘Ma’ Wallace Ferguson of Texas (1925-1927; 
1933-1935). Broadly speaking these trends are replicated in the cohort of Southern 
governors used in Ewing’s larger and later study.   
At 34, Long was much younger than average when inaugurated; but he was not the 
youngest to enter the office, as both Richard Russell (Georgia, 1931-1933) and Daniel J 
Moody (Texas, 1927-1931), were 33. He had not graduated from high school and did not 
hold an academic degree, although he was later awarded an honorary degree by Loyola 
University.12 He was not alone in failing to graduate from high school; both Harvey Parnell 
(Arkansas, 1928-1933) and Dennis Murphree (Mississippi, 1927-1928; 1943-1944) were 
only educated to public school level. In common with the majority of his contemporaries, 
Long was a lawyer. He had previous public office experience through his time as Public 
Service Commissioner, and he was a member of the Democratic Party. 
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Based on this superficial biographical data, Long does not appear to be unusual. In fact, at 
first glance, this evidence would suggest that Long fitted within a spectrum of similar 
individuals, all of whom attained the office of governor in their states. Examinations of the 
governors’ offices and the interactions between the governors are, therefore, needed to 
determine whether Long was in any way unique as a governor, specifically as a Southern 
governor and as a governor of Louisiana. 
Oklahoma 
During the period under examination (1928-1935), Oklahoma was the only state, other than 
Louisiana, to impeach its governor; Governor Henry Simpson Johnston (1927-1929) was 
impeached twice, in 1927 and 1928, and on the second occasion he was convicted and 
removed from office. As the most recent recipient of a gubernatorial impeachment before 
Long’s impeachment, Henry Simpson Johnston, is an appropriate subject for a comparative 
case study.  
William ‘Alfalfa Bill’ Murray is reported to have described Johnston as “the smoothest and 
best parliamentarian” amongst the delegates at the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention.13 
Elected to the first Oklahoma Senate, Johnston had run, unsuccessfully, for the US 
Congress in 1908 and 1914. Despite this accolade from Murray, Johnston seems to have 
regularly failed to comprehend political strategy and, unlike Long, to have been an unwitting 
pawn of other political strategists. For example, as a grand master in the Masons, an active 
member of the Ku Klux Klan and prohibitionist, Johnston was encouraged by Ed M Semans, 
the former chair of the Oklahoma Democratic Party, to run for the chair of the state 
Democratic delegation to the national convention in 1924. It was Semans’ intention that he 
work against Alfred E Smith’s presidential nomination, since Smith was both anti-Klan and 
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anti-prohibition.14 Although elected, Johnston stood down in favour of US Senator Robert L 
Owen. Owen was a supporter of the anti-Klan Governor Martin E Trapp, so Johnston’s 
resignation ceded control of the delegation to Trapp, the outcome that Semans had sought 
to avoid. In comparison, in 1928 as governor-elect, Long not only disregarded tradition to 
select his own delegates to the Democratic Party national convention, he also viewed his 
defeat of the other factions in the state party as infinitely more important than the benefits 
which may emerge from supporting, potentially, the next president. In an episode which 
would be echoed by others throughout Long’s time in power, two competing delegations 
proceeded to the 1928 National Democratic Convention in Houston, Long’s delegation led by 
Harvey G Fields and a second delegation led by former governors, J Y Sanders (1908-1912) 
and Ruffin G Pleasant (1916-1920). Fields, following negotiations with Franklin D Roosevelt, 
governor of New York and the manager of Alfred E Smith’s nomination campaign, 
recommended to Long that the delegation should pledge its support to Smith. As Williams 
suggests, Long’s response to Fields’ suggestion, that it would be politic for Louisiana to 
support the prospective nominee and the potential new president, epitomised more his 
desire to send a message to Louisiana’s Democrats that he was now in control, not only of 
the party, but also of the state, rather than a broader aim of cultivating support networks with 
potentially powerful factions within the national Democratic Party: “Damn a President . . . I 
don’t care about that. I just want the Huey Long delegation seated. You tell ‘em to vote for 
Smith.”15 The episode demonstrates the degree to which Long, unlike Johnston, was 
determined to remain independent of the influence of established sections of the party.   
In the 1926 gubernatorial election, Omer K Benedict, Johnston’s Republican opponent, ran 
on a strongly anti-Klan message. The Democratic platform was very similar to the 
Republican one, in that it too favoured improvement of public schools, roads and free school 
books, but it also advocated the enforcement of prohibition and the introduction of a pardon 
and parole board. Although Johnston and Semans considered the Ku Klux Klan to be a non-
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issue, it was a major factor of the campaign, with Benedict claiming that Johnston was under 
the control of the Klan, and with Democrats denigrating the Republican as an active member 
of the Klan. However, Johnston led a Democratic sweep, with a US senate seat, six 
congressmen and three other state offices going to the party as well as the governor’s 
office.16 As such, it was reasonable to assume that Johnston, unlike Long when he was 
elected as governor of Louisiana, had a mandate to lead the state.17     
However, in another strategic faux pas, which also emphasises his differences to the 
Louisiana governor,18 Johnston initially took a neutral stand on the question of the leadership 
of the state senate. Once it became obvious that Mac Q Williamson, an opponent of 
Semans, would be elected, Semans advised Johnston to support A E Darnell. But since 
Johnston’s preference was publicised too late for legislators to change their allegiance, 
Williamson was elected president pro tempore and for the first time the state’s Legislature 
was organised against the declared preference of the governor.19 Johnston had thus 
demonstrated again that he was an inept political strategist. 
Johnston’s term in office was beset by poor decision-making on the part of the governor and 
political in-fighting. Aside from his demonstrable weaknesses in dealing with the state 
Legislature, Johnston’s biggest issue was his personal secretary, Mrs O O (Mayme) 
Hammonds. She was accused of controlling the governor and of blocking access to him by 
those with whom he had business. She was also the subject of rumours, including of an 
affair with the governor,20 and that she consulted with the dead. Although a petition to 
dismiss her was defeated in the senate in 1927,21 Mrs Hammond’s position was ultimately 
deemed to be untenable and she resigned from her post in early 1929. In an interview with 
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Betty Kirk of the Santa Ana Daily Register, Hammonds claimed, in the face of accusations 
that she was “the Mrs. Colonel House of the Johnston administration’ and the ‘governor in 
fact’ of Oklahoma” that because she had “paid [her] loyalty to Governor Johnston and the 
state, [so] the corrupt politicians have accused [her] of every political and moral crime.” In 
refuting the stories of political control she said “If I were as ambitious as they say I am, I 
would be standing in front of Governor Johnston instead of behind him.”22  
An attempt in December 1927 by legislators to convene a special session, without a call 
from the governor, was forced to relocate to a hotel when Johnston declared martial law and 
the National Guard prevented the legislators from entering the chambers of the Legislature.23 
Despite the state supreme court declaring the session to be illegal, the House adopted six 
articles of impeachment against Johnston, including that he had “violated the peace and 
dignity of Oklahoma by calling of troops;” was incompetent; had employed “Jose Alvarado, 
Mexican sharpshooter” who was wanted for a bank robbery; had paid an attorney $3,500 for 
work not carried out; and had “Feloniously conspired with one May Kline and one Mamie 
Hammonds” to extort $1,412 from C B McCormick “in return for the payment of a claim 
McCormick held against the highway commission.”24 Despite attempts by the House to 
convene to try the charges, the senate decreed by 22 votes to 16 “that the house of 
representatives had no authority to convene itself and vote the impeachment charges.”25 
Although Johnston had won this fight, the repercussions continued throughout the following 
year, culminating in a Republican surge throughout the state in the November 1928 
elections. With forty seven Republican members of the House forming a coalition with six 
anti-Johnston Democrats, the House voted eleven impeachment articles against the 
governor on 18 January 1929. The governor’s defence acknowledged that with the exception 
of a charge of incompetency, the charges were true but that his “actions were due to poor 
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advice from his associates and other government officials who, unknown to Johnston, had 
used him for their own interests.”26 Having determined that Johnston had not acted 
criminally, the senate found, by a vote of 35 to 9, that he was guilty of general 
incompetency.27 The verdict was front page news in Louisiana, where simultaneously, as 
reported in the Shreveport Times, “the most thoroughly abortive legislative session in 
Louisiana history” was coming to a close with “Governor Long [escaping] repudiation by so 
narrow a margin that his teeth must be rattling yet.”28 
The framers of Oklahoma’s constitution had, as Jean Shumway Warner reports, 
“intentionally created a weak state chief executive,”29 so that the governor’s power to 
legislate was limited to influencing the Legislature via the veto power. Despite the restrictive 
nature of its constitution, Oklahoma still attracted ‘characters’ to its governor’s office, most 
notably William “Alfalfa Bill” Murray. In an apposite description of Murray, Sir Ronald 
Lindsay, British Ambassador to the United States (1930-1939), wrote, “Just as certain 
obscure vitamins are necessary to make up a balanced diet, so an element of buffoonery is 
needed in American politics.”30 Murray was governor of Oklahoma from January 1931 to 
January 1935 so only his first year in office overlapped with Long’s official term of office in 
Louisiana, and yet there are sufficient similarities between the two men to be suggestive of a 
type of executive officer: “Governor, congressman, presidential candidate, and author of 
constitutions,” Keith L Bryant Jr’s summation of the political achievements of Long’s 
contemporary in the governor’s office of Oklahoma could almost have been applicable to 
Long himself. Although Murray, unlike Long, was an instrumental figure in the constitutional 
convention which resulted in statehood for his state, Long was, through legislative tactics, 
capable of amending the constitution of Louisiana to ensure that the political power in the 
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state revolved around the governor’s office, and therefore became increasingly centralised in 
his hands.    
As part of his case for a thorough historical investigation and assessment to be undertaken 
by the regents of Oklahoma State University, in response to calls for Murray’s name to be 
removed from buildings at the University’s Stillwater campus, Bill Bryans summarises the 
debate which pitted twenty first century views of Murray as a racist and anti-Semite against 
the recognised impact that Murray had on the state’s development. In phrases which could 
equally be applied to Long, Bryans summarises Murray as a continuing “enigma” whose 
legacy is still debated by historians.31   
However, these superficial similarities between Long and Murray serve instead to emphasise 
the difference between Long and other Southern governors. In one of his few attempts to 
adhere to the traditional American political campaign strategy which extols the progression 
from humble beginnings (the log cabin) to the White House, Long claimed humble origins.32 
These claims were dismissed by his sister as an exaggeration. “Every time I hear of that 
cabin,” she once complained, “it gets smaller and smaller.”33 Murray’s formative years were 
spent on the frontier in Texas in a one room wooden cabin. Elected as governor of 
Oklahoma in 1930, on his third attempt, Murray’s political and personal career shows 
diversity unlike that of the focussed and determined political progression of Long. Born in 
Texas in 1869, Murray’s working life prior to his arrival in the Oklahoma Territory had 
included work as a farm labourer, newspaper editor, teacher and lawyer. It was while he was 
working as an attorney for the governor of the Chickasaw Indian Nation, that Murray married 
the niece of the governor and, on becoming a Chickasaw citizen, he was able to practise law 
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before the tribal courts.34 He retired from his law practice in 1903. With a degree of 
apparently uncanny prescience combined with self-confidence worthy of Long, Murray later 
claimed “he saw that statehood must come and retired in order that he might prepare to play 
a role in drafting the coming State’s charter.”35 As president of the 1906 Oklahoma 
Constitutional Convention, he was instrumental in the first state constitution,36 a document 
which a contemporary journalist, R M McClintock of the Tulsa Tribune, called “a strange 
conglomeration of enlightened progressivism and of a series of checks upon legislative 
action outworn even then.”37 As Bryans details, Murray’s initial priority as the first Speaker of 
the state’s House of Representatives was to ensure that those aspects of Jim Crow 
provisions, removed from the draft version of the constitution at the behest of President 
Theodore Roosevelt, were enacted as the first piece of legislation by the new state 
Legislature.38   
Following defeats in the gubernatorial races of 1910 and 1918, interspersed with two terms 
as the US congressman for Oklahoma’s 4th district, Murray left the United States 
“disillusioned with an urbanizing nation and centralizing government” and spent ten years in 
South America, including time spent leading an agricultural colony in Bolivia.39 Returning to 
the United States in the summer of 1929, after the failure of the Bolivian colony, he 
campaigned once more for the office of governor of Oklahoma in 1930. The circumstances 
of the stock market crash and the beginnings of a national depression, combined with an 
opponent who was not only politically inexperienced but also an oil millionaire, ensured that 
Murray’s programme of lower taxes, road construction, old age pensions, and restrictions on 
public utility corporations, was attractive to an increasingly poor agrarian population and 
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resulted in his election by a large majority.40 As governor, his fiery rhetoric, frequent resort to 
executive orders and martial law to overcome the constitutional limitations placed on his 
office, combined with his idiosyncratic characteristics, attracted the attention of the national 
press. They, bemused by his antics, publicised the activities of a politician who, while 
presenting “a challenge to their ability to depict personalities,”41 also challenged “the 
implementation of federal relief programs in Oklahoma” by opposing Franklin D Roosevelt’s 
New Deal as an imposition of federal power over states’ rights.42  
In common with Long, Murray was a self-declared protector of the masses. While his rhetoric 
emphasised his connection with those who believed he was someone who empathised with 
them, his actions did little to enhance the daily lives of the poor of Oklahoma; but in the face 
of Murray’s inactivity, their continuing faith in their idol echoed that expressed by Long’s 
supporters’ valedictions, “Well, anyway Bill tries to do something.”43 
As a result of the apparent commonality in their approaches, Long and Murray were 
inextricably linked in the minds of some members of the public. Although at least one 
correspondent from Mississippi, A C Brister, saw Murray as an inferior prospect to Long for 
the Democratic nomination in 1932 suggesting, in the popular images of the two men, that 
potlikker had a greater appeal than alfalfa: 
“Don’t let Alfalfa Bill get the run on you. Potlicker is much closer to the 
hearts of the people than alfalfa hay. . . The south is the strong hold of the 
Democratic party. The east, and west will do most anything to bring the 
south back into line. The Louisiana, and Mississippi delagation [sic] is ready 
to go as a unit for this potlicker Governor of Louisiana. Alfalfa Bill has only 
one state to date lined up for him.”44 
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Contemporary news reports also relate that Long, recognising Murray’s widespread press 
and popular appeal, had deliberately sought to antagonise him during the 1932 Democratic 
National Convention: 
“Huey called on Alfalfa Bill Murray, in Chicago, routing him out of bed at six 
o’clock. “You’re supposed to be a farmer candidate,” Huey taunted him. 
“Farmers are supposed to be up before this.” While Huey was talking over 
the political situation, Alfalfa Bill telephoned down and ordered one 
breakfast, for himself. When it came up Huey ate most of it while Alfalfa Bill 
was in the bathroom washing the sleep out of his eyes.”45  
Although Long was not a candidate for the presidential nomination in 1932, Murray was. It is 
not specified in this anecdotal account of their meeting whether the discussion related to 
Murray’s bid for the nomination or if Long was acting on behalf of Franklin D Roosevelt, 
whose candidature he supported. It is, however, clear that the reporter, Jerome Beatty, 
considered the focus of the story to be yet another example of gauche behaviour on the part 
of Long. In his autobiography, Long claimed that he was working to reduce the impact of the 
favourite son bids on Roosevelt’s bid, and as such, had met with Murray to discuss his 
candidature. He describes the meeting as “fencing with a past master” since Murray had 
avoided discussing the candidatures of Roosevelt or himself, and instead spent the time 
working to make “a favorite son candidate out of” Long.46  
In a contemporary article, written prior to Murray’s failed attempt to secure the presidential 
nomination, Jack Spanner suggested that Murray had not  
“stated (and probably never enunciated in his own mind) his political views 
in terms of philosophical doctrine unrelated to the immediate problems with 
which he has had to deal, the immediate issues he has had to face;”47  
This infers that Murray’s actions tended to be a reactive response to issues rather than in 
line with specific ideological belief. His beliefs, however, appear to have been limited not just 
to his personal experience, but also to a fixed point in his experience based on his early 
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years in Texas and the Oklahoma Territory. Keith L Bryant’s study of the newspaper articles 
written by Murray during his time in Dallas concurs with this assessment, revealing that the 
opinions and positions he expressed in the 1940s had changed little from those he had 
taken in 1891.48 Long’s continuing adherence throughout his career to the principles that 
would be developed into the Share Our Wealth programme also suggests a man whose 
political thinking was fixated on an idea acquired at an early stage in his career. However, 
Long used the Share Our Wealth scheme, launched in 1934, as a weapon to outflank 
Roosevelt, rather than as a practical economic solution.49 While his lack of adherence to 
philosophical and political doctrines ties Murray to Long, their perspectives were somewhat 
different. Murray does not appear to have considered his thoughts or programmes in 
doctrinal context, in contrast Long explicitly rejected conformity to a set of ideals. Instead he 
selected only those ideas which benefitted him and which would assist the achievement of 
his ambition; a technique which very effectively increased the confusion of those attempting 
to label him.50  
The National Governors Association 
Long’s communications with his contemporaries among the states’ governors were not 
limited to interactions, such as the one with Murray, at national party conventions. The 
National Governors Association meets at least once a year with a different state hosting 
each meeting; the official transcripts from the meetings dating back to its origins in 1908 are 
available on the association’s website.51 Of the eight meetings held in the period 1928-1935, 
representatives from Louisiana were present at only three. Of the four meetings that he was 
eligible to attend, the first in 1928, which was held in New Orleans, was the only one that 
Long attended. It was the expenditure allocated for the entertainment at this event which 
formed a part of the impeachment proceedings against him.52 Between 1928 and taking up 
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his seat in the US Senate, Long was determined not to leave Louisiana because of the 
irreconcilable break with his Lieutenant Governor Paul Cyr.53 The 1932 meeting in French 
Lick, Indiana, was attended by Governor Alvin King (January – May 1932) after Long had 
gone to Washington DC. The only meeting during this period to be attended by 
representatives from all 12 Southern states was the one in 1935, which was held in Biloxi, 
Mississippi. As these meetings were generally attended by fewer than half of the governors 
of the Southern states, Long’s absences cannot be deemed to be unusual, but since the 
usual reason proffered for a governor’s absence tended to be either that the state legislature 
was in session or that it was an election year, his reason for absence, to prevent a 
usurpation of his office and power, was notably unusual.    
Despite his absence from these meetings, Long did seek, on occasion, to work with or rather 
to seek to lead his fellow governors, the most notable example being the proposed “Cotton 
Holiday Plan” in 1931. The Federal Farm Board’s forecast that the third largest cotton crop 
would be produced in 1931, when, together with associated low prices, anticipated an 
economic disaster for the cotton growing states. However, the Board’s proposed solution of 
a voluntary third-row-destruction plan was met with universal condemnation amongst 
producers. In the absence of an acceptable federal plan, Long invited representatives of the 
fourteen cotton producing states to attend a conference in New Orleans to consider his 
proposal to “[dissipate] the cotton crisis through a mandatory cotton holiday,”54 under which 
cotton producers would not plant cotton in 1932 and the glut crop from 1931 would be used 
to manage the demand until the 1933 crop was harvested. Long’s plan was endorsed by the 
conference with one additional proviso, that it would only be legally binding once states 
producing three quarters of the total crop had passed similar legislation. This proviso 
ensured that the law could only be enforced if Texas, which produced 35% of the total crop, 
passed the cotton holiday legislation. Within four days of calling a special session of the 
                                                          
53 Steps to Power chapter p157 
54 Snyder, Robert E “Huey Long and the Cotton–Holiday Plan of 1931” Louisiana History: The Journal 




Louisiana Legislature on the proposed bill, Long staged a photo shoot in which he was 
dressed in a cotton nightshirt, and sat “on a bed covered by cotton sheets and blankets” to 
sign the bill “prohibiting the planting, gathering, and ginning of cotton in Louisiana in 1932.”55 
This was a piece of political theatre which demonstrated not only a solidarity with the cotton 
farmers, but also promoted his message that he was determined to work long hours for the 
people of his state.56   
Long may have been able to influence the legislators of Louisiana to enact his plan and at 
speed, but getting the other states to follow his lead was much more difficult. While states 
such as Arkansas, Georgia and South Carolina were prepared to follow the lead of 
Louisiana, they would only do so once Texas had committed to the plan. Despite Long’s 
campaign of cables and personal envoys sent to Ross Sterling, governor of Texas, 
supplemented by personal radio broadcasts57 aimed at persuading the Texas public and 
through them, their representatives, the Texas Legislature voted against the holiday plan, 
ensuring its failure across the region.  
Irritated by the barrage of Long’s attempts to persuade the people of Texas and its 
Legislature to enact the legislation, Governor Sterling observed to journalists “[Long] may be 
able to demand that his legislature vote whatever he wants, but we are a little more 
democratic in Texas.”58 In an even more explicit exchange of accusations, critics within the 
Texas Legislature called Long “a demagogue ‘drunk with ignorance and power,’” to which 
Long suggested that the Texas legislators “‘had been paid off like a slot machine.’”59 In the 
face of determined opposition, and without the necessary legislation from Texas to ensure 
the effectiveness of the plan, Long announced that he was “singing his ‘swan song’ on the 
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Louisiana cotton holiday plan and that he was through with his fight for cotton prohibition.”60 
The cotton holiday plan demonstrates how the power that Long held as Louisiana’s governor 
separated him not only from his predecessors in the office but also from his contemporaries 
in the region. It also demonstrated that there were limits to Long’s power and influence, 
bounded as it was by state lines, a limitation which he would later work to remove, most 
notably during the 1932 presidential campaign, when he toured North and South Dakota, 
Nebraska and Kansas on behalf of Franklin D Roosevelt, and the re-election campaign of 
Senator Hattie Carraway in Arkansas.61 While Sterling opposed Long’s power and influence, 
it was his predecessors as Texas governor, the Fergusons, who offered the closest parallel 
to Long’s experience of impeachment and level of political influence amongst the southern 
governors.  
Texas 
Rather than to Long’s direct contemporaries amongst the membership of the United States 
Senate or his contemporaries amongst the Southern Governors, it was to another 
impeached former governor that Norton McGiffin compared Long’s oratorical skills, James E 
Ferguson (1915-1917) of Texas, 
“Like ‘Pa’ Ferguson, Huey can appeal to the intellectual or to the emotional 
at will . . . and, in general, comports himself like a politician who is all things 
to all men.”62  
Ferguson was impeached for the misappropriation of public funds and removed from office 
in 1917. In the face of his ineligibility to run for the office again, his wife Miriam ran and won 
the election for governor in 1924. That Miriam, who was not politically experienced prior to 
her campaign for office, had publicly supported her husband’s anti-suffrage platform and, it 
was claimed, was running to vindicate her family’s name, were points which, when combined 
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with her claim that Texas would gain “two governors for the price of one,” led to accusations 
that she would be a cipher for her husband.63 The creation of the “Ma” Ferguson character, 
with the bonnet and the calico skirt, feeding the chickens, not only sought to mitigate the 
accusations that a female candidate was contrary to the traditional role of women, it also 
reinforced the accusation that she was a figurehead for her husband’s continued political 
career.64 This suggestion was subsequently borne out by legislation, passed at her 
instigation, to provide amnesty to anyone previously convicted of impeachment. Although the 
law was later repealed, James Ferguson did seek to use the amnesty as a means to run for 
governor again. Ultimately, however, with the amnesty determined to be unconstitutional, 
Ferguson’s ineligibility for office was confirmed. Miriam Ferguson ran for governor on three 
more occasions, and was successful on the second occasion in 1932. In an article which 
demonstrated the perceived threat of James Ferguson’s influence over his wife, the Dallas 
Morning News dismissed Long’s antics in Washington DC as “inconsequential” in contrast to 
the combined activities of the Fergusons: 
“The Hon. Hooie Long, Louisiana’s merry-andrew in the Senate, gave an 
exhibition the other day quite in character with his talents and taste. 
Because he was unable to gain support for confiscation of fortunes he 
attacked Senator Robinson, Democratic leader, and resigned from all his 
committee appointments. . . . Texas might get pretty sarcastic about the 
situation but for the painful necessity of disposing once more of the 
Fergusons. The irresponsibility of the Hon. Hooie is temperamental and 
inconsequential, whereas the irresponsibility involved in the arrangement 
again proposed by the Hon. Jim whereby he fetches water and carries 
wood for the Hon. Miriam is calculated and extremely consequential.”65  
Following her husband’s death in 1944, Miriam retired from public life. Although Long’s 
control of the governorship of Louisiana was equally as unabashed as that of the Fergusons 
in Texas, his dominance was predicated on the illusion that Governor Oscar K Allen (1932-
1936) was not only the elected governor, but that he was also autonomous. Long sought to 
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reinforce this illusion by claiming he could not move Allen on an issue he did not himself 
want to address66 and, in September 1935, answering reporters’ questions about the 
possibility of an upcoming legislative session by claiming “Oscar hasn’t made up his mind;”67 
an illusion which, however, he would publicly undermine every time he occupied Allen’s 
office in the Capitol Building in Baton Rouge.68  
Despite the overt nature of the influence of her husband on her term in office, and 
controversies regarding pardons, contract awards and bribes, impeachment threats against 
Miriam were unsuccessful. Nor did these controversies prevent her from being elected for 
her second term as governor, when Depression-hit Texans responded to her promises of 
lower taxes and state expenditures, and voted for her as the Democrat nominee in 1932 
over the incumbent, Sterling. The Fergusons’ terms in office may have been characterised 
by controversies and impeachment, but while the Dallas Morning News’ parochial 
assessment of Long dismissed him as “temperamental and inconsequential” in comparison 
to the home-grown threats, it failed to recognise the pervasiveness of Long’s rule of 
Louisiana, especially the unprecedented level of control over the state that he had 
accumulated, unlike his predecessors in the executive office. In comparison to the Dallas 
Morning News, an editorial in the Chicago Daily News, recognised both Long’s domination of 
Louisiana, “‘I am the Democratic party in Louisiana,’ declared Long magniloquently, in 
presenting his claims before the national committee,”  and, what they saw as, his potential 
threat at the national level: 
“In giving Long the victory the majority of the delegates prepared the way 
for their favorite to revise his claim into ‘I am the national Democratic party,’ 
. . . That surrender to expediency in the interest of faction was made in the 
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spirit that disrupts parties. The injustice done to the constructive forces of 
Louisiana’s Democracy is an injustice to the people of the nation at large.”69 
Louisiana 
The threat, as perceived by the Chicago Daily News, had its basis in Long’s control of his 
home state. There was an atmosphere of implied and actual violence in Louisiana under 
him, with, as the state auditor, L B Baynard Jr, wrote in 1929, his supporters and his 
opponents exacerbating the situation: 
“Things have been in more or less excited state since the Legislature 
convened, and one crowd that you hear talking are almost ready to lynch 
the Governor and the other crowd make him a hero.”70 
This atmosphere was generated as an extension of the governor’s wish to dominate and 
control the power of the state. Intimidation and aggressive behaviour had become not just a 
method by which that power was achieved and controlled, it was also an expression of the 
power itself. In 1928, the Louisiana Legislature passed legislation to create, in common with 
other states, a Bureau of Criminal Identification as a “‘clearing house’ [which would have] on 
file records, photographs, descriptions, fingerprints and all information relating to 
criminals,”71 and which would report to a board of managers, chaired by the governor. 
However, the bureau was utilised by Long as a personal police force, with members of the 
BCI being used in the kidnapping of Samuel Irby and James Terrell during the 1930 US 
Senate election campaign.72  
In 1934, the Legislature passed bills which allowed Long, through Governor Allen, to expand 
the BCI into a “state police force with full police powers equal to or superior to those of local 
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police and deputies and with state-wide jurisdiction.”73 In response to mass meetings 
opposing these new powers, the bureau and the state police intensified their presence 
around the state capitol, as a response to “renewed threats by citizens of Louisiana to take 
matters into their own hands unless given immediate relief from dictatorial tyrannics,” and a 
photographer, Leon Trice, was “driven off the state house grounds under threat of assault”74 
when he tried to photograph the assembled troops. In January 1935, James Mchaffey, a 
leader of the anti-Long Square Deal Association of Louisiana, went to Washington DC to 
consult with members of Congress from Louisiana and other states, having seen “the 
possibilities of violent rebellion in Baton Rouge” he was determined “to ‘free Louisiana from 
the dictatorial yoke’ of Senator Huey P. Long.” He claimed that he and his wife had been 
threatened and followed by Long’s “‘imperial cossacks’ (plainclothes men)” as they left the 
state.75 Long’s creation, in the Bureau of Criminal Identification, of a militaristic unit which 
reported to the governor alone, and which had powers to investigate anywhere in the state 
without the restrictions placed on, for example, the police, was a further tool which he could 
use to gain, retain and demonstrate power and intimidation.  
In other respects, however, Louisiana under Long was neither more nor less violent than it 
had been prior to his election to the office of governor. For example, with regards to racial 
violence, while accurate figures are not available for the number of lynchings in the state, 
calculations based on contemporary newspaper articles have indicated that between 1878 
and 1930, the so-called ‘lynching era,’76 there were 157 lynchings in South Louisiana, of 
which the majority, 114, occurred prior to 1900.77  
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A map of recorded lynchings between 1900 and 1931, based on data collated by the 
Tuskegee Institute, ranks Louisiana as the state with the fourth highest number of incidents, 
172, behind Georgia (302), Mississippi (285) and Texas (201).78 Although developments in 
the field of lynching scholarship over the past two decades have begun to make progress in 
a previously under-explored area of United States history, reliable statistics for lynchings 
remain unavailable.79 Estimates suggest that at least five thousand African Americans were 
killed in the southern states with hundreds more victims from across different racial and 
ethnic backgrounds across the United States.80 Based on recorded incidents, Edward F 
Haas estimated that between 1882 and 1952, the number of lynching victims from across 
Louisiana was at least 391, although with the inclusion of unrecorded incidents, the true 
number is likely to have been over 500.81 It is commonly accepted that throughout this 
period, the rate and numbers of reported lynchings declined, especially after the turn of the 
century. Explanations for the reduction in racial violence include the Great Migration (the 
migration of blacks from Southern states to other parts of the country, as opportunities for 
employment emerged in areas where the threat of violence was less pervasive) and, as 
Stewart E Tolnay and E M Beck have proposed, a subsequent increase in the demand for 
this cheap labour resource represented an economic need for a reduction in the persecution 
of southern blacks.82 However, the decline in reported numbers of lynchings does not 
necessarily represent a reduction in the number of racially motivated deaths; it has been 
proposed that the so called ‘legal lynchings,’ which provided a façade of legality by 
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expediting criminal trials resulting in the death penalty, had replaced the lynch mob.83 Long 
is reported not to have endorsed lynching, but to have accepted it as part of the way of life in 
Louisiana.84 In fact, involvement in such generally accepted displays of violence was not a 
block to holding political office; certainly Governor John M Parker was unrepentant about his 
involvement in the lynching of eleven Sicilian immigrants in New Orleans in 1891.85 
Jeansonne has contended that it is inappropriate to compare Long with other southern 
governors such as Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi or Eugene Talmadge of Georgia because 
of their racist reputations, as Long “operated in a different environment. Blacks were not a 
factor in Louisiana after adoption of the Constitution of 1898.”86 When discussing Long’s 
much vaunted tendency not to play the race card in electoral campaigns, Jeansonne’s 
comments are appropriate, to a point. Amongst his political contemporaries in Louisiana, 
Long’s restraint on race was not particularly unusual, as race was no longer a major factor in 
state politics since blacks had been constitutionally disenfranchised. However, it is more apt 
to describe Long as being no more or less racist than his contemporaries, rather than to 
extol him for this restraint, since he was as capable as any other politician of using racist 
tactics when politically expedient. Long’s attempts at avoiding the issue of the Ku Klux Klan 
during the 1924 gubernatorial campaign, when he failed to clarify whether he was a member, 
may have cost him the election,87 but his vitriolic attack on Dr Hiram W Evans, imperial 
wizard of the Klan,88 together with his programmes, condemned, as they were, for benefitting 
black Louisianians, which he excused as being for all poor Louisianians not just blacks, 
offered a stark contrast to McGiffin’s 1935 claim that Long’s election victories in Louisiana 
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were owed to “the massed and machine-like support of the Ku Klux Klan.”89 Instead, his 
actions suggest that Long was ambivalent on the question of race, provided it did not affect 
him or his campaigns and programmes. 
Comparative study: Louisiana’s governors 
The gubernatorial terms of the three men who preceded Long as governor of Louisiana have 
each been designated as the transition point heralding, what Louis Vyhnanek called, the 
“new era in Louisiana politics”90 that was Long’s gubernatorial reign. While Vyhnanek 
identified Henry L Fuqua (1924-1926) for this accolade, as he was the final governor elected 
by Mayor Behrman’s New Orleans machine, Haas proposed Parker as the transitional figure 
“between Louisiana’s reactionary planter-Old Regular oligarchy and the subsequent 
explosion of neopopulism.”91 A similar designation is assigned to Oramel H Simpson (1926-
1928) by Jerry Purvis Sanson, “Simpson functioned as a transitional figure between the old 
days of Old Regular dominance and the new era of Huey Long.”92 Together these three 
assessments make it clear that Long’s governorship of Louisiana represented something 
that was vastly different from that which had gone before. From these definitions, a two-part 
conclusion may be drawn. Not only, for these historians, did Long represent a substantial 
change from the governors before him, but also, retrospective analysis has shown that each 
of his three predecessors, Parker, Fuqua and Simpson, represented a change, to some 
degree, from that which had gone before them. 
Although only four years separate their terms in office, Governors Parker and Long were not 
only demonstrably different executive officers, characters and men, they were from very 
different backgrounds and environments. Parker was not a natural politician. He was a man 
whose family, social, religious and business background instilled a sense of social 
commitment in him, which led him to participate in the politics and community activities of 
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New Orleans specifically, and Louisiana as a whole, whilst simultaneously despising those 
professional political operatives as exemplified by the New Orleans machine.93 Haas has 
described Parker as “the perfect embodiment of a ‘good’ reformer – dignified, systematic, 
and moderate;”94 a set of characteristics which could not be attributed to Long. In his 
assessment and review of the gubernatorial inaugural addresses of Louisianian governors, 
Sidney J Romero notes, appropriately, that “[the] addresses are as varied as the governors 
who gave them,”95 and identifies the addresses given by John Miliken Parker (1920-1924) 
and Long as being two of the shortest. Romero considers Parker and Long to have been 
“two of [Louisiana’s] most active governors”96 and since the political interactions, 
associations and rivalry of the two men were a dominant characteristic of Long’s political 
career, a comparison of the two governors and their terms of office is an appropriate case 
study. Despite their personalities, they initially demonstrated that they could work with one 
another, however, ultimately the differences between them were too great to maintain 
anything other than a personal and political enmity. In June 1929, following the overturning 
of the impeachment, Long’s opponents formed the Constitutional League of Louisiana under 
Parker’s presidency, which was primarily dedicated to the restoration of the constitution of 
the state of Louisiana, but also to condemn, what they saw as, the immorality and 
debauchery, misuse of power and corruption exhibited under Long’s governorship. The 
League committed itself to restore a “respect for and support of decent and honest 
honourable public administration.”97  
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John M Parker  
Politically Parker aligned himself with the Progressives, influenced in part by his friendship 
with fellow hunter and fisherman, Theodore Roosevelt. His first gubernatorial attempt in 
1916, as a Progressive candidate, garnered 38% of the vote but he lost to the Democrat’s 
candidate, Ruffin G Pleasant.98 During his 1920 gubernatorial run, as a Democrat, Parker 
campaigned on the issues which would later form the basis of Long’s legislative programme: 
roads, natural gas for New Orleans, and the regulation of oil pipelines, including those of the 
Standard Oil Company.99 While Matthew J Schott’s assessment of Parker’s administration is 
that “viewed against its promise [it] was not entirely successful,”100 its legacy, as Charles 
Pellegrin contends, may be seen in the reforms originated by Governor Sam Houston Jones 
(1940-1944), including state governmental reform, some twenty years after the end of 
Parker’s administration.101 While Parker’s and Long’s legislative programmes may have had 
a great deal in common, without Parker’s initiatives, Long’s programmes may well have not 
been possible.  
After Long, the alignment of Louisiana’s governors was split along pro and anti-Long lines, 
with as Jeansonne suggests, the Louisianian voters choosing alternatively between those 
advocating clean government and state benefit cuts (anti-Long), and those championing 
liberal economic programmes with attendant corruption (Long).102 But as Pellegrin suggests, 
it was ultimately the progressive reformers, whose programmes could not entirely be rolled 
back by governors like Earl K Long (Democrat, 1939-1940, 1948-1952, 1956-1960) and 
Edwin Edwards (Democrat, 1972-1980, 1984-1988, 1992-1996), who succeeded in the 
battle between the Long and anti-Long factions; it was in the rejection of “the excesses of the 
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Edwards administration”103 and the election of the reformers, David C Treen (Republican, 
1980-1984), Buddy Elson Roemer (Republican,1988-1992), and Mike Foster (Republican, 
1996-2004) that the legacy of John M Parker’s administration can be seen. 
Parker’s attitude to the role of governor contrasted starkly with that of Long. Instead of 
declaiming that “I am the constitution around here now,”104 as Long did in the early days of 
his administration in the face of a legislator’s objection to his interference on the floor of the 
Louisiana Senate, Parker viewed his role as “executor of laws rather than an initiator of 
political action,”105 a facilitator rather than a leader. This was an approach which, in 
Pellegrin’s assessment, was one of the reasons for Parker’s lack of success in the executive 
office.106 However, unlike Long, Parker considered the business of politics to be a social 
obligation of a man of his class and status.  
A businessman and a plantation owner, Parker was socially, temperamentally, 
philosophically and financially, a very different character to Long. Where Long had actively 
sought the office of governor as a stepping stone to his ultimate goal, the presidency, and 
used the office to cleave power for himself, Parker worked behind the scenes, encouraging 
others, such as Governor Luther Hall (1912-1916), to take the limelight, and only running for 
office himself when others had failed to meet his expectations of what should be delivered by 
the governor. In common with Long, Parker seems to have recognised that membership of, 
and candidature through, the Democratic Party offered the best chance of success in 
Louisiana’s elections. Like Long, Parker’s allegiance to the Democratic Party appears to 
have been a matter of political expediency in the absence of a credible alternative. His 
allegiance to the ideals of the Progressive party and his run for governor as their candidate 
in 1916 had offered the best chance for a third party success in Louisiana since 
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Reconstruction.107 The national Progressive Party nominated Parker as their vice-
presidential candidate in 1916, with Theodore Roosevelt as the presidential candidate. 
However, Roosevelt declined the nomination and supported the Republican candidate, 
Charles Evans Hughes, in the election. In the face of Roosevelt’s abandonment of the party 
for the presidential nomination for the Republican Party, it is likely that Parker’s allegiance to 
ideology over party may well have been tested.108  
It is Jeansonne’s argument that “Long’s predecessors and successors did more than is 
generally recognized,” but that the difference between these men and Long was the latter’s 
personality and charisma.109 However, limiting the explanation for Long’s success to the 
force of his personality excludes a number of other factors, notably his sharp political 
intelligence, and his determination to achieve recognition and power. An extraordinary factor 
of Long’s obsession with power is that, while he pursued it for his own ends, his 
manipulation of political power in Louisiana was such that it benefitted others, especially the 
poor of the state, as well as himself. As Jeansonne has mentioned, Long’s charisma is the 
prime characteristic by which he tends to be differentiated by historians from his immediate 
predecessors. In comparison, Parker has been condemned by Haas for lacking both the 
charisma and the empathy to connect with the average Louisianian voter, especially those 
outside of his own social class.110  
The programmes and activities of Parker’s gubernatorial administration formed the basis 
upon which Long built his programme for Louisiana. As John W Scott has demonstrated, in 
regards to the state of the roads in Louisiana of the period, such assessments which credit 
Long with the improvements to the state’s highways are “grossly unfair to [his] immediate 
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predecessors, particularly Gov. John M Parker.”111 In the eight year period from the start of 
Parker’s gubernatorial term until the inauguration of Long as governor in 1928, Louisiana’s 
road structure was faced with a self-propagating challenge: the improvements and 
developments in automobiles meant that more were being purchased and used in Louisiana. 
With increased vehicle ownership there was the need for a better and more expansive road 
network; with the availability of better roads, more cars were purchased. 
For Louisiana’s politicians, improvements to the motor industry, with its impact on the state’s 
oil and gas industries, provided the impetus for a substantive and wide-reaching opportunity 
to develop the state’s infrastructure, which was led by Governor Parker.112 With new 
severance taxes legalised under the 1921 constitution, Parker initiated a substantive 
infrastructure programme in state institutions, including public education and hospitals, and 
instigated the work carried out by Louisiana’s Highway Commission. Scott’s primary focus is 
to debunk the mythology which credits Long with “’lifting Louisianians from the mud.’”113 
Parker’s programme, which created the new campus for Louisiana State University to the 
south of Baton Rouge at no additional cost to the tax-payer, was funded by the 2% 
severance tax income. Long’s contributions to these issues during this period were of a 
purely political nature, thereby creating a role for himself as the defender of the common 
man of Louisiana in the face of increased taxation.    
Parker’s achievements in office can be better defined as a partial success rather than, as 
Schott proposes, as a lack of success. In comparison with Long, it would be easy to dismiss 
Parker as ineffectual, but his commitment and determination to improve the state of 
Louisiana under his governorship along progressive and conservative lines is evident in his 
infrastructure programme, as well as in his determination to revise and review the state’s 
constitution. Where Long’s obsession with personal and political power led him to maintain 
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control of all areas of state government, ensuring those individuals holding state posts, not 
only owed allegiance to him and his programmes, but would also be subservient to his plans 
and ideas, Parker’s administration did not seek the same level of control and management. 
The 1921 constitutional convention serves as a prime example of Parker’s management 
style. Convinced of the premise that the precepts of good business management would 
improve the administration of the state, Parker lacked both the inclination and the ability to 
build the necessary coalitions of support for his programmes to be fully enacted. Despite 
Parker’s call for “a short, simple charter,” the state’s new constitution was to become 
unwieldy, long and subject to numerous amendments.114 It did, however, expand state 
taxation and rationalise the state’s role in infrastructure, conservation and education. 
Through the new constitution, Parker was also responsible for expanding the powers of the 
Railroad Commission (renaming it the Public Service Commission), powers which would 
directly benefit Commissioner Huey P Long’s need for a state-wide profile and recognition, 
as he prepared for his own race for the executive office. 
Prior to his inauguration, Parker had indicated that he intended to expand severance 
taxation in the state. Concerned how these proposals would impact their businesses, 
representatives of the big corporations, first lumber and then oil, met with the governor-elect. 
During these meetings, Parker agreed that the severance tax would not exceed 2% for the 
duration of his administration. To further assuage concerns that his commitments could be 
overturned by the Legislature, he offered to let the oil companies’ lawyers write the 
legislation. Subsequent attempts by the constitutional convention to increase the rate of the 
tax were stymied by Parker, who refused to renege on his agreement. Long, amongst 
others, criticised the limitations of the legislation introduced by Parker – claiming that the 
severance tax rate should have been higher at 3% rather than 2%, and his ‘gentlemen’s 
agreements’ with Standard Oil and other companies were deemed to be more favourable to 
                                                          




the corporations than the people of Louisiana.115 Yet when Long came into the governor’s 
office, eight years later, his amendments to Parker’s legislation in these areas were limited, 
rather than reversing legislation he had opposed two years previously, he raised the 
gasoline tax from two to four cents.116  
In Huey Long, Williams includes a two page assessment of the governorship of Parker, not 
purely because of the interactions between him and Long, but also as a way of 
demonstrating how Long’s governorship was an improvement on what had gone before. By 
emphasising the impact of Long and denigrating Parker, Williams positions his own 
assessment as pro-Long, while failing to acknowledge that without Parker and the work of 
his administration, Long could not have delivered his programmes. Long’s governorship was 
therefore, in part, a result of what had occurred under Parker. Most noteworthy is Williams’ 
assessment, “Politicians like Parker prepare the way for revolutionary change . . . They sow 
the seed, but bolder men have to do the harvesting.” It is Williams’ implicit message that 
Parker may well have started some of the improvements in Louisiana, but that he had simply 
paved the way for the bolder man, Long, to deliver revolutionary change.117 The wider 
implication of the collective assessments of Vyhnanek, Haas, and Sanson, suggests that 
rather than being the catalyst for change, Parker’s administration had, together with the 
administrations of Governors Fuqua and Simpson, wrought a climate of nascent change in 
Louisiana on which Long had built his agenda.  
Huey P Long, a different style of governor 
When Sam H Jones wrote “More bunkum has been written about Huey Long, and his place 
in history, than any man in this region I know of,”118 he was alluding to the extraordinarily 
extensive coverage and numbers of works dedicated to the life and career of Long, while 
offering a degree of criticism of the quality of some of these works. He also identified a clear 
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difference between Long and the other Louisianian and Southern governors of the era: the 
degree to which Long fascinated, not just his contemporary supporters and opponents, but 
also those who have sought to explain the phenomenon of Long with the hindsight of 
historical perspective. 
In comparison to the governors who had preceded him in office, Long presented a stark 
contrast. His brashness of manner and apparent lack of social skills may have offered a 
degree of informality in comparison to his immediate predecessors, but it is his accrual of 
political power, his ultimate goals, and the measures he took to acquire them, that sets 
Long’s tenure of the executive office apart. Prior to his time in political office, he attended as 
many of the political meetings that he could both in Louisiana and out of state. At these 
events, he watched politicians, such as Jeff Davis (Arkansas, Governor 1901-1907, US 
Senator 1907-1913), James K Vardaman (Mississippi, Governor 1904-1908, US Senator 
1913-1919) and Theodore G Bilbo (Mississippi, Governor 1916-1920, 1928-1932, US 
Senator 1935-1947) ply their trade, focussing on what each man achieved through his 
speeches and behaviour, and how it was done.119 Additionally, although there appears to be 
no evidence that Long and former Louisiana governor Henry Clay Warmoth (1868-1872) met 
during the latter’s last years in New Orleans, it is clear that Long had studied Warmoth, since 
he utilised the former governor’s techniques and style in his own quest for political and 
personal power.120 In his diary entries for April and May 1929, Warmoth demonstrated that 
he was closely following events in Baton Rouge during Long’s term of office, although it is 
not entirely clear from these entries, what his position was on the impeachment.121 
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While this modelling of himself on others calls into question Long’s claim to be sui generis, it 
also exemplifies his political character. Long was able to mould and utilise the successful 
techniques and stylistic characteristics of others, (such as Warmoth’s tactics, Davis’ use of 
language, Vardaman’s precise style of dress and Bilbo’s attacks on the wealthiest citizen in 
a town), which they had used to convince their audiences that, not only were they ‘one of 
them,’ but also that they were sufficiently superior to them to be capable of representing 
them.122 Long was, as a result of his utilisation of the techniques of other politicians, a 
composite character rather than a strictly original one. However, the resulting combination 
created in Long a politician who was able to radically alter the dynamics of politics in 
Louisiana.   
The warning signs were there for Louisiana’s political classes to see, that Long would be 
unlike any previous executive officer. These signs were particularly evident in his impact on 
turnout in gubernatorial elections in the state. As Barbara Wingo has shown, Long’s 
rhetorical style and state-wide campaigning had a phenomenal effect, with turnout between 
the 1920 and 1928 campaigns increasing by “almost 100 percent in nearly all areas of the 
state.”123 In 1920, the turnout for the general election was 55,136,124 in 1928 it was 
96,674.125 Despite Wingo’s claim, it should be noted that this increased turnout was in part 
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due to the federal ratification of the 19th Amendment on 18 August 1920,126 and not solely 
due to the Long effect. The previous gubernatorial election results had also indicated an 
increase of 51.78 percent in the turnout for the second Democratic primary in 1924 as 
compared to 1920 Democratic primary.127 However, there was so little interest in the general 
election in 1924, that it emphatically demonstrates the irrelevancy of the Republican Party in 
Louisiana. The Boston Globe announced that “a light vote was reported. No tabulation of the 
vote was being made,”128 while The Daily Review reported that a total of 132 votes had been 
cast for the successful candidate, Fuqua.129 Long’s ability to “[excite] the interests of people 
who had become apathetic about politics” may have combined, with the promotion of his 
own bills, including one for free textbooks, and the “emotion-charged” issues of prohibition 
and religion, to extend his impact to the increased turnout in the state for the 1928 
presidential campaign.130 
From the early days of his term as governor, including the months before his inauguration, 
Long made clear his intentions and determination to instigate his political programme with a 
patent disregard for precedence. An editorial in the New Orleans Item warned readers that, 
despite Long using the “power of patronage” in ways similar to “all his predecessors, 
including Mr Sanders,” the “unusually liberal” levels of acquiescence amongst members of 
the legislative assembly towards the governor-elect cannot “in view of his violent and 
revolutionary employment of his new power in the State Central Committee” offer “the 
members of Legislature any assurance that he will not exercise the power they have given 
him unwisely.”131 In February 1928, shortly after his election as governor, Long, while still 
governor-elect, as mentioned above, had disregarded tradition in the selection of the state’s 
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delegates for the Democratic Party’s national convention. Previously, delegations had been 
selected at a state convention, but with the assistance of Harvey G Fields, Long had 
determined that a convention was not a constitutional requirement and that selection of 
delegates could be made by the central committee, the membership of which he, through 
patronage, controlled.132   
Other newspaper articles from the period immediately prior to Long’s inauguration on 21 
May 1928, also demonstrate a disgruntled and disquieted response to Long’s unusual and 
early domination of the Louisiana Legislature. In a New Orleans Item article entitled “Long is 
Boss; And Playfully Goes About Job – Burlesque Stunts Begin Early; Freak Resolution Is 
Read,” R B Pixley and C E Frampton reported on Long’s precedent-smashing activities and 
the wide-ranging focus of his attention:  
“Nothing escapes his notice. He is interested in doorkeepers and porters as 
well as the jobs on the desks and committee chairmanships. Whatever may 
happen to Governor Long in the coming weeks he is boss now and no 
mistake. And there is something jovial about his bossing.”133  
Long’s presence in the legislative chambers, overseeing the work of the day and committee 
assignments, caused a number of senior members to wonder at his activities, as “No 
Governor-elect has ever done it before, but this Governor is something different.”134 Pixley 
and Frampton’s assessment of Long’s pre-inauguration activities was a warning to the 
populace of the state that Long’s administration would not be a continuation of gubernatorial 
politics as usual. 
Conclusion 
Huey P Long has frequently been described and assessed in isolation as an exceptional 
political character. The purpose of this chapter has been to determine the degree to which 
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Long was indeed exceptional by comparing and contrasting him to his contemporaries 
amongst the other governors of the southern states, and the degree to which he differed 
from his predecessors in the office of governor of Louisiana. By using case studies of other 
southern governors whose terms have either been characterised by impeachment or have 
been designated as ‘characters,’ Governors Henry Johnston Simpson (OK), William Henry 
‘Alfalfa Bill’ Murray (OK), James Ferguson (TX) and Miriam A W Ferguson (TX) it is possible 
to determine whether Long was as different as he claimed. In Louisiana, Long’s persistent 
feud with former Governor John M Parker and his use of the tactics used by former 
Governor Henry Clay Warmoth have made these two men useful case studies by which to 
examine Long. In determining the degree to which Long differed from his predecessors and 
his contemporaries, it has been possible to establish the potential that existed for 
impeachment in his career. 
As Jeansonne argues in his article, “Huey P Long: A Political Contradiction,” one cannot fully 
define an area, city or state based on its voting record in one or two elections, and nor 
should this record be used to define a place throughout its history. As such one cannot 
specify a single incident which led Long to become the person that he did. The factors are as 
wide-ranging and complex as the demographics of Louisiana: “Long was as much shaped by 
the forces indigenous to the state as he shaped them.”135 By comparing Long and his term 
as governor in Louisiana with his contemporaries amongst the southern governors and his 
predecessors in the office in Louisiana, it is apparent that he was a sufficiently different 
political operative that he can be defined as an ‘exceptional’ southern governor. While 
superficial commonalities in biographical statistics and experience in office are evident, 
Long’s level of control over political power in Louisiana sets him apart from his peers. It is 
also evident that, unlike most of his gubernatorial peer group, Long represented a significant 
change in, and challenge to, the political dynamics of the state of Louisiana. Not only was he 
a vastly different model of governor to those who had preceded him in office, he was, as 
                                                          




alluded to in this chapter, a ‘tipping point’ in the development of Louisiana and its political 
system. Long’s level control over the state was to have an impact which has resonated 
through the decades since his death. This level of control over the power in the state, not 
only set Long apart from his peers and predecessors, it was also the fundamental point of 
contention which drove his political opponents to a degree of animosity which threatened 
Long’s career and, ultimately his life, and which created the circumstances and atmosphere 









Steps to Power 
 
This chapter will demonstrate how Long’s career progression developed from a deliberate 
ascension to the presidency via a specifically prescribed pathway to one dedicated to the 
acquisition of political and personal power, and that this route ensured that his impeachment 
would occur in March 1929. There are two distinct but intertwining routes by which the 
circumstances and motivating forces of Long’s rise to prominence may be discerned: the 
political ladder and the acquisition of power. The political ladder represents the structural 
and logical steps to Long’s prominence in Louisiana and subsequently the nation: election 
as a member of the 3-person state Railroad Commission (1918-1928); election as governor 
of Louisiana (1928-1932); and election as United States Senator (he was elected in 
September 1930 and took up his seat in January 1932). In his acquisition of power in 
Louisiana throughout his career, Long demonstrated his ruthlessness, desire and 
determination to dominate, and his reluctance to be subordinate to anyone. Although it is in 
his retention of the powers of the governor once he had left the office that he demonstrated 
an obsession with personal power beyond that which he had previously displayed when 
appropriating powers for the offices he occupied. This chapter will explore Long’s rise to 
political power and his obsession with the acquisition of political and personal power. It will 
also discuss why, over and above his policies and programmes, this developing obsession 




Biographers of Long take the view that from an early age he was determined to attain high 
political office, specifically the presidency of the United States. Some, such as William Ivy 
Hair, have noted the appropriateness of a political career for one with the “combination of 
skills, mania for attention, and urge to dominate others,”1 but these biographers have failed 
to recognise both the single-mindedness with which he followed his preconceived path to 
achieve his ambition, and that the determination to achieve high political office pre-dated an 
interest in politics. A motivating issue for Long’s pathway to power was his perception of his 
status within Louisiana’s social strata;2 as such, the holding of high political office would, in 
his eyes, equate with power in the state and politics. For Long politics, as with much else, 
was a means to an end. In a letter, written when he was 25, to his brother George (a.k.a 
Shan), he bemoaned the attention from the New Orleans newspapers, which had identified 
him as “an aggressive candidate for governor, despite [his] statement that [he] would not 
[run].”3 His frustration was more to do with his ineligibility for the governor’s office than the 
attention of the press. He admitted to Shan that his statement, that he was focussed on his 
current political office, was a deliberate obfuscation since “the chief underlying reason is that 
I cannot run on account of my age. This darn thing has been my handicap for fifteen years.”4 
This letter makes clear not only that to be governor of Louisiana had been a long-held 
ambition and that his inability to achieve his goal purely because of his age was, for Long, an 
almost intolerable frustration, but it also confirms that he saw the attainment of each political 
office as a step towards the next level, rather than as a goal in its own right. The origins of 
Long’s obsession with power may be detected at an early age, when he annotated his 
school books with “Hon Huey P Long.”5 He was 10 years old during the administration of 
Governor William Wright Heard (1900-1904). Heard’s administration was overshadowed by 
those which preceded and succeeded it, with the result that it is largely ignored by 
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scholarship.6 Mark T Carleton’s sketch of Heard highlights his administrative expertise in a 
period of relative calm for Louisiana, with his gubernatorial successes including the transfer 
of penal system control to the state, the creation of the State Board of Education and parish 
school boards, and the creation of the unsuccessful State Crop Pest Commission to handle 
a boll weevil infestation.7 The introduction of the State and parish school boards would have 
shaped the school life of the young Long. As such his perception of power in Louisiana may 
have been informed by the Heard administration. That a state governor could directly affect 
the daily life of a child would certainly have struck Long as an example of the amount of 
power which was available to the state’s politicians, a power he would come to crave. It is 
therefore power, and the acquisition of power, which was the driving force of Long rather 
than the practice and administration of politics itself. Political office, most notably that which 
was held by the state governor, would have seemed to offer the ten year old Long the 
means by which he could acquire this power.  
Long does not appear to have comprehended what exactly it was that he was looking to 
achieve. Like a child who when asked what he wants to be when he grows up states, a 
doctor, but who fails to understand the skill set required to achieve such an ambition, and so 
does not study the sciences. In setting his sights on the presidency, Long mapped out a 
logical pathway by which it could be achieved. However, he appears to have failed to 
understand the skill set necessary to make his goal attainable, the behavioural traits and the 
interpersonal interactions necessary to build the coalitions required to support a presidential 
campaign. Instead, Long saw political power in the US as a pyramid, which rose from a base 
of local and state offices to the pinnacle as represented by the presidency. Not only did he 
specifically identify his route to the presidency, he followed those steps without varying and 
he did not consider alternative routes which could have achieved his ambition more directly 
or in a much shorter time frame. Additionally, his focus on his goal ensured that he was 
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disinclined to follow more traditional pathways to attain his objective. By August 1928, when 
Long was constitutionally eligible to hold the office of the presidency of the United States, 
there had been thirty of them. Of these, thirteen had previously been state governors (this 
includes Grover Cleveland for each of his two non-successive terms as president) and 
eleven had previously been United States Senators.8 No president had previously taken the 
route identified by Long and had been both a state governor and had held a seat in the 
United States Senate.9  
As Railroad Commissioner (subsequently Public Service Commissioner), Long brought 
cases against corporations which benefitted a diverse group of Louisiana’s population, and it 
was on this record that he campaigned for the governorship, first in 1924, and then 
successfully in 1928. As a state-wide personality, he would have had a potential opportunity 
to campaign for the presidency at the end of his gubernatorial term in 1932. However, not 
only did he lack an appropriate national presence, but Louisiana also did not offer a 
sufficiently effective platform to raise his national profile. A diverting exchange in the Atlanta 
Constitution, in early 1931, had instead served to emphasise the regional nature of Long’s 
persona. After he had served potlikker (the juice of boiled vegetable greens and saltfat pork) 
and cornpone to a group of bankers in February 1931, Julian Harris, the editor of the Atlanta 
Constitution reported on the contrasting styles of Georgians and Alabamians who crumbled 
their cornpone, while Long dunked his. When Harris questioned Long’s etiquette, he began 
a light-hearted debate which included not just Long but governors from across the South, 
including Doyle E Carleton (Florida), John Garland Pollard (Virginia), Ross S Sterling 
(Texas), William H “Alfalfa Bill” Murray (Oklahoma) and Lamartine G Harman (Georgia). But 
the issue was not limited to a Southern readership, with Governor Franklin D Roosevelt 
(New York), Mayor of New York City, James “Jimmy” Walker and the author of Etiquette: In 
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Society, In Business, In Politics and At Home, Emily Post, all being invited to participate in 
the debate.10 For Long, this episode was light-hearted but while it served the purpose of 
further increasing his national profile, it also emphasised the gulf that needed to be bridged, 
since this interlude could not be said to have highlighted presidential characteristics. 
However, his determination to follow each step of his planned route to the presidency 
provided him with, what he may have seen as, the solution to the problem of his lack of 
profile, a run for the United States Senate. Where Franklin D Roosevelt had begun his 
campaign for the presidential nomination, several years before his actual run, by establishing 
himself as a national figure in the Democratic Party, including writing to party leaders across 
the country in the wake of Alfred E Smith’s failed run encouraging them to look to the future 
of the party and suggesting that “had we kept our national organization going between 
elections we should have done better and I hope that steps will be taken to have this carried 
out during the next three years.”11 Long, in contrast, had iconoclastically disregarded such 
traditional routes and behaviours, and as such, did not truly seek to establish an effective 
national persona until he moved to Washington DC to take up his Senate seat. He did have 
a presence on the national stage, but his image as an outrageous buffoon, the archetype of 
a Southern governor, was not a suitably ‘presidential’ image designed to appeal to the 
national electorate. It is also unlikely, as things stood, that he could have garnered sufficient 
support from within the national Democratic Party or across the country for a viable 
campaign. Additionally, it should also be noted that the historical precedent of previous 
presidential campaigns does not suggest that Long’s strategy for his route to the presidency 
was an effective one and that a seat in the United States Senate was not a guarantee of a 
strong national profile. If his proposed career path was a means to an end, the achievement 
of his ambition: the presidency, then there is a logic to Long’s tactic to utilise each elected 
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office to maximise his opportunity to attain the next level of elective power. The contradiction 
lies, however, once he had been elected to the US Senate, in his determination to retain to 
his own person the powers of his previous office even though he had moved on to the next 
one on his route. Rather than a means to an end, the acquisition and, notably, retention of 
political powers had become the driving force of Long’s ambition. The route to the 
presidency became instead the means to acquire personal and political power rather than 
simply a progression through the ranks of elected offices. 
One of the reasons Long may have been determined to retain the power of the governor’s 
office was because the office of a US Senator lacked the same level of authority to which he 
had become used to as governor. Power in the US Senate was dependent not just on party 
and seniority but also on the ability of the individual to manage, to negotiate and to work 
within coalitions. As others throughout the twentieth century, including Lyndon B Johnson, 
would later demonstrate, the route to the presidency could be achieved through the 
traditional structure of the US Senate and within the constructs of the national Democratic 
Party.12 In his insular adherence to a defined career pathway, Long failed to appreciate fully 
the potential power that would have been available to him, had he complied with the 
traditions of the Senate. Instead of working within a system, his tendency was to attempt to 
dominate it. His preference for political leadership (executive) rather than quid pro quo 
teamwork (legislative) was emphasised by his career path. Until the US Senate, each of the 
elected offices on his career path allowed him to lead or dominate rather than have to work 
with others to achieve his programmes. Long’s elected roles did not place him in a position 
that he believed required him to work with others, therefore coercion rather than cooperation 
was his preferred tactic. For his first elected office, he had chosen to run for a relatively 
ineffective body with a membership of three commissioners, instead of yielding to the 
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encouragement of W T Heflin and O K Allen. Heflin and Allen had asked him to “run for state 
senator in the special election called this morning for this district by Governor Pleasant to fill 
the vacancy in the state senate and decide the ratification of the prohibition amendment.”13 
Long had declined to run, claiming that he could “ill afford the time necessary to make a race 
and act in the senate.”14 Approximately six weeks later, he announced that he was formally 
entering the race for the Railroad Commission seat.15 When it came to the US Senate, the 
power of leadership was, significantly, unobtainable for him in the short term. So instead of 
working to gain sufficient seniority to achieve a leadership role, a strategy which would take 
both time and a conciliatory approach, he set out instead to challenge those individuals in 
position of power, such as the Democrat’s minority leader in the Senate, Joseph T Robinson 
(1913-1937, AR).   
However, it should be noted that Long’s retention of control of Louisiana preceded his actual 
move to Washington, so to limit the discussion of his actions to his sense of inadequacy 
once in the Senate does not reflect the full picture. In Louisiana, he had held not only the 
constitutionally allocated powers of the governor, but he had also subverted the 
independence of the judiciary and the Legislature, acquiring influence over the powers of 
these institutions, as well as control over the police and armed forces. Although the nineteen 
charges in the impeachment resolution brought on Tuesday, 26 March 1929 addressed each 
aspect of Long’s accretion of power, the eight charges on which the House finally voted to 
impeach him, while more specific in nature, failed to address the broader accusations of the 
originals.  
Louisiana Railroad Commission16 
At the instigation of his childhood friend, Harley B Bozeman, Long targeted the state 
Railroad Commission for his first political office primarily because it afforded him the 
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opportunity to enter into political office at an early age.17 When the Railroad Commission 
was created by the 1898 state constitution to cover the regulation of the “practices and rates 
of railroads, steamboats and other vessels, sleeping cars, telephone and telegraph 
companies and pipelines,”18 no minimum age restriction was set for its three commissioners, 
each of whom would represent one third of the state of Louisiana. Bozeman’s identification 
of this opportunity also helped to avert another clash between Long and his eldest brother, 
Julius, since Long had announced his intention to challenge Julius for the office of District 
Attorney. Without the lure of a state level office, such as the Railroad Commission, it is likely 
that Long would have ignored the advice of Bozeman, that he could not beat Julius, and 
entered the race for District Attorney. While the post of District Attorney may have more 
obviously suited Long’s expertise as a lawyer, the Railroad Commission offered him a 
political office and one in which he only needed to work with two other commissioners. As 
would become increasingly apparent throughout his career, Long had a demonstrable 
preference for executive leadership rather than legislative teamwork. While the latter 
requires a politician to work with others to form coalitions to develop and pass legislation, 
with a focus on negotiation skills and teamwork; the former offers the opportunity to direct, 
lead and instruct, with an expectation of obedience. Ultimately Long’s accumulation of power 
in Louisiana allowed him to direct and coerce rather than to persuade cooperative support; a 
factor which was highlighted in the US Senate when he found that his previously successful 
tactics failed to elicit the support and admiration of his peers. In the event that Long had 
reached the presidency, it is difficult to envision how he could have moulded his techniques 
to be able to work effectively with Congress.  
By winning the election for the third (northern) district, Long was placed to represent twenty 
eight parishes for a six year term, an opportunity he used to build his personal state-wide 
reputation. As Harnett T Kane, a contemporary journalist from New Orleans reported, Long 
had an immediate impact on the increased activism of the commission. The other two 
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members of the commission had held their seats for a number of years, John T Michel was 
elected in 1912 and was a ward leader for the Old Regulars in New Orleans; Shelby Taylor 
was the chairman of the commission. A Baton Rouge lawyer, Taylor had held his seat since 
1908.19 The Railroad Commission had been an ineffective sinecure prior to Long’s election 
as commissioner. The structure of the three member commission offered him the opportunity 
to exercise a leadership role without the need for extensive teamwork, since a simple 
majority carried decisions. With Long’s election, the profile of the commission was raised 
across the state,“[people] who had barely known it existed now heard of it every day. Huey, 
it seemed to the public, was the commission.”20  
Within months of his election to the commission in November 1918, Long had begun an 
action which had a dual purpose. Not only would it raise his profile across the state, but it 
was also designed to protect his own financial investments. His initiative on behalf of the 
independent oil companies regarding the Pine Island oil situation was as much a personal 
matter, since he owned stock in three of the companies, as it was a political attack on the big 
oil companies, including Standard Oil.21 At the end of the First World War, demand for crude, 
low gravity grade diesel, including Pine Island’s, had diminished and the United States 
government had cancelled its orders. The major oil companies, notably Standard Oil, 
announced they would no longer buy Pine Island oil or carry it in their pipelines, leaving the 
independent producers with stock piles of oil in wells which were leaking and polluting the 
surrounding land. In his discussion of the development of the Pine Island situation, from an 
“isolated conservation problem in a northwest Louisiana oil field”22 to a controversy which 
had a “lasting economic and political impact on Louisiana,”23 Brady M Banta highlights how 
the personal economic and political machinations of Long had influenced the development of 
                                                          
19 Williams (1969) p125 
20 Kane p48 
21 Hair summarises Long’s attitude to his personal wealth as “although anti-big business in rhetoric, 
he was never anticapitalist when it came to small enterprises.” Hair p89 
22 Banta, Brady M “The Pine Island Situation: Petroleum, Politics, and Research Opportunities in 
Southern History” The Journal of Southern History Vol 52, No 4 (Nov 1986) p590 




the situation. In comparison to a period of cooperation between federal government and the 
petroleum industry on regulation, Banta suggests that the “enmity between Huey Long and 
Standard Oil produced an atmosphere of mutual distrust that retarded any predilection for 
cooperative enterprise.”24  
Instigated in reaction to an embargo on the purchase of independent producers’ oil by 
Standard Oil and other pipeline companies in the immediate aftermath of the armistice in 
November 1918, which had resulted in the reduction of Long’s investment in the Banks Oil 
Company of $1050 down to 10 cents on the dollar, Long’s enmity with Standard Oil not only 
had detrimental effects on economy of the state, but tainted his political relationships with 
two of the state’s governors, Ruffin G Pleasant and John M Parker, both of whom Long had 
supported at an early stage of his political career. Long persuaded his fellow commissioners 
to sign a report, in a closed session, which condemned Standard Oil for importing crude oil 
from Mexico while Louisiana oil was wasted, and called on the state Legislature to enact a 
law giving the commission greater control over the oil companies by declaring them utilities. 
The report called for Pleasant to summon the Legislature into special session to enact the 
law, and was further endorsed by a newspaper advertisement, in which Long called on 
readers to “Write the Governor to Call The Special Session.”25 Pleasant refused to act upon 
the commission’s recommendation or to call the Legislature into special session. In a 
personal letter to the governor, which reinforced his accusations while simultaneously 
projecting an illusion of allegiance, Long sought to warn Pleasant of the “many expressions 
from various friends” in his section of the state, who were “expressing themselves quickly 
and in the open as believing [he] had been improperly influenced for [his] failure to take 
action against the Standard Oil Company.”26 Despite his assurances that he knew Pleasant 
was “not unduly influenced,” Long questioned the governor’s lack of public comment on the 
matter, suggesting that if he had “any good reason for not calling the special session, [he] 
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should let it be made public and quickly.”27 Both Williams and Hair have concluded that Long 
was most likely pleased with the failure of the action, since the upcoming gubernatorial 
election of 1920 offered him a wider stage for his complaints28 as well as giving him the 
opportunity to expand his image as a state-wide political operative. In a self-congratulatory 
letter to his brother, Shan, in September 1919, he clearly demonstrated the duality of 
purpose he had hoped to achieve by pursuing Standard Oil over the Pine Island situation. 
He wrote that he had “made some few thousands of dollars out of [the oil business], 
including good law fees which I have charged for certain work I have done”29 but he claimed 
that he did not know what advice he could give to Shan, Julius and their friends so that they 
too might reap the rewards of oil, because he was “always afraid to invest the other man’s 
money . . . It is so easy to lose.”30 This apparent reluctance to allow others to benefit, as he 
had done, appears at odds with his boasts of his profits. However, it can be seen as another 
example of his determination to disassociate himself from the wider populace, friends and 
relatives included.31 In a key statement, Long emphasised just how profitable he was finding 
the oil business since it would  
“not hurt my political future to make whatever investments I wish to in the 
oil business. I understand the situation down here better than any man in 
the state, and have a perfect right to do it.”32   
This statement shows that Long believed the benefits he could get from the oil industry were 
not just limited to financial gain; he could also use them to accrue political credit, specifically 
by pursuing the big oil companies. Certainly Charles L Orr, a friend of Long’s from his time at 
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the University of Oklahoma,33 recognised as early as January 1917 that Long’s “merciless 
attack on the soulless corporations of Louisiana” was by way of “laying the foundation for a 
stellar political career.”34 However, Long refused to concur with Orr’s assessment, and in his 
reply, chose instead to suggest that his purpose in running for political office had a more 
altruistic motive, to target the corporations: 
“Last summer I decided to try my hand against the state ringsters and 
corporation bosses that have dominated this state for many years. I ran for 
railroad commissioner, a position similar to that of corporation 
commissioner in your state, or public utility commissioner in some other 
states.”35 
In a 1939 retrospective series of articles, “The Kingdom of the Kingfish,” Hermann B Deutsch 
described how at the first rally of the 1920 gubernatorial campaign, held in Hot Wells, 
Louisiana, “[not] yet even a kingminnow, Huey P. Long appeared unannounced . . . and 
stole the show by his vitriolic attack on Governor Pleasant.”36 Accompanying this article is a 
copy of Trist Wood’s cartoon from the New Orleans Item which had “marked Huey Long’s 
first entry into state-wide politics” portraying a vigorous Long “in eruption” as he spoke to the 
crowds.37  
As Deutsch noted, not one of the prospective gubernatorial candidates, who had spoken in 
Hot Wells, actually remained in the election race after being eclipsed by Long at the event.38 
Having pushed himself into the political consciousness of the state by attacking the 
governor’s stance on the pipelines, Long sought to further develop his political connections 
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by aligning himself with Parker’s gubernatorial campaign. Although Williams considers him to 
have been the most “incongruous member”39 of the coalition supporting Parker, Long was 
explicit that his support rested upon the need to eliminate the New Orleans machine’s 
control of the state,  
“So long as the ring continues, the state is without law, without order and 
constantly taking backward steps from civilisation. . . . I consider it the most 
execrable thing with which this state has ever been cursed – surely the 
country should make it possible for the citizens of New Orleans to free 
themselves from this octopus.”40   
However, his allegiance was predicated on two points alone, both of which would assist in 
advancing Long’s career strategy. First, Parker’s platform had indicated that he favoured a 
measure on pipeline regulation; the second, that with Long’s assistance, Parker’s success 
with the voters in the northern parishes could be improved. During his previous run for 
governor in 1916 as the Progressive Party’s candidate, Parker had proved successful in the 
southern parishes, but had very little support in the north. If he was elected, especially with 
Long’s support in the north of the state, Long would be able to claim he had delivered the 
governor’s office for Parker. For Long, the benefits of supporting Parker for the 1920 
gubernatorial election were two-fold: he could claim that he had the power to influence the 
electorate and also that he had a role in creating the governor’s programme.  
However, Long’s anticipated influence over the new governor was short lived. On the matter 
of the pipeline bill, he had drafted a proposal which designated all pipelines to be common 
carriers or transportation,41 although, as a letter to D H Finley demonstrates, he claimed he 
did not expect his proposal to be accepted given the state of his relationship with Standard 
Oil: 
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“The Standard Oil Company and myself and friends will enter a conference 
together, though I have been requested to lay aside my bitterness toward 
them and adopt a conciliatory attitude, which I will attempt to do, but I do 
not think they will allow me to retain very long. You know they like me about 
as well as I do them.”42 
The final bill passed by the Legislature, a compromise drawn up to satisfy the major oil 
companies and the independent producers rather than Long, determined that the courts 
could judge a pipeline to be a common carrier if it carried oil from other producers on a 
regular basis, not simply if it carried oil from other producers on an occasional basis. This bill 
resulted in an irreparable break between Long and Parker. In an early demonstration of his 
inability to accept the stipulations of another politician, Long allowed his personal fury, that, 
in his view, Parker had gone back on his pledge for pipeline regulation, to determine his 
actions. That the primary beneficiary of this bill would be Standard Oil simply aggravated the 
offence. Although Williams portrays Long as having recognised that this outcome would give 
him a valid political issue, which he could reasonably utilise to his benefit, it is more 
appropriate to apply a less positive assessment of his reactions. Long’s petulance at being 
bested in a political argument certainly allowed him to create for himself a bête noire, in the 
Standard Oil Company, one that he would indeed seek to manipulate to the maximum. But 
to suggest, that he acted in a way other than to react with personal enmity and churlishness 
attributes a level of political adroitness and prescience, which is dependent solely on 
Williams’ retrospective analysis of Long’s career-long pursuit of Standard Oil rather than an 
assessment of his actions at that time.43 Long published a statement which accused Parker 
of having reneged on his campaign promises:  
Huey Long, railroad commissioner, is out with a statement bristling with 
charges hurled at the “Standard Oil lobby, now gathered in Baton Rouge.” 
He charges administration leaders have become susceptible to this 
powerful influence and that the Butler resolution of the Senate to 
investigate, is but a play for delay and ultimate defeat of the Douglas bill 
making all pipe lines common carriers. Mr. Long issues a warning to 
Governor Parker, declaring he had promised this bill from every stump in 
the state and that it is now up to him to see that it passes the Senate, he 
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warns the governor against “certain friends,” who are only interested in their 
own success. He declared he had supported Parker ardently during the 
campaign and added: “Whose program for the good of the state I am yet 
supporting.”44  
This was a clumsy move which signalled the break between the two men very early in 
Parker’s new term of office. Long was not acting as a pragmatic politician, when he broke 
with Parker and became a persistent opponent of his administration, rather than accept the 
compromise deal. In a letter to his lawyer, Judge Robert R Reid, he expressed his “contempt 
for certain parties who secured my support under false pretenses [sic] and went back on 
every promise made to me.”45 While Long’s action on this occasion presaged future breaks, 
the break with Parker was specifically linked to their disagreement over the oil pipelines and, 
therefore, Standard Oil. The corporation had, in part, been responsible for the financial 
losses that Long had sustained over the Pine Island situation, and now he had been unable 
to persuade the new governor to enact legislation which would impose penalties on the 
corporation. In retaliation, after his failed attempt to influence the governor, he did not limit 
himself to accusations that Standard Oil was controlling Parker and his administration: “The 
attitude of the Governor at the present time,” he told Thomas J Greer  
“is such as to indicate that he has about thrown himself and all his marbles 
into the bag, toward the inevitably consuming flames of the special 
interests. He is against any little man securing rights in the legislature, if 
opposed by the Standard Oil Company.”46  
He also claimed that members of the Legislature were under the company’s control, a tactic 
which he would continue to use throughout his career, most notably during the 
impeachment. For Long, accusations that his political opponents were subject to 
inappropriate influences were a staple of his political career, including the allegations that 
Parker was in thrall to Standard Oil. It was the use of claims of corruption such as these 
which precipitated the first attempt to impeach Long.  
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In a statement published in the newspapers, Long accused his two fellow commission 
members of taking bribes from the Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company, over 
rate increases, while claiming that he alone had rejected these advances.47 The resulting 
outrage in the Legislature at his claims would have resulted in impeachment charges being 
brought against him, had not the members recognised that such an investigation would 
necessarily have had to first prove the innocence of Commissioners Taylor and Michel, since 
they had been implicated. Long could not be impeached for impugning his fellow 
commissioners unless they could be shown to be innocent of his claims. A formal 
investigation into the commission’s activities was initiated, while concurrently in a personal 
action, Governor Parker swore out affidavits charging Long with libel regarding the 
accusations that his administration was being run by Standard Oil.48 The official outcome of 
the Legislature’s investigation was to recommend that all three members of the Public 
Service Commission face impeachment charges, although the Legislature lacked the will to 
act on its own resolution since no testimony was brought to impeach Long and the 
administration did not wish to risk the posts of the other two commissioners.49 A second 
proposal that all three commissioners stand for re-election was deemed inadvisable, since 
Long’s increased popularity as the person exposing the influence of the corporations meant 
that he alone was likely to be re-elected. Long was left to inform Judge Harney F Brunot at 
his libel trial, “all the legislature did . . . was to allow me to be called a liar all over the 
statehouse.”50 He was found guilty of libel, but the sentence was a suspended 30 day jail 
sentence for one charge and a one dollar fine for the other, because, Brunot stated, he 
considered Long to have “an impulsive nature, and that the lesson of guilt, rather than the 
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severity of punishment will be sufficient.”51 This decision offered both parties the opportunity 
to claim victory, since for Long, the sentence was a “sweeping victory . . . inasmuch as he 
had been found guilty on strictly technical grounds, and then a moment later practically 
released by the court”52 while Parker could be said to be vindicated by the guilty verdict. 
However, Deutsch’s later report that Long responded bitterly to reporters’ questions about 
which of the two sentences he would accept: “I wouldn’t tell you my name was Huey Long,”53 
suggests that Long was not entirely satisfied with the verdict, possibly since the guilty verdict 
represented another defeat at the hands of Parker. Certainly his supporters in Mansfield, 
Louisiana, were not impressed with the outcome of the trial, although their objection lay with 
the penalty rather than the verdict: 
We hold no brief to defend Mr. Long, and Gov. Parker needs none, and 
there is no fault to be found with the verdict of the court, but we resent the 
penalty imposed, as the court by implication, at least, leaves it to be 
inferred, that we the people, of the First R. R. Commission District had 
elected a fellow to the most exalted office within our gift, whose word 
amounted to so little that he could not libel a man for more than four-bits 
worth at a pop . . . No! for whatever may be said about Huey, he is not so 
all-fired cheap as that. . . The trouble with Gov Parker and the Baton Rouge 
Judge is that they take our Huey too seriously. His home folks know better 
than to do that, but when he is trouble, we must stick to him like a fever tick 
does to a Sabine parish cow.54 
 As governor, Long exacted his revenge on Brunot for the decision, as he began to fill the 
Louisiana Supreme Court with men who owed their allegiance to him. Having previously 
managed the election of John R Land to the court from the northern district,55 he made it 
clear that he supported his libel trial lawyer, Robert R Reid, over Brunot for the seat in the 
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southern district. Reid won the election. Brunot would later take a seat on the court, but only 
after he had switched his allegiance to Long.56  
In 1922, in the election called as a result of the death of Commissioner Michel, Francis 
Williams was elected as commissioner for the southern district. A swift reorganisation of the 
commission installed Long as chairman.57 The first case to come before the reorganised 
commission involved the telephone rates increases which had resulted in threatened 
impeachment. Under Long’s chairmanship, the hearing was loud, argumentative and 
dictatorial in nature. Since Williams had pledged to reduce phone rates during his recent 
campaign, the telephone company’s representative, Blanc Monroe, attempted to propose 
that Williams recuse himself from the case. The motion was shouted down by Long, who 
threatened Monroe with contempt and jail should he persist in promoting it. After evidence 
was heard, Deutsch reports that the commission “took the case under advisement, meaning 
that Mr Long went back to Shreveport” to write the decision rejecting the increase and 
restoring rates to their previous level. While ultimately the company appealed the decision 
and a compromise rate increase was agreed,58 the subsequent refunds totalling $440,00059 
to people across the state not only provided a tangible demonstration of Long’s effectiveness 
on behalf of the people as well as his determination to take on the corporations on their 
behalf, but it also provided him with publicity material to utilise in future campaigns.60  
The work of the commission, especially after its remit was widened and it was renamed the 
Public Service Commission, had a broad impact not just via state-wide cases but also 
through local municipal cases. It is T Harry Williams’ opinion that while the outcome of the 
diversity of cases dealt with by the commission did result in increased name recognition 
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across the state for Long, it was for him a combination of “self-interest and idealism.”61 
However, since Long lacked a philosophical or ideological framework, ultimately his actions 
were self-serving.62 Following the outcome of the phone rate case, Long returned to court to 
request the company pay not only the costs of the case, but also his fees.63 Just as he 
introduced the concept that those cases which were to succeed before the commission 
should benefit the general community and not simply local interests,64 so he also insisted on 
full three person panel hearings where previously cases would have been heard by a single 
commissioner, whose decision would be confirmed by the other two members. This is not to 
suggest that Long adhered to a strictly professional and politically appropriate style of 
chairmanship. He was less inclined to adhere to the concept of full panel hearings when the 
hearings were held in private which therefore offered fewer opportunities for publicity, later 
deeming Francis Williams’ executive sessions to be a waste of public money, demanding 
that the sessions  
“all be in the open and full view of the public, with the transactions duly and 
publicly recorded for inspection, when I go into session with the two 
colleagues who are now on the Commission. Whenever there is anything 
done in one of those private meetings, let them write it out and send it up 
here for my action.”65 
His vindictiveness was as likely to rule his decision-making and behaviour as were his 
scruples. Certainly, the level to which Long controlled the commission as chairman suggests 
that the use of the three member panel was an example of domination rather than of 
collegiality. A series of letters between Long and Francis Williams demonstrates how he 
sought to control the activities of the commission and the other members, and that he was 
adamant that Henry Jastremski, the commission’s secretary, was there to support him and 
his work, not that of the other commissioners. In his letter, Long refused to give permission 
                                                          
61 Williams (1969) p155 
62 See Motivations chapter 
63 “Long and Barrows Ask Lawyers’ Fees” Shreveport Times 26 January 1923 p11 
64 Williams (1969) p157 
65 Letter to Henry Jastremski, Secretary, Louisiana Public Service Commission from Huey P Long 
dated 13 January 1927 Huey P Long Papers, Box 33 Folder 1225 Louisiana Public Service 




for Jastremski to accompany Williams to Washington DC on commission business, claiming 
that funding for both men to travel was unlikely to be forthcoming, but also that he needed 
Jastremski to work on two cases due to go to trial within the next ten to twelve days. He 
claimed he would be  
“completely at a loss without Henry there during these trials. In fact he is 
going to have to get up most of this data for me because I can’t spend 
much time there making preparations.”66 
To highlight how Long’s profile was raised by his time and activities with the commission, T 
Harry Williams recounts several tales in which individuals from across the state appealed to 
Long for his assistance against the corporations and businesses, including a story, related 
by William J Dodd, of a logger who, along with other small producers, had been unable to 
get the Kansas City Southern Railroad to transport his stock. Having spoken with Long, the 
man was told to have his stock ready for transport that night. Although not entirely certain 
that Long would be able to persuade the railroad to do the pickup he made certain the stock 
was ready. The logs were collected. The man’s wife was shocked, saying that someone who 
could do such a thing must be a dictator, and in what would become a recurring refrain in 
Louisiana the logger replied “What’s the difference? He gets things done.”67 Williams uses 
this story to demonstrate how Long was actively supporting the people of the state and how 
he “liked the feeling of power that came to him when he could help such a person,”68 but he 
fails to examine further Long’s changing attitude to power as demonstrated not just in the 
wife’s response but also in Williams’ own assessment of Long at this time. Both of these 
points indicate a development in Long’s perception of power; he recognised that not only did 
he have the means and ability to bring about small changes in the lives of people, but that 
his reputation and profile could benefit from these small actions, actions which could be 
converted into electoral support. An example of the small actions that Long would undertake, 
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which had the potential to improve his reputation, is the loan of $8 to C J Dunbar in 
December 1928: 
“Dear Governor: 
Enclosed you will find draft covering the amount you loaned me about 
December 15th, while riding enroute to New Orleans. I thought you would 
be interested to know that I made very satisfactory arrangements today 
with my Patent. Thanking you for your favour, and wishing you every 
success, 
I am, 
Very truly yours,”69 
Long’s response to Dunbar’s letter and repayment of the loan, while a self-eulogising piece, 
also speaks to a degree of cynicism regarding the reliability of others. A cynicism which was 
built on, or caused, his experiences with other politicians: 
“Dear Sir: 
I thank you very much for the check for $8.00 which you sent me in return 
for that amount of money which I handed to you. You reinspire my 
confidence in human beings. I was glad to give you the $8.00 so that you 
might know you had what money I had in order that I could do you a favor 
in safety. The chances were 99 out of 100 that I had a fine man with me, 
but I did not care to take the 100th chance, and after I carried you to New 
Orleans, I knew you needed the $8.00 worse that I did so I had you keep it. 
I am certainly wishing you the very best luck in the world and hope that I 
have made a true friend out of the incident. 
Yours truly, 
Governor”70 
Although Long did actively work in opposition to those whom he had previously supported 
and to those who had at one time supported him, he did not always renege on friendships 
and obligations. During the First World War, state Senator S J Harper was indicted “as a 
traitorous character” an offence which in Long’s view could have “sent him to the penitentiary 
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for thirty years and have called for a fine of $30,000.”71 Long, who had been supported 
financially by Harper during his early days as a lawyer and whose first successful attempt at 
drafting state legislation had come under the auspices of the senator,72 defended Harper 
against the charges despite acknowledging it had been “considered very improper.” Long 
claimed he had done so because “[Harper] had been such a constant friend” but that while 
his defence had been condemned during the race for the Railroad Commission, his 
“explanation to the people as to why I did it, brought me considerably votes [sic] than my 
opponent was able to take away.”73   
For his supporters, Long’s appeal was that he was actively attempting to do something 
rather than conform to the status quo. As a Railroad commissioner, one of his supporters 
praised him for attempting to “[combat] a corporation that has trained the people of our city 
to think every request they make must be granted” and for being “so able and fearless to 
present the truth at a time when we are beaing deseived by erreneous [sic] statements, that 
will not enlighten but blind-fold the public.”74 Long’s work on behalf of his supporters 
garnered promises of support for his proposed gubernatorial run in 1924, even if his work 
had not achieved the required outcome; in March 1923, Mr W B Sivley Jr, manager of 
Klondyke Seed Farms, Collinston La, wrote to assure Long of his support in return for the 
assistance he had received regarding the provision of new depot facilities by the Missouri 
Pacific Railroad, despite the facilities promised not having been delivered yet.75 Even a letter 
to decline the invitation to speak to a high school graduation was turned by Long into a 
demonstration of the work he was doing “fighting for the people,” since any free time he had 
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was spent “to try to do a little practicing on the side so [he] may make the money with which 
[he could] carry on this kind of fight.”76 
It was a larger target which provided Long with a greater opportunity to expand his profile.  
Standard Oil had provided his legal practice with a persistent target through a case which 
had begun in 1921 and dragged on, at the behest of both sides, until 1927. Long 
represented Consolidated Progressive Oil Corporation when it sued Standard Oil for nine 
million dollars in damages in respect of a lease of land fraudulently sold by a former 
Consolidated president to another party, which was then sold on to Standard.77 Long’s 
pursuit of the corporation was obsessive and personal. Having, in his view, suffered at the 
hands of Standard Oil over the Pine Island oil situation and then having faced a protracted 
law case against them while acting for Consolidated, he sought to utilise to maximum effect 
his position on the Public Service Commission by acting against Standard Oil and to try to 
undermine what he perceived to be its domination of the state. As Public Service 
Commissioner, Long’s case against Standard Oil may not have offered the drama, the 
blustering and the shouted threats of contempt and imprisonment that had been exhibited in 
the phone rate case, or any real degree of success for Long, but it represented a significant 
step in his continued pursuit of the corporation. As the commission initiated its proceedings 
in late 1922 on the question of pipelines, Standard Oil was undertaking procedures to 
separate its pipeline operations from the rest of its business, creating the Standard Pipe Line 
Company in January 1923. The commission’s attempts to control the oil corporations by 
designating them public utilities and thereby imposing restrictions on practices and rates of 
the pipeline companies were blocked by the state supreme court in summer 1923. Although 
the court’s judgement determined that the commission had overstepped its powers in 
treating Standard Oil as a whole as a public utility, it also allowed the commission to 
examine the accounts of Standard Oil as these related to the pipeline business. It is 
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Williams’ opinion that Long was satisfied with undertaking this continued harassment of the 
company since, even if it did not achieve tangible success in his personal fight against 
Standard Oil, it further underlined his reputation as the man who would go up against the big 
corporations on behalf of the people.78 This was a currency that Long could use in his next 
political race, for the governor’s office, and from that office he could act against Standard Oil.  
The 1924 gubernatorial race 
It was Long’s intention to garner the reputation and support that he had developed during his 
time on the Public Service Commission, especially through those cases which had affirmed 
his reputation as a man of the people, into support for his campaign for the governor’s office. 
Lacking the finances as well as the political and organised support of his opponents, Henry L 
Fuqua and Hewitt Bouanchaud, his campaign repeated the tactics previously used during 
the election for the Railroad Commission. His brother-in-law, Dave McConnell, drove him 
across the state to give speeches, pin up posters and hand out circulars. In an era of 
increasing radio ownership, Long used radio broadcasts as a way of getting his speeches to 
a wider audience, and was one of the first politicians in Louisiana to use radio as a campaign 
tool. His speeches were personal attacks on his opponents, their supporters and Standard 
Oil. In a statement sent to the newspapers, he condemned his former associate and a 
prospective opponent, Judge James G Palmer as working for Standard Oil rather than for 
the people of Louisiana.79 The result of the 1924 election demonstrated, however, that 
despite his efforts on the commission, Long lacked a sufficiently state-wide personality and 
following, and an adequate support structure that could compete with the New Orleans 
machine. Clearly, he was not yet in a position to be able to manipulate and manage the 
focus of a major political campaign.   
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The central question for all candidates in the 1924 gubernatorial campaign was the 
increased activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The distribution and diversity of the state’s populace 
complicated the issue of the Klan for Long. If he had been a Catholic and from the south of 
the state, his campaign strategy would have been a simple choice between a strong anti-
Klan stance, picking up the majority of Catholic voters but few votes from the northern 
parishes, or a moderate anti-Klan platform, which might dilute the Catholic vote but would 
improve his chances of support in the north. However, as a Protestant candidate from the 
northern parishes, where Klan membership was at its strongest, an anti-Klan stand by Long 
would alienate those areas of his strongest support.80 In personal correspondence, he 
denied that he was a member of the Klan and sought to distance himself,81 but publicly, in a 
poor strategic choice, Long sought to avoid the question. He tried instead to deflect the 
discussion to one on Standard Oil, claiming that it was they, not the Klan, who were the 
political power in the state. Such was the perceived toxicity of the issue that his fellow 
commissioner, Francis Williams, sued the Times Picayune for libel over a cartoon which 
portrayed him as being “actually and consciously engaged in a conspiracy with the Ku Klux 
Klan to elect a [Klan] candidate [Huey P Long] as governor.”82 Williams claimed that if 
anyone could prove that Long “is a klansman, or the klan candidate, [he and his brother 
would] withdraw” their support.83    
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The primary election was won by Bouanchaud, with Fuqua second and Long third. Although 
the result meant Long did not participate in the run-off, which Fuqua won, it did present a 
degree of concern for the supporters of his opponents. While Bouanchaud had a majority of 
the votes across the south of the state and Fuqua’s strength had come from the urban 
areas, Long had done much better than expected, and his support had come from the rural 
small-farmer poor parishes from across the state. This was support which could be expected 
to be further expanded in the future, especially if, as Long suggested, the rain did not again 
prevent them from voting.84 
Whilst his position on the Public Service Commission was essential for his future plans for 
the governor’s office, and in spite of the outcome of the 1924 gubernatorial election, Long 
appeared to be so confident of his re-election to his seat on the commission later the same 
year, that he focussed as much time on supporting the United States Senate re-election 
campaign of Joseph E Ransdell, as he did on his own campaign. Although Ransdell was a 
diametrically opposite character to Long, both parties benefitted from the unusual affiliation – 
Ransdell needed Long’s support to overcome the challenge of his opponent, Lee E Thomas, 
whose campaign had the support of Governor Fuqua and former Governor J Y Sanders; 
while Long anticipated that his support of Ransdell would be reciprocated by the senator and 
his supporters in the southern parishes and amongst Catholic voters in the gubernatorial 
contest of 1928. Long’s self-confidence in his own support was justified as he took all of the 
twenty eight parishes in his district, representing 83.9% of the vote.85    
Following his re-election, the Public Service Commission was largely inactive under Long’s 
chairmanship, except on cases which would improve his gubernatorial chances; political 
activity as represented by public service was no longer his focus, the Commission had 
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served its purpose in raising Long’s profile and now it served to keep Long in the public eye 
as he prepared to move up the next step on his career ladder. With the election, in 1926, of 
Dudley J LeBlanc to the commission’s second district seat, the dynamics of the three person 
commission altered; Francis Williams was nominated (by LeBlanc) to the chair and, in 
Long’s absence, the majority vote passed. Once ousted from the chairmanship, Long’s 
interest and participation in the Commission’s activities waned considerably. In a statement 
after being ousted, he said: 
“I can afford to lose the chairmanship of the Commission at this time, and in 
the best of grace. It will give me a much needed opportunity to actively 
devote my attention to my campaign for governor, and to take care of some 
of the private law practice which I have had to neglect for the legal work of 
the Commission.”86  
By positioning his law practice as having been neglected by his work as chair of the 
commission, Long sought to emphasise his commitment to the state, and its people, as 
something which had been at the cost of personal sacrifice. The commission had served its 
purpose in promoting Long across the state, and he now focussed his time on building a 
network of support outside his stronghold of the northern parishes. The period between 1924 
and the beginning of campaign activities in 1927 was, for Long, an extended session spent 
in building support collaborations with, amongst others, Paul Maloney in New Orleans; 
Colonel Robert Ewing, the owner of New Orleans States and the Shreveport Times, whose 
“unswerving loyalty and clear exposition of the facts and issues were” Long claimed, “without 
doubt, one of the most outstanding factors in the whole campaign;”87 and Senator Edwin 
Broussard. ‘Coozan Ed’ would help deliver the southern, French speaking parishes in return 
for Long’s support in the 1926 US Senate race against J Y Sanders.88 However, this 
connection was sufficiently nebulous that Harvey E Ellis found it necessary to write to 
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Broussard in January 1927 to encourage him to reciprocate Long’s support in the face of 
attempts by “the same influences that attempted to keep Long from supporting [him] in the 
recent senatorial campaign” to conduct an “insidious campaign of slander against Long.”89 
While Ellis declined to act as manager for Long’s state campaign, stating that he had 
insufficient time available to carry out the “exacting requirements of such a position,” he did 
offer specific advice on how Long should conduct his campaign to overcome his image as “a 
radical and a Bolshevik” which may have appealed to “a certain class of our voters, [but] the 
vast majority of our citizens are unwilling to trust the future of our State in the hands of such 
a man, and you are going to be judged by your speeches and your actions, and the men with 
whom you surround yourself in conducting your campaign.”90 In a statement which echoed 
Ellis’s concerns, Mayor Lee E Thomas, of Shreveport, issued an announcement in June 
1927, indicating that he would joining the gubernatorial race “unless some available 
candidate from north Louisiana enters the race” because “a great many citizens [he knew 
were] opposed to a man of the destructive and bolshevistic type for governor of this state.”91 
In his response, Long obliquely referred to Thomas’ previous failed run for the US Senate 
during which the mayor had attempted to play to racial sympathies, and claimed that he was 
not “familiar with the bolshevik activities unless it be that they have some reference to the 
combination that Mr. Thomas made with his friend, the negro republican leader, Walter L. 
Cohen.”92 During the 1924 US Senate race, Thomas had, in campaign materials, 
condemned his opponent Joseph Ransdell for addressing a letter to the republican leader 
using the phrase ‘Mr Cohen.’93 This accusation rebounded on Thomas, when many in the 
state questioned the apparent collusion between him and Cohen, and expressed resentment 
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at the involvement of a black Republican leader in “a white primary of a party with which he 
[had] no affiliation.”94 Having mocked Thomas for his failed tactic, Long used the same one 
in his own Senate race against Ransdell, and even cited the same letter that Thomas had 
quoted.95  
Notwithstanding his advice that Long conduct his campaign along conservative lines and not 
to rely on his personal supporters to win the race, Ellis wrote that he believed if Long were 
elected, he would “clean out the Aegean [sic] stables at Baton Rouge and will give this State 
an honest, fearless, progressive administration, and that you will surround yourself by 
conservative friends to whom you will appeal for counsel and advice.”96 Ellis reiterated this 
opinion in a subsequent letter to Louis A Wood, further suggesting that the “only man who 
can defeat Long is Long himself” and that if he relied on “safe, sane conservative men, to 
whom he will appeal for counsel and advice” he would win the election.97 
Governor of Louisiana 
In December 1926, Long faced the 1928 gubernatorial election confidently. In a letter to R F 
Robinson, he estimated that he could take the “country part of the state . . . with from 70,000 
to 75,000 votes in the lead of my opposition.”98 He also expected to carry New Orleans, but 
had made “plans so that, regardless of what may happen there, my majority in the country 
will be so large that nothing that is done in New Orleans can affect my chances of being 
governor.”99  
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In the years since his failed run in 1924, he had created an organisation and attracted funds 
for a campaign war chest, including a $40,000 donation from New Orleans business man, 
Robert S Maestri.100 Unlike the political machines of New Orleans (the ‘Old Regulars’ and 
the ‘New Regulars’) which operated up to and including the state level, and which could be 
brought to bear in support of any candidate identified by the machines’ leaders, Long’s 
organisation had a single purpose, to bring about his election to the office of governor. His 
organisation also differed from the New Orleans machines in affiliation. Unlike the others, 
whose membership was based in essence on a degree of ideological consistency, the upper 
levels of Long’s organisation were made of men whose allegiance was to him personally in 
varying degrees. While there were those whose allegiance was dependent not only on the 
size of the favour they owed to Long, but also the degree to which they could allow 
themselves to submit to Long’s sense of superiority and how far they could align themselves 
with his programmes, there were those whose allegiance was to Long himself, including 
Seymour Weiss and Maestri. The main strength behind Long’s organisation, however, lay 
with the rural vote, which had supported him in 1924 and which formed the solid backbone of 
the Long machine. Rural leaders were either influenced to support Long by the people in 
their parishes or they were inclined to support him by his programmes, which promised to 
deliver future improvements for them; while their support may have been in some way 
ideologically linked to Long, it is most likely that they were drawn to support him solely for 
the benefits his programmes would bring to their communities.  
The efficiency of campaign activities for 1928 was vastly improved for Long by both the 
existence of his organisation and by the influx of financial support. Instead of having to 
deliver and pin up his circulars himself, he could now rely on his organisation to do the more 
mundane aspects of the campaign, while he focussed on speaking in as many parts of the 
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state and to as many people as possible.101 Long followed his established campaign 
strategies, plastering the state with circulars, stump speeches, radio broadcasts102 and 
personal attacks on his opponents, and he emphasised his programmes, especially the free 
school books initiative. The result of the first Democratic Party primary demonstrated the 
growth of Long’s support across the state. Although he led, he did not gain a sufficient 
majority of the vote to avoid a second, run-off, ballot: Long, 126,842, Riley J Wilson, 81,747, 
Governor Oramel H Simpson, 80,326.103 Long’s lead was such that he was unlikely to lose 
the run off, unless Simpson’s supporters could be delivered as a block to Wilson. However, 
with the defeat, Simpson’s organisation collapsed and one of his leaders, Paul Maloney, 
defected to Long.104 Subsequently, the Old Regulars “decided to advise Mr Wilson not to 
enter a second primary.”105 Long therefore became governor of Louisiana, without needing 
the second primary.106 In return for Maloney’s action, Simpson was given a minor office in 
the Long administration.107 Long’s electoral success, however, was not accompanied by 
electoral gains by his supporters in the Legislature’s elections. His organisation had been 
solely focused on his election, it was only in later elections that Long tickets would be 
promoted and elected in their entirety. In theory, therefore, his influence over the Legislature 
was limited at best. With only eighteen of the one hundred members of the House of 
Representatives aligned to Long, and only nine of the thirty nine senators,108 received 
wisdom would suggest that it was likely that the new governor would struggle to form strong 
enough coalitions to implement his programmes. However, Long’s actions immediately after 
                                                          
101 Williams (1969) pp259-261 
102 Long’s opened his gubernatorial campaign at Bolton High School in Alexandria on the evening of 3 
August 1927. His speech was heard by 3000 people in the auditorium, with a crowd, estimated to be 
around 5000, listening outside to the speech through loudspeakers. The speech was also broadcast 
by radio station KWKH in Shreveport “Cheers As He Tells Issues” The Shreveport Times 2 August 
1927 p1 & p13 
103 “Final Results Announced” The Alexandria Daily Town Talk 24 January 1928 p1 
104 “Concede Post to Huey P Long” The Shreveport Times 23 January 1928 p12 
105 Ibid 
106 The general election results were Long: 92,941; Etienne J Claire, Republican: 3733 
uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php.fips=22&year=1928&f=O&off=5  
107 Notes from Paul Maloney interview by T Harry Williams on 26 June 1957 in New Orleans La. T 
Harry Williams Papers Research Material HPL: Oral History Interviews, Box 19 p2 




the elections were such that observers of Louisiana politics were soon made aware that 
conventional wisdom rarely applied to Long. 
Between the election in January and his inauguration on 21 May 1928, Long set about 
disabusing those among his supporters who believed, like Colonel Robert Ewing, that they 
would be the power behind the throne of the new administration. One of his first actions was 
to bypass the traditionally-accepted process for nominating delegates to the Democratic 
National Convention. In some ways, Long was in essence no different from any other 
Louisiana politician of the era, he understood that to enact his programmes, deals would 
need to be made. Where he differed from other contemporary politicians was in the speed, 
ruthlessness and effectiveness of his strategies in getting such deals enforced. He sent long-
time supporters from Winn Parish, Harley B Bozeman and Oscar K Allen, to persuade 
undecided and undeclared legislators to come over to his side, so that by the time the 
Legislature sat in session in May 1928, one week before the inauguration, Long was 
confident of promised support from a majority of legislators in both houses.109  
Traditionally the governor’s wishes were a strong but not necessarily decisive factor in the 
election of the presiding officers in the two houses of the Louisiana Legislature. In the 
senate, Long’s forces supported the re-election of Philip H Gilbert as president pro tem, an 
election the popular Frenchman easily won. In the House, with none of the newly elected 
Long members sufficiently experienced or imbued with his absolute trust to be an obvious 
candidate for speaker, he settled on the newly elected John B Fournet as his preferred 
candidate. Fournet was elected to the office by 72 to 27 votes. Long’s initial relationship with 
the state Legislature was a mixture of adherence to those traditions which would offer 
support for his dominion and a dismissal of any which would prevent him achieving his 
goals. The Legislature’s rules dictated that the president of the senate and the speaker of 
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the House determined the committee memberships within each house; in practice, factional 
decision-making had previously determined committee structures. But adherence to this 
process would have inhibited Long’s ability to control the legislative practices, so in another 
break from conventional practice, he dictated to both Gilbert and Fournet the full make-up of 
each committee within each house. As the New Orleans Item reported, the new governor’s 
rule of the state had begun.110 
Long’s determination to control all aspects of state government was enforced through formal 
powers, persuasion and even strict adherence to constitutional restrictions. When he was 
inaugurated as governor, the office held one constitutionally mandated power which he could 
and did utilise with immediate effect, that of patronage through the appointment of state jobs. 
Even officials who were already appointed to state boards and agencies, and whose terms 
were not yet due to expire, were not exempt from his determination to control. While 
constitutional restrictions may have prevented Long from exercising his authority over all 
agencies immediately, adherence to the same constitutionally sanctioned authorisations 
allowed him to place his own people in to positions he wished to control. Where 
gubernatorial authority did not allow for rapid changes, then the Legislature was persuaded 
to pass laws allowing Long’s personnel changes to be instituted.111 In the case of the New 
Orleans Charity Hospital, when attempts to push a bill through the Legislature to instigate 
changes failed, it was through a precise attention to detail that he got his way. He noted that 
the terms of two members of the board had expired and they were serving without 
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authorisation. With their removal and the installation of his own appointees, he achieved 
control of the board.112  
In the case of Dr Valentine K Irion, head of the Conservation Commission, Long claimed that 
while Governor Fuqua had “sent Irion’s name to the senate for confirmation and he was 
confirmed [that] the governor [had] failed to issue a commission.”113 It was therefore Long’s 
contention that Irion had no right to the office, to which he had appointed Robert S Maestri. 
In a story picked up by newspapers across the country, Long secretly mobilised the state 
militia, in a blatant demonstration of force and intimidation, to remove Irion from office. The 
state supreme court determined that Maestri was entitled to the office but Irion resisted until 
advised that his request to appeal to the US Supreme Court had been denied by Chief 
Justice Charles A O’Niell, he then resigned. The militia was stood down and its members 
were advised that “it was a ‘test mobilization.’”114  
In a tactic previously used by Governor Henry Clay Warmoth, Long required each of his 
appointees to sign undated resignation letters at the beginning of their terms in office as 
insurance against a future break.115 Williams sought to minimise the significance of this tactic 
by suggesting that not all letters were retained, stating that in some instances letters were 
demanded of a whole board if Long distrusted a single member and that the remainder were 
secretly returned to those trusted appointees.116 However, as Abe L Shushan testified during 
the impeachment, letters which were believed to have been destroyed were in fact retained 
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by Long.117 Long’s disposition to control those around him, combined with his inability to 
brook dissent from political or personal allies, meant that he was unlikely to have trusted 
anyone so implicitly that he would have given up any degree of control that he may have had 
over that individual by returning or destroying such leverage as an undated resignation letter. 
For Long, control was a fundamental factor in his ability to deliver his programmes. As such, 
Williams’ assessment is not just contrary to Long’s exhibited behaviour, it also demonstrates 
an attempt to position him within the accepted behaviours of Louisiana rather than as an 
aberration. Williams estimated that in the first two years of his administration only a third of 
state employees were Long people.118 While he argues that Long was acting similarly to the 
governors who had preceded him by using jobs to exercise political influence, he fails to 
recognise the crucial point of difference, that Long had developed the conventional system 
of one-off patronage repayment into an apparatus to maintain recurring points of 
manipulation.119 The combination of state jobs and control of the Legislature, when used 
together with ruthless persuasion methods including blackmail, amounted to a degree of 
political power never previously exercised by a Louisiana governor. One of the skills Long 
had developed as a travelling salesman, which also made him a skilful campaigner, was his 
ability to remember everyone he had met. As governor, he utilised this skill to control the 
state. He knew who held which post and, most critically, who was connected to whom. 
These relationships were targets which could be, and were, manipulated. 
With these strategies in place, Long could reasonably expect a great degree of success in 
achieving his legislative programmes in the early years of his administration. However, the 
legislative opposition contained experienced political operatives, whose skill and knowledge 
of parliamentary procedure exceeded that of Long, and who could be expected to be 
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brought to bear to block or hold up legislation.120 Moreover, their determination to oppose 
Long’s legislation was as fixed and unreasonable as was his determination to pass his 
programmes. As Cecil Morgan later acknowledged, the pursuit of rational and pragmatic 
politics was damaged by the destructive atmosphere, such that even had Long proposed 
legislation to which they were philosophically and ideologically inclined, they would have 
opposed it, simply because it came from Long.121 As such, opposition to Long, and the need 
to ensure that cooperation or compromise did not mean legitimising his agenda, blocked any 
potential for bipartisan agreements. 
Long’s first legislative session included all of the strategies which would mark out his term in 
office as a highly unusual one. In a tactic that was not only against tradition and custom, but 
which also called in to question the separation of the branches of government in Louisiana, 
Long acted as his own floor leader in both houses of the Legislature. Storming the floor, 
shouting instructions to legislators, and answering voice votes on behalf of his supporters, 
his behaviour was as much about being at the centre of events as it was about being in 
control of those events. When in embarrassment at his actions, his supporters asked him to 
desist, he refused. But as newspapers reported, the situation had come to a head during the 
first of the 1929 special sessions, when, on 19 March 1929, representatives, including “L. L. 
Williams and A. P. Frymire of New Orleans and J. Y. Sanders of East Baton Rouge” 
objected to his presence on the floor, and “the stinging rebukes to which [he] was compelled 
to listen during the moments he flitted from member to member in the rear of the House of 
Representatives, forced him to leave, and he did not return.”122 
His first regular legislative session had seen his bills for natural gas in New Orleans and free 
school books passed and an amendment to the existing severance tax law passed to pay for 
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the books. Amendments for a road bond and gasoline tax, which would fund Long’s 
programme of highway construction across the state, were scheduled for ratification by the 
electorate in November 1928. The amendments were approved by overwhelming 
majorities.123 Despite this apparent initial success, Long faced legal challenges to both the 
free school books legislation and the severance tax. In a response to the Caddo Parish 
School Board’s opposition, he declared that its action would harm school children: 
“I do not find where any reason was advanced as to why school children of 
Shreveport and Caddo parish should be prevented from having free school 
books. The action of the school board proposes to penalize our thousands 
of children throughout the city and parish because someone else is going to 
get the same free school books. The state has the books on hand and they 
are ready to send out. They would not cost anyone a single cent, but the 
Caddo school board has yielded to keep the children from having the free 
school books at all.”124 
In both cases, when the judgement of the state supreme court found the laws to be 
constitutional, the complainants appealed the decisions in the United States Supreme Court, 
but in the meantime the books were allowed to be distributed to the children of the state and 
the severance tax collected. In April 1930, the court decided in favour of both of Long’s laws. 
The books were being given to the children, not the schools, so did not violate state / religion 
constitutional restrictions. The state was deemed to be exercising reasonable latitude in the 
imposition of the severance tax.125  
The degree to which Long could be vindictive towards his opponents and at the same time 
manipulate them into adhering to his wishes is best demonstrated in an incident early in his 
administration which was related to the free school books case and which helped sow the 
seeds for his impeachment. The opposition to the school book legislation was primarily 
located in Caddo parish; the school board and citizens of the parish objected to what they 
viewed as state sponsored welfare – the issuing of free school books – and to the 
unconstitutional involvement of the state in religious schools – the issuing of books to pupils 
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attending church run schools. At the regular legislative session in May 1928, legislation had 
been passed to enable the city of Shreveport, located in Caddo parish, to acquire land in 
neighbouring Bossier parish for the purpose of donating it to the federal government to build 
an army air base on the site. The proposed base would have positive economic impacts for 
the city and its environs. After the session had adjourned, it was discovered that the crucial 
phrase “or without” had been omitted from the legislation in error, thereby nullifying the 
proposed plan to offer the land from outside of Caddo parish. 
Long had called a special session of the Legislature to start on 10 December 1928 
specifically to enact legislation to collect the gasoline tax and to start road construction. For 
the people of Shreveport and Caddo parish, the special session was a reprieve, if the 
governor could be persuaded to extend his call to include a discussion of the proposed air 
base and thereby issue the corrective legislation. Long refused. The episode demonstrates 
his desire to punish those who opposed him, as well as his ability to manipulate them to 
achieve his goals in full. Long presented an ultimatum to the Shreveport committee which 
was designed to enrage his opponents: an apology was to be published in the newspaper 
for the way the city had treated him; the city and Colonel Robert Ewing’s newspapers would 
show him more respect; the Caddo school board would withdraw its legal case against the 
school books and their distribution; and the Caddo delegation would announce its full 
support for the governor’s programme in the special session. Shortly after the committee 
refused to accede to Long’s demands, the notification that the air base had been awarded to 
Shreveport was received. In the days that followed, petitions to the governor failed to alter 
his decision and on 8 December he published the call for the special session, without 
reference to the air base.  It was Long who then proposed a compromise solution; that the 
twenty eight opposition senators should sign a petition calling on the Caddo school board to 
distribute the school books without compromising its legal challenge. Twenty five of the 
twenty eight senators signed and the Caddo school board pledged to distribute the books. 




“The Caddo parish school board Wednesday afternoon formally accepted 
the proposition of Gov. Huey P. Long that it take over the distribution of free 
school books in this parish until its suit against the text book act be finally 
passed upon, in return for the governor’s inclusion in his call for a special 
session of the legislature of the necessary legislation for the establishment 
of the army attack wing here.”126 
Williams, in his determination to show that Long was a pragmatic politician, whose 
compromise proposal allowed his opponents to save face, misses a crucial point in his 
interpretation of this incident.127 Rather than exhibiting pragmatism, Long had demonstrated 
that he would get what he wanted, in this case the distribution of free school books in Caddo 
parish, while at the same time demonstrating to his opponents that failure to adhere to his 
programmes would have substantial political, economic and financial penalties.   
Having ended 1928 with successes in his major programmes, Long started 1929 with 
demonstrations of his disdain not just for his legislative opponents, but also for those who 
had supported his gubernatorial campaign, without being aligned to his organisation, 
beginning with tearing down the governor’s mansion in Baton Rouge; by upholding the death 
sentences of Thomas Dreher and Ada LeBoeuf128 and so alienating his Lieutenant 
Governor, Paul Cyr; and instigating breaks with Colonel Robert Ewing and John Sullivan 
over the raids on gambling establishments.129 But it was a decision by the US Supreme 
Court in the severance tax case that would specifically lead Long to actions that would end 
in his impeachment. The Court determined that, in light of a Louisiana law that prevented 
anyone who had overpaid taxes from recovering the funds without the permission of the 
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state, payments of the severance tax would go into abeyance pending a decision on the 
case. Demonstrating the highly interconnectedness of Louisiana politics and Long’s 
programmes, this decision severely affected the funding of the free school books 
programme.130 
The lowest point of Long’s gubernatorial career came with his call for the Legislature to meet 
in special session in March 1929 to legislate on six items, including a controversial 
occupational tax on oil. Long’s determination to direct a recalcitrant Legislature to pass his 
bills led, first to the adjournment of the session, and in the face of another adjournment 
during the second session, a brawl and the instigation of impeachment charges against him. 
The specific details of the impeachment will be explored in the Enemies, Enmity and 
Impeachment chapter.131 
Long had spent late 1929 and early 1930 in negotiations with a group of businessmen led by 
Harvey Couch, a former Winnfield resident, who had seen the political battles in the state as 
counterproductive to their interests. The negotiated truce proposed by this group guaranteed 
both an end to the impeachment process, which despite the collapse of the trial remained 
active on the Legislature’s books, and support for the governor’s 1930 legislative 
programme. In exchange, Long guaranteed that no occupational tax132 would be enacted 
while he was governor, although, as Deutsch observed, while Long kept this pledge, he did 
later enact the tax under O K Allen’s administration.133 The immediate outcome of this truce 
was that a chemical company announced it would locate its plant in Louisiana, and Standard 
Oil revealed that it would no longer oppose the severance tax in court, thereby releasing 
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funds for the free school books programme.134 However, in negotiating the truce, the 
businessmen did not fully understand the full scope of Long’s ambitions for Louisiana. His 
focus had turned to major infrastructure projects across the state. The new governor’s 
mansion was already being built, in the style of the White House in Washington DC, and 
would, Long hoped, be complete by the time the Legislature met for the regular session in 
May 1930, and his plans included a new capitol building in Baton Rouge, a bridge across the 
Mississippi, improvements to the port in New Orleans and a widening of his road 
construction programme. The state Highway Commission estimated that the state would 
spend $28,000,000 on bridge and highway construction in 1930, with the governor 
anticipating that “more than 3000 miles of highway” would be completed by the end of 
1932.135  
It was Long’s view that the effects on Louisiana of the recent stock market crash could be 
mitigated by the jobs provided by his infrastructure programmes.136 It was therefore 
inevitable that disagreements would emerge between the business leaders and Long, when 
they attempted to restrict the level of his control over the expenditure that would be raised 
through a bond issue for his construction programmes. Long considered the business men 
convenient allies, but was unwilling to bend to their will. In a crude demonstration of his 
power, Long targeted a brother-in-law of Esmond Phelps, one of the men leading the call to 
impose restrictions on his control of the bond monies. Arthur B Hammond, a part-time lawyer 
for both the Dock Board and the Levee Board was, in Long’s opinion, drawing two official 
salaries, a circumstance which was officially illegal under state law. This made Hammond a 
useful target for Long’s retribution and he was dismissed from both of his jobs.137 The long 
term damage caused by this single demonstration of his power, was the unrelenting pursuit 
of him by Hammond’s wife, Hilda Phelps Hammond in particular through her activities 
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campaigning for investigations into both Long and Overton’s actions during the Overton-
Broussard US Senate election campaign. Mrs Hammond’s determination to have Long 
removed from office did not, however, allow her to engage in tactics which had already been 
exhausted. A letter exchange with John M Caffery, who proposed focussing on Long’s 
avoidance of war service, elicited a response that the most effective plan was to work in the 
US Senate to expel him for fraudulently electing John H Overton.138  
Despite his work in preparation for the May 1930 legislative session, Long was unable to 
overcome the opposition’s concerted efforts to block his bills, notably the funding for his road 
construction project. In a tit-for-tat session, Long vetoed those appropriations bills passed by 
the Legislature, including funding for two of his political enemies, Francis Williams (the 
chairman of the Public Service Commission) and Lieutenant Governor Paul Cyr.139 The 
outcome of the session was, what Sindler calls, the ‘inadvertent encouragement’ of Long to 
by-pass the elected members of the Legislature and put his programme to the test of the 
popular vote.140 On 15 July, five days after the end of the regular session, and with two years 
of his term as governor remaining, Long formally announced he was running for the United 
States Senate in the upcoming election against the incumbent, Joseph E Ransdell.141 The 
election would in effect be a referendum on the programmes that the Legislature had 
recently blocked. Defeat in the race would enhance his political opponents’ cause, but 
victory would present him with the legitimate mandate to enact his policies, and would 
demonstrate to all the level of control he held over the state. 
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In a vitriolic campaign, during which both sides indulged in the tactic of name calling, as 
demonstrated by Long’s campaign materials,142 and also engaged in intimidation. Osmond 
Maher, a Long supporter, wrote of the  
“insults and abuses [he] went through during the latter part of the campaign 
. . . people are awful sore here and myself and everyone else who 
supported you are classed as a traitor and I am going to have rough sailing 
until I get rid of my holdings here and get in some other place.”143   
On 1 September 1930, just over a week before the Democratic primary for the Senate race, 
Samuel Irby approached the Ransdell campaign with evidence of graft in the Highway 
Commission. As a result, Irby travelled to Baton Rouge to give evidence which would, 
according to newspaper reports, form the basis of a “secret investigation of the highway 
commission.”144 The following day, Irby announced that he would sue Long and O K Allen for 
slander for “statements made by them to Irby’s wife . . . that [he] had gotten drunk at the 
Hiedelberg hotel at Baton Rouge and had beaten up two women and shot up a room;” Irby 
denied the allegations.145 On 3 September, Irby and James Terrell were taken from the 
Gardiner Hotel in Shreveport by men of the state’s Bureau of Criminal Identification, 
including Dave McConnell, Long’s brother-in-law and one of his cousins, Wade Long. 
Newspaper reports of Irby and Terrell’s disappearance apportioned the blame to “Long 
Henchmen” who had taken the men from the hotel at “about 2 o’clock Thursday morning” 
and “spirited [them] out of Shreveport.”146 With increasing pressure being brought by both 
Terrell’s brother and front page headlines in the press, including accusations that telegrams 
purported to have been sent by the two men, to prevent habeas corpus proceedings, were in 
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fact fraudulent,147 Long arranged for Irby to broadcast a statement on Sunday, 7 September. 
He claimed that his actions earlier in the week had been to expose and compromise the 
enemies of Long, not Long himself.148  
The significance of this incident lies not in that graft existed or that Irby had been appointed 
to his position on the commission by Long and had recently been sacked, but in that Irby 
was married to the aunt of Alice Lee Grosjean, Long’s secretary, and was a close friend of 
Grosjean’s ex-husband, James Terrell. Mason Spencer, a state representative, later claimed 
that Terrell had told him that “Huey had bought Alice Lee from him for $2500 and a Buick 
coupe [and that] Irby [had claimed that] Alice had taken $75,000 Huey had given her to 
hold”149 As such, both Irby and Terrell presented a threat to Long and his election hopes.  By 
removing the two men, Long demonstrated to the state the lengths to which he would go to 
protect himself and to ensure that he would be elected to the US Senate; his manipulation of 
Irby into making a pro-Long radio broadcast two days before the election confirmed his 
power in the state. 
Long utilised his usual electioneering tactics, but he also introduced new technological 
developments to maximise his reach. For this campaign, he used sound trucks to magnify 
his voice at speeches, so he could reach more people without straining his voice.150 The 
result of the Democratic primary on 9 September 1930 was Long: 149,640, Ransdell: 
111,451. The turnout had increased by over 69,000 votes cast as compared to Ransdell’s 
previous US Senate race (in 1924 Ransdell had defeated his opponent, L E Thomas by 
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104,412 votes to 87,547).151 The results in New Orleans (Long: 38,682; Ransdell: 43,373) 
demonstrated that Long’s popularity in the city was increasing (a doubling of his 1928 portion 
of the vote)152 and that the control of the Old Regular machine over the lower ranks was 
weakening.153 In the absence of even a token Republican candidate in the general election, 
the primary result was final, Governor Long was US Senator-elect. In a special session of 
the Legislature, called just one week after the primary, the governor’s programme was easily 
passed, including, notably, the withdrawal of the 1929 impeachment charges. In terms of 
political power, Long was at this point at his most powerful and influential. He controlled the 
majority of political power in the state, the governor’s office, the Legislature and aspects of 
the judiciary; his opponents were dramatically weakened and cowed by both his success in 
the senatorial race and his increased percentage of the vote in urban areas, places in which 
he had previously struggled. His level of influence now meant that he could reasonably 
expect to manage the transfer of the governor’s office to his hand-picked successor and, 
potentially, choreograph the election of his own candidate against Louisiana’s other 
Democratic US Senator, Edwin Broussard, in 1932.154  
Not all of Long’s demonstrations of his need to dominate others were as overt as his 
dealings with the Legislature. In an episode that caught the attention of the national press, 
the commander of a German warship on a good will visit to the United States was met by the 
governor who was wearing green silk pyjamas. While the incident offered both the Louisiana 
and national press a degree of amusement and was portrayed as the gauche behaviour of a 
young governor, it was by no means an unusual tactic for Long to use. He would often hold 
meetings in his bedroom, in his pyjamas, his underwear and occasionally naked. Williams 
describes these incidents as “a symbol of his power . . . [so] people would know how great 
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he was”155 but his analysis is only part of the story. In blithely and confidently disregarding 
matters of dress, formal or otherwise, Long deliberately set his visitors at a disadvantage, 
both socially and politically. With his visitors embarrassed or affronted by his lack of manners 
or distracted by his clothing, or lack thereof, Long was able to take control of the meeting, 
dominating his visitors to his advantage. 
It is true that at each stage of his political career, Long endeavoured to increase the powers 
of the office that he held, even to the point of acquiring power over bodies which would 
constitutionally have been expected to restrain him, thereby prompting the accusations of 
dictatorship. It was, however, at this point, the zenith of his political power, that the 
obsession with his personal control truly became monomaniacal and compulsive. The 
technical issues that lay with Long’s election to the US Senate were not based only in the 
constitutional provision which prevented a person holding a federal and state office 
simultaneously, but also in his unwillingness to hand over control of the state to a political 
enemy, and thereby concede his hold on the power he had acquired. 
Governor and Senator-Elect156 
Although Long’s Senatorial career is not within the remit of this thesis, the period from the 
collapse of the impeachment trial until Long was sworn in as Senator provides further 
evidence of patterns of behaviour. Specifically a continuation of the behaviour which had 
created the circumstances in Louisiana that led to the impeachment. As such, his actions in 
the period, 1930-31 offer corroboratory evidence of the likelihood of impeachment.  
Traditionally, a newly-elected senator would go to Washington DC in the March after his 
election to take the oath of office; Long would have been expected to take the oath at the 
end of Ransdell’s term, in March 1931. However, since his term as governor was not due to 
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expire until May 1932, this left a fourteen month period during which, in normal 
circumstances, a lieutenant governor would be expected to serve out the unexpired term of 
the governor. Normal circumstances, however, do not take in to account Long’s ambition, 
together with his propensity to bear a grudge. Having broken with Lieutenant Governor Paul 
Cyr over the Dreher and LeBoeuf murder case, their mutual animosity had solidified during 
the impeachment, when Cyr supported the anti-Longs’ endeavour. The nature of the battle 
for the governor’s office demonstrated the desperation of Cyr, the vindictiveness and 
obsession of Long and the willingness of Louisianians to engage in political spectacle. Cyr’s 
legal battle for the governor’s office was based on the argument that having been elected to 
the US Senate, Long was in contravention of the state’s constitution by holding a federal and 
a state office simultaneously.157 Long’s counter-argument was that he was Senator-elect 
until he took the oath of office. His determination to prevent Cyr from taking the governor’s 
office for “one split second” led him to extreme behaviours, including refusing to leave the 
state, since in his absence, Cyr would become acting governor.158 In the aftermath of the 
impeachment, Long wrote to his fellow governors to explain the references to the 1928 
Governors’ Conference during his trial, and to offer his apologies for his absence at the 
upcoming conference on the basis that he could not leave Cyr in charge of the state: 
“I regret that I cannot come to the Governors’ Conference in New London. 
On the contrary, I will have to stay in Louisiana because should I leave here 
the Lieutenant Governor, whom I caused to be elected on my ticket, would 
become the Acting Governor and I would have some time undoing what he 
would do during my absence.”159  
Such was their aversion that one newspaper suggested that Long’s appointment of Alice Lee 
Grosjean as Secretary of State for Louisiana meant that in the event that an “act of 
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Providence should remove Paul Cyr from the chair of Lieutenant Governor” she would 
become acting governor and Long would “take his seat in the Senate at once.”160 
In October 1931, during the campaign for the next governor of Louisiana, Cyr’s frustration 
led him to file a law suit in Shreveport to have Long declared a US Senator and to have it 
determined that in being elected to that office, he had vacated the governor’s office. 
However, instead of waiting for a verdict in the case, Cyr had himself sworn in as governor 
and issued a statement to that effect. On hearing of Cyr’s actions, Long, fearful that he 
would seek to seize governor’s mansion, placed a guard on the building and then drove at 
breakneck speed from New Orleans to Baton Rouge. Additionally, in response to a rumour 
that Cyr was forming a private army to seize the state government, he mobilised the state 
police to defend the capitol and the mansion.161 In a farcical turn of events, W L Aldrich took 
the oath of office, reasoning that with two governors in the state already, a third was not de 
trop.162 In an action which echoed both Cyr’s claim against him and Aldrich’s farcical move, 
Long charged that in taking the oath for the governor’s office, Cyr had vacated his office as 
lieutenant governor. Long had Alvin O King, president of the senate, sworn in as lieutenant 
governor.163 The court determined, in agreement with Long’s arguments, that only the US 
Senate could determine the qualifications of senator. A decision in Cyr’s subsequent appeal 
was delayed until after the January 1932 election,164 and ultimately Cyr’s case was 
dismissed.  
Long’s run, for the US Senate, was solely designed to confirm his and his administration’s 
power in Louisiana, by establishing a popular mandate. His unwillingness to leave the office 
suggests that his run for the US Senate seat in 1930 was a reactive response, which 
happened to coincide with his overarching personal career plan, rather than his next, 
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planned, step. However, Long was able to ensure that he finished his term as governor by 
controlling the outcome of the succession to fit his own schedule, and as campaign manager 
for Oscar K Allen, as a letter to Harvey G Fields demonstrates, he left little to chance in the 
days before the gubernatorial election,  
“I am sending you a package of election literature and buttons that I want 
you to have well scattered throughout your Parish during these closing 
days of the election. This package contains all the old literature and some 
new that we have, but I want you to have it neatly and properly handed 
around all over the Parrish. If you have to hire some one, then if our friends 
haven’t any money, I will pay for it, for I want this to be done. Let the 
literature get out. It puts the facts before the people to off-set eleventh hour 
lies.”165 
With King in the lieutenant governor’s office, and his choice of successor, Allen, now elected 
to governor’s office and scheduled to be inaugurated in May, Long decided that he could 
now safely leave the state to take his seat in the US Senate in January 1932. However, he 
does not appear to have been entirely confident that both his position and succession were 
completely secure. In a paranoid move, designed to prevent further action by Cyr, Long left 
the state quietly on 23 January and on 25 January was sworn in as the junior US Senator for 
Louisiana. With a pre-arranged relay, it was only a minute after the news was passed to 
Baton Rouge that King was sworn in as acting governor.166 
Descriptions of Oscar K Allen suggest, that in selecting him as his successor to the 
governor’s office, Long had already decided that he would not be relinquishing control of 
Louisiana when he went to Washington. Allen is described as a dignified and affable man, 
whose biggest weakness was his tendency to be influenced by those around him with more 
forceful personalities, most notably his wife, Florence167 and Long. Long’s control over his 
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puppet governor was such that he did not even need to be in Louisiana to dominate him, as 
demonstrated by this exchange with US Congressman John J O’Connor:  
“[I]n the course of our chat he said to me, ‘You so-and-so, you know a long 
time ago you said something to me about Jimmy O’Connor. Are you really 
interested in him?’ I said, ‘Yes, I am; he is a great fellow and you did him a 
dirty trick.’ Whereupon the Senator picked up the telephone and asked to 
be connected with Governor’s mansion, in Baton Rouge . . . ‘O.K., you’ve 
got a vacancy for Deputy Attorney General, haven’t you? How much does it 
pay? Ten thousand? Well, appoint Jimmy O’Connor to it in the morning. So 
long.’ He then turned to me and said, ‘Now are you satisfied, you so-and-
so?’ And I said, ‘You’re a great guy!’ He was!”168  
Once in Washington DC, Long must have realised that the position of junior senator from 
Louisiana was relatively insignificant. The power in Louisiana had, as a result of the 
governorship of Long, rested with the governor, or the man who controlled the office of the 
governor (providing that man was Huey P Long). In contrast, the power of the United States 
Congress, and specifically in relation to this particular discussion, the Senate, does not lie 
with a single individual. From the informal establishment of the post of majority leader by 
1913, the entrepreneurial, individualistic senators whose independence is described by 
Davidson & Oleszek,169 and their cumulative power, had coalesced around the party holding 
the majority of seats in the chamber, the leaders from that party, seniority and committee 
assignments, as a result the power in the Senate lay with the majority party and, through the 
system of hierarchy, its most senior and long-serving senator. When Long finally took up his 
seat in January 1932, the Senate was evenly split (Democrats 47 seats; Republicans 48 
seats; Others 1 seat); the election later that year would bring about a period of Democrat 
dominance of both houses of Congress which would last almost unbroken until the Reagan 
administration.170 For a newly elected senator, establishing contacts, learning the traditions 
of the institution, building coalitions and support networks were the accepted way to start his 
senatorial career; however, such a low profile, conciliatory approach was certainly not the 
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way Long did things. In contradiction to his low-key departure from Louisiana and 
determined to maximise the publicity around his swearing in, Long instigated a row with the 
senior senator from Louisiana, Edwin S Broussard. Although Broussard was a political 
enemy, tradition dictated that the state’s other senator would escort the new senator to take 
the oath; by forcing a quarrel, which resulted in both men refusing to follow the tradition, 
Long ensured he would gain media attention.171 In the absence of Broussard, Democrat 
minority leader, Joseph T Robinson escorted Long to take his oath. In a further breach of 
Senate rules, Long smoked a cigar during his first session, laying the lighted cigar on 
Robinson’s desk while he took the oath, and when the other senators failed to come to 
congratulate him, he deliberately approached those, from both sides of the aisle, who were 
known to attract the greatest level of media attention.172  
During his first session in the US Senate, Long attended for 56 days and was absent for 81 
days, with the majority of his absence days spent in Louisiana. It is the consensus of his 
biographers that Long’s activities on his arrival in Washington DC were designed to develop 
his national profile and to alleviate his sense of being “a minnow in the Washington pool.”173 
This resonates with a pattern exhibited in Long’s behaviour throughout his career, his 
determination to be at the centre of attention, irrespective of whether that attention was 
positive or negative. Long’s recognition of the lack of status in his new position additionally 
offers an explanation, unexplored by these biographers, for his retention of the political 
power in Louisiana, a combination of his need to be in control of everything which came 
within his grasp, whether it remained in his remit or not, and a recognition that his new office 
offered little by way of actual political power.174 As Williams, a usually sympathetic 
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biographer, explained, Long’s attitude to anything he created or funded, was one of 
ownership. Long saw such people and institutions as “his personal possession and that the 
people in it owed their position to him.”175 In the event that someone associated with such an 
organisation acted in opposition to Long or his wishes, he would interpret it as a personal 
affront and take revenge.  
His possessiveness towards the office of governor of Louisiana appears to have been further 
corroborated when, in a statement in early 1935, he declared that he would be a candidate 
for governor again in 1936: 
“Long made the statement as the house of representatives, in special 
session, was rushing toward final passage of a new batch of bills he 
dumped in the legislative hopper Tuesday night. ‘It’d be fine to be governor 
of a state like this,’ he said, smiling broadly. ‘I think I’ll be a candidate in 
1936. Why, this state’s got $1,500,000 in the bank. I’m going to run for 
governor.’ ‘What about the presidency?’ he was asked. ‘Aren’t you going to 
run for that?’ ‘That comes later,’ Long said, smiling broadly.”176 
However, this statement appears to have been designed to tease and antagonise his 
political enemies at both the state and national levels, including the newspapers, by 
emphasising his control over the state and demonstrating an intention to use its resources. It 
is clear from this statement that Long’s ambition to be president remained intact, as did his 
determination to continue to control the power in the state. His colleagues in the US Senate 
were less convinced than the newspapers that Long really did intend to return to Louisiana, 
with Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi, stating that “he had never heard Long say 
anything about running for Governor,” although a number of senators did state “privately 
they wished he would.”177 
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Long’s determined progression to personal and political power contained and created the 
aspects which formed the basis for impeachment throughout his political career. By 
identifying and pursuing, without variance, a specific route to the US presidency, his focus 
on achieving his goal precluded the use of more traditional and acceptable behaviours to 
work towards his objective.   
Long had a perception of political power, which had generated his ambition, and which had 
driven his behaviour in each of his political offices. It had also led him to mould those offices 
to fulfil his perception of what the power of each office should have looked like, rather than 
its constitutionally determined reality. Long’s career progression, his steps to power were 
exemplified not just by his climbing of the ladder of political offices with the aim of becoming 
President of the United States, but also by the methods he used while in each office to 
manipulate his way to the next stage and to accumulate power to the office he was in while 
he occupied it. The exception to this behaviour occurred when he retained for himself the 
power of the governor’s office when he left the office for the US Senate. The consistent use 
of these methods throughout Long’s career created the environment where impeachment 
was possible at any stage, and with his success in subverting constitutional checks and 
balances meaning that, not long into his governorship, impeachment was apparently the only 
recourse for those who opposed him. 
Long determined at an early age that his route to the presidency would be through 
competitive elections, consecutively to a minor state office, the governorship of Louisiana, 
the US Senate and then to the White House. Having excluded from his pathway a more 
conciliatory route, such as working within the state and national Democratic parties and 
developing support networks, Long’s career was necessarily an antagonistic one which 
required him to challenge traditional expectations within the party and the state. Having 




national politics, Long necessarily ensured that he would challenge the status quo, most 
noticeably by his accumulation of power. As such, he created an environment of 
confrontation rather than a placatory one; one which heightened the sense of provocation. 
As someone who was determined to pursue his own individualistic path, Long saw no need 
to follow the routes to progression determined and followed by others. By setting himself at 
odds with the accepted norms of politics within the state, Long challenged his environment 















From the post-Reconstruction period through to the 1970s, the state of Louisiana formed 
part of “the most transparently undemocratic region of the nation,”1 not only because of 
legislative disenfranchisement of black voters but also as a one party state, with factionalism 
within the dominant Democratic Party occasionally offering the state’s voters the illusion of a 
two party system. As a political operative in Louisiana during the early twentieth century, 
Huey P Long’s political alignment was therefore necessarily limited to membership of the 
Democratic Party, should he wish to achieve success in political office. From an early age, 
Long had made it clear that he planned to have a political career which would take him from 
local state office, via the governorship and the United States Senate, to the Presidency of 
the United States.2 The degree to which Long’s political calculations and ideological 
allegiances were superseded by his desire for power, as a means to control others, was 
evident by the execution of the latter parts of his intended career pathway. This chapter will 
discuss the extent to which Long’s partisanship can be considered as pure political 
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expediency designed to achieve his personal goals and the degree to which this focus on 
power accumulation over political ideology itself made impeachment almost inevitable.  
However, it is first necessary to determine what motivated him. One of the earliest 
commentators on Long, the journalist Harnett T Kane, wrote that he was a smart politician 
who had “not given much thought to abstract theories of government.”3 Although Russell B 
Long later categorised him as one of his father’s detractors,4 Kane had identified one of the 
major problems which faced contemporary commentators, how to explain Long within the 
context of current politics when his programmes, activities and tactics defied simple 
classification by political ideology. With Long variously designated, according to the 
prevailing political ideologies of the time, as a communist, fascist, socialist, progressive or 
populist, commentators failed to produce a convincing or consistent assessment. It is 
therefore necessary to consider whether Long’s motivations lay within one or more 
ideological trope; if as a pragmatic political operative, his actions were driven by expediency; 
if he was obsessed with the accumulation of personal and political power; or if, indeed, he 
adhered to an individualistic set of principles which could be categorised as a personal belief 
system, that is a personal ideology rather than a politically identifiable one.   
The reasons any politician may have for entering politics are rarely straightforward. Some 
may discuss their ideological beliefs, their need to ‘give something back,’ to support a 
specific cause or to solve a problem for the benefit of the wider community. Some may even 
speak of their ambitions to achieve a certain level of political office, citing this goal as the 
way in which other achievements will be reached. Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo 
suggest there are two types of career path available to those entering into politics: the career 
politicians and the individuals with political careers. The career politicians “enter the political 
sector because of the non-pecuniary rewards they derive from being in office. Individuals 
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with political careers . . . enter the political sector in order to increase their market wages,”5 
while it is the non-pecuniary rewards associated with seniority in office, such as committee 
appointments or legislative achievements that attract career politicians.6 Although he did not 
articulate it in such terms, for Long the key factor in his reason for entering politics was the 
power he could personally gain in office; the achievement of benefits for the wider 
community may be interpreted as having been secondary to this goal and certainly, despite 
the accusations of contemporary critics, political ideology was not a driving factor. However, 
his determination to deliver on his campaign promises and his retention of control over the 
governor’s office suggests a more profound goal than simply the acquisition of power.  
Robert A Dahl proposed that for many people “politics is a remote, alien, and unrewarding 
activity”7 suggesting that  
“politics, then, need not compete with one’s primary activities . . . Since the 
primary activities are voracious in their demands for time, political activity 
enters into competition with them. For most people it is evidently a weak 
competitor.”8   
It is evident that Long was not ‘most people,’ in this context politics was his primary activity, 
rather than a subsidiary activity. He claimed to be born to politics9 and in Long’s life political 
activity subsumed those occupations Dahl defines as primary activities for most people: 
“food, sex, love, family, work, play, shelter, comfort, friendship, social esteem and the like.”10 
Long’s relationships and interactions with these activities demonstrated a disregard for 
normal social conventions except when he perceived, or was made to see, that his activities 
were ultimately being viewed in a negative way by the electorate and were therefore deemed 
to be detrimental to his political life.  As a 1935 New York Times Magazine article explored, 
once the detrimental effects of his behaviour were revealed to him, Long attempted to 
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reform, although he would not acknowledge that this need to improve his public persona was  
his motive for his actions. 
“Having reached a point where what he does is of importance to his 
following, and keeping tabs as he does on the foibles of his fellow-
Senators, he is aware of the need of an immaculate moral exterior. So 
Long has stopped drinking – he says he is “on the wagon” – and he does 
not smoke any more, Mrs. Long is with him more in Washington than ever 
before, and the picture Long is presenting to the world is that of a plain man 
with a plain way of life. He ascribes the need for abstemiousness not to 
political expediency but to physical well-being and clear thinking.”11 
This dramatic change occurred after Long had taken up his seat in the US Senate and as he 
began to focus on the attainment of his next goal, the presidency. He had begun to 
recognise that idiosyncratic behaviours, such as drunken fights, taking food off of the plates 
of strangers and greeting VIPs while dressed in pyjamas, which may have found amused 
approval amongst his followers in Louisiana, were unlikely to be perceived in a favourable 
fashion by the national electorate.  
Rufus Browning’s hypothesis that the most influential politicians are able to manage their 
political careers and lives by disassociating themselves from actual relationships is borne out 
by the life and career of Long.12 His relationship with the Louisiana electorate has been 
widely reported as distinctly partisan, a divide between those for whom he was an anathema 
and those who felt an affinity with the man who seemed to both understand and represent 
them, but as Browning suggests, the reality was that this persona masked a self-involved 
and self-promoting political operative: “[beneath] an outside layer of warmth, the politician . . 
. is and must be somewhat cool and perhaps even downright cold.”13 Certainly Long’s 
relationships with his father, his siblings and his family suggest an individual who had little or 
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no empathy for others.14 It is ironic then that Long would, unintentionally, found a dynasty of 
political operatives both in Louisiana and at the national level.15 
Pragmatism & Expediency 
 
The Democratic Party and the Solid South  
At the time Long was elected to his first political office in 1918, as commissioner for north 
Louisiana on the three-person state Railroad Commission, the Democratic Party had 
dominated state politics since 1877. The party had also achieved a rare domination of 
politics at the national level, holding the presidency (Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1921), the US 
House of Representatives (since 1910) and the US Senate (since 1912),16 before all three 
reverted to Republican control after World War I. Barbara Deckard Sinclair’s study of roll 
calls in the US House of Representatives in the 1920s provides evidence of the regional 
nature of the Democrats at the national level, with approximately two thirds of Democrat 
House members coming from Southern states.17 It was only with the Democratic victories in 
other parts of the nation during the New Deal Congresses (1933-1938) that the strength and 
influence of the southern section was reduced as their dominance of the party’s House 
membership decreased to about 40 per cent.18 With these changes, the influence of the 
South in the national party marginally began to be reduced, although the seniority system of 
committee chairing within Congress ensured that change was limited. 
Conventional wisdom amongst historians and political scientists holds that in the period from 
Reconstruction through to the post Second World War era of civil rights, the American South 
                                                          
14 See Enemies, Enmity and Impeachment chapter p216 
15 Hess p442 
16 Heitshusen, Valerie Party Leaders in the United States Congress, 1789-2015 Congressional 
Research Service https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30567.pdf 
17 Sinclair, Barbara Deckard “Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The 
House of Representatives, 1925-1938” The American Political Science Review Vol 71, No 3 (Sept 
1977) p941 





was a stronghold for the Democratic Party.19 While the exact definition of the American 
South does vary between authors, (from the seventeen states which mandated racial 
segregation to V O Key’s 1949 definition: the eleven states which seceded from the Union), 
a consensus has developed around Key’s definition.20 Gary Miller and Norman Schofield 
propose that the restrictions of the two party political system inevitably forces the two main 
parties to be formed from coalitions between individuals and groups with differing, and 
possibly opposing, ideologies. These “unnatural coalitions of enemies”21 come together to 
achieve electoral success and, therefore, executive and legislative power at both the state 
and national level, and as Miller and Schofield demonstrate, these coalitions tend to 
disintegrate when the circumstances binding them together come under strain or no longer 
exist. Using the definition proposed by Miller and Schofield, the relationship of the 
Democratic Party in the Southern states can be defined as an unnatural coalition of 
enemies. The party’s hold on the South in the early twentieth century was so embedded as 
to have created a distinct area of the United States in which democracy was essentially 
absent for a large portion of the population.22 The bloc influence of the section was 
effectively exploited to maintain and preserve the southern way of life. Key suggested that 
the Southern states’ loyalty to the Democratic Party was bound by the single issue of white 
supremacy, observing,  
“[we] ought to be both specific and candid about the regional interest that 
the Democratic party of the South has represented in national affairs. It 
must be conceded that there is one, and only one, real basis for southern 
unity, the Negro.”23  
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While this simplification of the priority of the Democratic Party in the South as a purely racial 
issue ignores the power of the elite economic interests, whose domination of both the party 
and the section had effectively disenfranchised the poor and illiterate of all races; both 
aspects combined to create an environment in Louisiana which Long was able to exploit 
successfully.  
 The Democratic Party in Louisiana: factionalism 
The functionality of the two party system of American politics at national and state levels 
ensures that to be effective a politician must align him or herself to whichever of the two 
parties most closely matches his/her personal, political and ideological mind-set. As such, 
most American politicians owe their political allegiance to the party which serves as a 
collective of the tenets, standards and mores its membership hold in common. The primary 
function of the Democratic Party in Louisiana, however, was to maintain the standards of 
white supremacy in the state having effectively eliminated political opposition by side-lining 
the Republican Party. Thus, rather than acting as a coalition for likeminded political 
adherents, this single function ultimately reduced the party to a coalition of factions. The 
factionalisation of the Democratic Party in the South and specifically in Louisiana suggests 
that not only would members’ political ideology differ from others within the state party, but 
that it could also differ, perhaps substantially, from that embodied in the national party. 
Although, such differences would be dependent on how many Southern Democrats were in 
positions of control or influence at the national level. Equally, the factionalism of the state 
party suggests that ideological beliefs were also not only diverse but also divisive. 
By the time of Long’s birth, in August 1893, Louisiana had, as Haas puts it, long been 
“‘redeemed’ from the alleged misrule of Reconstruction.”24 With the northern states and the 
federal government less interested in the actuality of the racial constructs of the South now 
                                                          





that slavery was legally at an end,25 the structural status quo had very effectively been 
restored through constitutionally legalised black disenfranchisement, ‘Jim Crow’ laws and the 
dominance of Louisiana’s politics by the Democratic Party, a primarily white male institution. 
As Key, Allan Sindler and others have discussed, the dominance of the Democratic Party in 
the South did not result in a consistent one-party system across the section. Instead, as 
Sindler suggests, Democratic politics in the South ran “the gamut from multifactional chaos 
to a structured and disciplined bifactionalism.”26 Although as Joel Friedman demonstrates in 
his article on Judge John Wisdom’s determination to re-create a two-party system in 
Louisiana, the Republican Party had not completely disappeared from the state. Its inability 
to broaden its appeal, diversify its membership, field viable electoral candidates and 
therefore give the voters of Louisiana “a healthy democratic system . . . of two vital, rival 
political parties”27 had ensured that “the Democratic primary was tantamount to a general 
election.”28 As Sindler points out, the structural factionalisation of Louisiana’s politics, which 
resulted in the Democratic Party’s dominance, was not solely linked to Long’s period in 
power, since organised factionalisation had successfully existed prior to his ascent to power. 
In the pre-Long era, the factions consisted of varying and competing coalitions amongst the 
urban business, rural planters and upper class interests, as well as the Democratic machine 
in New Orleans.29 As Rudolf Heberle and Alvin L Bertrand stated, factions were “either the 
followings of certain outstanding politicians or they were built around political clubs and 
informal cliques.”30 By the time Long was elected to his first political office, the 
factionalisation of the Democratic Party in Louisiana was embedded and had replaced two 
party politics in the state for over forty years. For a twenty year period, until the election of 
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John M Parker as governor on an anti-machine ticket in 1920, the Choctaw Club of New 
Orleans (also known as the ‘Regulars’ and the ‘Old Regulars’) had dominated state politics. 
The machine’s primary aim was to run the city without state interference. An objective it 
sought to maintain by building alliances with cotton plantation owners and rural courthouse 
politicians across Louisiana.31 
Long’s political affiliation to the Democratic Party, therefore, necessarily derived from his 
recognition of its domination of Louisiana politics, rather than from any deep-seated 
ideological affinity. Long embraced the party’s factional divisions. Rather than owing 
allegiance to a specific Democratic ideology at national, regional or state level, he ultimately 
created his own faction without adherence to political ideology, especially party-sponsored 
ideology. Under Long, Louisiana’s specific brand of bifactionalism ensured the state, unlike 
the other Southern states, was not plagued by a series of disconnected transitory factions 
with no consistent leadership or continuity in political programmes. Instead, as Louisiana’s 
pre-existing factions became redefined as ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ Long, Louisiana acquired a 
“structured and organized politics, a politics that made sense.”32  
To suggest that Long had the prescient intention to create a political system that would offer 
the people of Louisiana benefits characteristic of a two-party structure is similar to the view 
that Long represented the idealised image of the paternalistic progenitor of an American 
political dynasty. A fantastical image, and yet the individualistic, selfish, self-promotionist, 
whose loyalty to family and profession was always subordinate to his personal “pursuit of 
politics” and power33 did, by default, provide the basis for such a system and the foundation 
of a political dynasty in Louisiana. Long’s legacy lies, in part, in formalising the bifactional 
political structure in Louisiana in the absence of a viable opposition party, providing what 
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Sindler calls a “close approximation to the two-party system,”34 a system which would outlive 
Long by decades.  
The ideological influences on Huey P Long 
To paraphrase the English poet John Donne, no person can exist in the world without being 
influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by the environment around them.35 For politicians, 
the environment informs and influences their political opinions and ideologies. When, in 
response to a journalist, Long characterised himself, “just say I’m sui generis, and leave it at 
that,”36 he sought to emphasise not only his originality of character, of thought, and of 
personality, but he was also looking to present himself as an independent political entity, 
separate not only from the two main political parties but also different to the factional 
politicians who had not only ruled Louisiana before him, but who represented the forces of 
opposition to him in the state. In his report of this conversation, Harnett Kane stated that 
Long yawned before interrupting the discussion of his attributes with the sui generis 
comment; Kane’s superficial suggestion is that Long was merely bored with the speculation 
and the discussion on how  
“the same forces that had produced the other Southern hillbilly governors 
and senators had produced Huey Long. What qualities enabled him to 
reach a status on the American scene achieved by none before him?”37  
Long’s self-appraisal appeared to focus upon his exceptionality which, by definition, 
rendered moot any attempt to classify his personality or achievements within ‘conventional’ 
psychological or political frameworks. Kane concurred with Long’s assessment, 
characterising him as fitting “no mold” and suggesting that he was  
“a mixture of type: the original hill-country rebel, the egotist demanding 
constant satisfaction, the evangelist who backslid, the overlord of a city 
gang.”38   
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The multifaceted personality of the ‘Kingfish’39 has presented the greatest challenge for both 
contemporary assessors and subsequent historians assessing Long’s record, personality, 
character and the dichotomous extremes in the responses of the people of Louisiana, those 
who worshipped him as compared to those who abhorred him. Among those who clearly 
adored Long one correspondent, Cheston Folkes, identified this division among voters when 
he wrote, after the US Senate election in 1930, that while Long was not a universally popular 
choice, he was 
“the necessity of the situation - - the one man whose personal magnetism 
and personal popularity founded on irreproachable honesty and 
unswervable patriotism could be depended upon to rally a sufficient support 
to save the party that the opposition tried so hard to wreck.”40  
Folkes, a Long supporter, also eulogised Long and suggested that Ransdell should 
recognise that he had the privilege of being defeated by 
“a true and tried Democrat, who in every emergency since he entered 
public life has been true to his people, true to his party, true to his State, 
and true to his own convictions of right.”41 
Louisiana of the 1920s and 1930s is consistently portrayed as being distinct from the other 
forty seven states by tradition, by demography, by history and by political experience. If, as 
Carleton Beals claimed, Louisiana was outside of the American tradition,42 it is legitimate to 
ask whether one can therefore judge Long’s actions and activities in the context of American 
politics. Arthur M Schlesinger Jr suggested that Long represented less the image of a 
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European dictator than a Latin American despot,43 that his was less a dictatorship based on 
a pre-existing ideological construct and subsumed by a personality cult (as in the case of 
Mussolini or Stalin), and more a makeshift, though powerful, regime dominated by a single 
individual, his ideas, motivations and needs. Contemporary commentators emphasised 
Long’s loud-mouthed and loud-clothed buffoonery, focussing on the risks Long represented 
by comparing him with European dictators, specifically Germany’s Adolf Hitler but also Italy’s 
Benito Mussolini. While some journalists, such as Walter Duranty, also questioned whether 
Long’s experiment in Louisiana would inevitably become a precedent for the country as a 
whole,44 others including, Norton McGiffin, offered critical assessments of Long’s tactics and 
priorities, paying only cursory acknowledgement to Long’s expertise and skills, while deriding 
the use to which Long put his talents,  
“[he] can promise the proletariat the moon with a fence around it, and such 
is the power of his personality that millions of addled Americans will rise up 
to call him blessed.”45 
However, contemporary assessments suggest that the comparison between Long and the 
European dictators was deemed to be an apposite one. The progression of the New Orleans 
Item’s condemnation of Long’s level of control in the state developed from, in the days 
before his inauguration as governor, a strong suggestion of excessive control of the 
Legislature, organised, as it was, “on lines dictated directly by Mr. Long [which had placed] 
the Governor-elect in full control,”46 to the explicit use of the term ‘dictator’ by 3 July 1928, is 
indicative of how Long’s style was increasingly being viewed with concern by some sections 
of the state’s political elite. The latter editorial sought to expose Long’s duplicity in having 
campaigned to stop the misuse of public funds, only for him to work to stop a bill which 
would have controlled the expenditure of state officials:  
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“This is the kind of legislation which the little dictator has been pretending 
all his life that he would give the people. He is not giving it to them. When 
somebody else undertakes to do so, he gives the people the boot.”47   
Not only does this piece demonstrate the Item’s increasing condemnation of the governor 
and his failure to deliver on his campaign promises, it also demonstrates the degree to which 
Long was seeking to control both the Legislature, and the legislation it would pass. A year 
later, in May 1929, the Baton Rouge State Times explicitly linked Long to Mussolini, when it 
suggested Long had exceeded the Italian by rewarding the signatories of the Round Robin 
letter just five days after the impeachment had failed:48 
“There is one thing Mr. Long’s friends can truthfully say of him. He is as 
bold as a burglar in his operations. Mussolini in his more daring moments 
was never more brazen in his defiance of the public.”49 
However, it is in the multifaceted character of Long that his influences, both political and 
personal, may be identified. By resisting the desire to label Long as a specific type of person 
or a brand of politician, and by treating each aspect individually, one may seek to identify the 
origins of Long’s political personality. 
Since it is unlikely than any individual could emerge from within a community without 
experiencing a degree of interaction with, and through, that community, it is reasonable to 
deduce that Long’s political ideas were developed in the context of contemporary thought 
rather than in isolation. As Haas put it, “the place and time of one’s upbringing, and 
especially the beliefs and values present in one’s childhood, are crucial in determining the 
course of a person’s life.”50  In the case of Long, it is the place of his birth and childhood, 
Winnfield in Winn Parish, Louisiana, a stronghold of Populism in the 1890s, which offers the 
connection between the possible influences that surrounded Long’s childhood and the 
policies he advocated while in office.  
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Populist Party in Louisiana 
In June 1918, the same year that Long first began to articulate his proposals for the 
redistribution of wealth51 and the year he won his first elected office, Melvin J White 
published an article on populism in Louisiana noting that  
“populism everywhere was a product of hard times, the principal cause for 
which, so far as Louisiana was concerned, was the depression in the cotton 
industry.”52  
In the article, White describes the origins of the Populist Party in Winn parish in 1890. The 
tenets and aims of the Louisiana party are listed by White, in addition to some “if not all of 
the principles of the national organization,” as “the reform of the convention system for 
nominating candidates for state offices,” the reform of the “appointive power of the governor” 
and anti-lottery renewal.53 The tenets and aims of the national Populist Party were primarily 
linked to the reasons for its creation, populism having emerged in times of economic, social 
and environmental difficulties.54 Post-war inflationary prices for cotton had led to over-
production and a lack of crop diversification had created the depression in the cotton 
industry. When combined with a series of natural disasters, both floods and droughts had 
affected the state during the 1890s, these circumstances had led a number of the hill 
farmers, particularly in north Louisiana, to join the Farmers’ Alliance. Originating in Texas, 
the union of dirt farmers claimed to have three million members in the South and was 
affiliated to the million strong Colored Farmers’ Alliance. While not as powerful in Louisiana 
as it was in other Southern states, the Alliance movement posed a threat to the Democratic 
establishment there. By attracting poor white farmers to its interracial association, the 
Alliance threatened both the Louisiana Democratic Party’s key electoral constituency and its 
prima facie tenet, the retention of white supremacy in the state.55 The People’s (Populist) 
party had been formed in Winn Parish in 1890 to represent the poor whites and blacks of 
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Louisiana and from 1892 it had replaced the Alliance movement in the state. Hardy L Brian, 
the youthful leader of the Populist Party in Louisiana, was a “man of energy and unusual 
ability” for as well as being the editor of the party’s newspapers (Comrade and The 
Natchitoches Populist) at the age of 26, he also acted as the secretary and then the 
chairman of its state central committee.56 The founding members of the Louisiana People’s 
Party sought to build a labourers’ movement of black and white workers, both agricultural 
and industrial.57 These were “radicalized union men who . . . shared with Hardy Brian a 
missionary zeal . . . as makers of a nonviolent revolution” that sought reform of the country’s 
transportation system, monetary supply, (notably free coinage of silver – an inflationary 
economic tactic, which by replacing the gold standard, would “increase the country’s money 
supply, raise the prices received by farmers for their goods, and relieve the crushing burden 
of farm debt,”)58 and agricultural finance.59 For the 1896 elections, a ‘fusion’ agreement 
between the People’s and Republican parties ensured that one party’s voters would support 
the other’s candidates. In the silver issue, Brian had identified the single issue which would 
distinguish the Populist-Republican fusion ticket from that of the Democratic Party, thereby 
attracting disaffected Democrats to the Populists, with the result that in Louisiana’s April 
1896 elections, the fusion ticket gained “43 percent of the vote, as officially tallied. A free 
vote and a fair count would have elected the fusionists.”60 There is consensus that the 
openly fraudulent misuse of black votes had ensured the Democrats’ hold on the state, 
especially with egregious results such as those recorded for four plantation parishes, East 
Carroll, Madison, Tensas, and West Feliciana, where the black voters were inclined to 
support the Populist-Republican candidate, John N Pharr over the governor, Murphy J 
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Foster. Despite the inclination of voters, the reported result for these parishes was Foster, 
9499; Pharr, 1.61  
By replicating Brian’s technique at the national level, the Populist leaders had “in just two 
short years taken a fledgling third party and brought it to the brink of a national political 
break-through.”62 As Haas states “the Populist party and its Republican allies”63 was the only 
truly serious challenge to the dominance of the Democratic Party in Louisiana in the fifty year 
period from the end of Reconstruction to Long’s election as governor. However, both the 
local and national leaders of the Populist Party failed to anticipate the response of the 
Democratic Party to this challenge. As John D Hicks proposed, the electoral success of a 
third party demonstrated that there was a desire and a need for its ideals and programmes. 
As a result of the success, one of the two major parties would subsequently subsume those 
ideas, making the continued existence of the third party irrelevant.64 In the face of a realistic 
electoral challenge and the loss of its supporters over a single issue, the Democratic Party 
utilised political strategies of its own to ensure it would retain its hold on power; the 
Democrats abandoned their support for the gold standard in favour of the free silver issue, 
and nominated William Jennings Bryan, a free-silver supporter, as its nominee for the 1896 
presidential election.  Although Bryan was not a Populist Party member, the combination of 
his personal links to the members of the Populist Party in Nebraska, together with his 
support for some of the Populist platform (specifically direct elections for US Senators and 
income tax reforms), as well as his support for the free-silver issue, his nomination 
effectively ended the Populist Party’s challenge in national politics. The adoption by the 
Democrats of the free-silver issue removed from the Populists their single distinctive issue, 
the issue which had greatly increased both their popular support and membership. The 
Populist leadership felt it had no choice but to endorse Bryan as its nominee or face the 
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accusation of hypocrisy if it appeared to backtrack on the free-silver issue by failing to 
support the candidate committed to that issue. The subsequent recriminations and internal 
disputes ensured that when Hardy Brian ran for Congress in 1898, at the age of 33, he was 
unable to revive the Populist Party in Louisiana to its heyday of only two years earlier.65  
Although, as Sipress reports, Brian “returned to Winn Parish, where he remained active in 
church and civic affairs . . . there is no indication that he ever again took a prominent role in 
party politics.”66 But as the editor of the Winnfield Times, a weekly newspaper and successor 
to the Comrade, during the period from 1914 to 192267 it is feasible that he would have been 
known to the young Long. At the age of thirteen, Long had worked as a typesetter at the 
offices of the Southern Sentinel, one of Winnfield’s weekly newspapers, and he acted as 
newspaper correspondent for the Times-Picayune and the Shreveport Times in 1915 and 
1916.68 Since Winnfield was no more than a village, with a population of 2900 people at that 
time,69 Long and Brian may have crossed paths. It is also conceivable that Long may well 
have heard about Brian’s career if, as T Harry Williams speculates, he grew up hearing 
“plenty of Populist talk, some of it from his father, more from other elders in Winnfield.”70 One 
could further speculate how the tale of the Winnfield man who had been the youthful leader 
of a political party, who had represented the state at a national party convention and who 
had run for a Congressional seat, may well have caught the imagination of a politically 
ambitious young man and inspired him to plan his own political career.  
A number of commentators have attributed Long’s political activities, most notably the 
national Share Our Wealth scheme, to a populist ideology, since the tenets of the scheme 
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were based on a redistribution of wealth via amendments to the country’s taxation system. 
Schlesinger ascribed the ideological basis for Share Our Wealth to populism in Winn Parish, 
specifically “poor white Populism,”71 while Long’s son, US Senator Russell B Long, stated his 
belief that Long was “a Populist . . . [who] wanted no one to be too rich and no one to be too 
poor.”72 However, it is apparent from his interview for Ken Burns’ documentary, Huey Long, 
that Russell Long was determined to interpret the phrase “Every Man A King” as meaning 
equality for all, an attribution of benevolence predicated on Russell Long’s adoration of his 
father.73 In his self-aggrandising autobiography, Every Man A King, Long claimed not only to 
have foreseen the stock market crash of 1929, but he also attributed his position on wealth 
distribution to something akin to a biblical edict, since “God Almighty . . . Thomas Jefferson, 
Andrew Jackson, Daniel Webster, Theodore Roosevelt, William Jennings Bryan and every 
religious teacher known to this earth had declaimed against”74 the disproportionate allocation 
of wealth to the few. By using such statements, Long sought to position his programme, not 
only within a religious context, but also within the tenets of American political tradition, and 
within the mores of the progressive and populist movements. Thus, Long provided both 
himself and the programme with a sense of validation and a specifically American context. In 
an earlier articulation of the Share Our Wealth credo, Long had adapted the statistics 
reported in The Saturday Evening Post, that sixty five per cent of the country’s wealth was 
owned by fewer than two percent of its people. In his letter to the Shreveport Times, Long 
suggested that the “greatest asset to Bolshevism in America” was its unequal distribution of 
wealth and that “if the inheritance laws of France were enacted in this country it would 
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prevent the concentration of wealth to a great degree” and so avoid the “spread of this 
anarchy.”75  
Progressivism in Louisiana 
In the introduction to his 2005 presidential address to the Louisiana Historical Association 
meeting, “In Pursuit of Louisiana Progressives,” Samuel C Shepherd Jr deplored the 
tendency of historians, specifically those writing on the South and on Louisiana, to dismiss 
the existence and impact of progressives and progressivism in Louisiana, suggesting not 
only that they preferred instead “far spicier topics than the progressives . . . Acadiana, 
Creoles, the Vieux Carré, and jazz – not to mention the Bourbons, the Louisiana Lottery, 
Storyville, and Uncle Earl Long . . . [and the] towering figure of Huey Long,” but also 
suggesting that some people “just are not comfortable combining the words ‘progress’ and 
‘Louisiana.’”76 Accepting that he had himself followed this trend, Shepherd took the 
opportunity of his address to provide a summary of the scattered findings on Louisiana 
progressism, emphasising those progressive developments which had occurred in the areas 
of education, agriculture, child labour laws, public health, women’s suffrage, anti-machine 
campaigns, and penal reform; and proposing that further research was required to “validate 
the proposition that Louisiana progressives deserve a more prominent place in our state’s 
historical narrative.”77  
Despite Shepherd’s negative assessment of the state of historical research on the 
progressives of Louisiana, there is clear evidence of progressivism even at the gubernatorial 
level in the early years of the twentieth century, for example, Newton C Blanchard is 
described, by Haas, as the “first Louisiana Democratic governor to display a hint of 
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progressivism in his administration,”78 for criticising lynching and calling for improvements to 
schools and services for the black community in Louisiana.79 However, it was John M Parker 
who was the pre-eminent progressive governor of Louisiana. Having failed to take the office 
of governor as the Progressive Party’s nominee in 1916, in what Schott calls “the only 
serious challenge to Democratic party rule from 1896 to 1963,”80 Parker re-joined the 
ubiquitous Democratic Party and from within its auspices won the governorship in 1920, 
clearly demonstrating the unassailable hold the party retained on political power in 
Louisiana. 
Parker’s contributions to the state during his time in office were of a distinctly progressive 
bent, and included the revision of the state constitution in 1921, the first severance tax on oil, 
publicly funded improvements to the campus of Louisiana State University and the 
beginnings of a modern highway system.81  His long-standing campaign against the power of 
the New Orleans machine had effectively achieved success when Mayor Martin Behrman 
was defeated in the 1920 New Orleans mayoral election, but since Behrman was returned to 
power in 1925, this can only be seen as a partial success. Despite their opposition to each 
other, Parker and Behrman can, as Schott discusses, be said to have represented urban 
progressivism on the issue of state support for public services, with only the moralistic 
aspects of the Parkerite anti-machine brand of progressivism separating them.82 
A friend and hunting companion of Theodore Roosevelt, Parker was, according to Hair, the 
antithesis of Huey P Long:  
“Parker was dignified, honor-bound, and taciturn; Huey was indecorous, 
devious, and loquacious. Parker thought first of principles, Huey of results. . 
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. Parker thought leadership meant pointing the right way and setting a good 
example; Huey believed a leader should compel.”83  
However, Long was one of Parker’s most active and vocal supporters and active 
campaigners for the 1920 gubernatorial election, and he was invited to give the address at 
the 1919 Labor Day Picnic by the Central Trades and Labor Council of Shreveport. Long’s 
speech followed speeches by a number of the declared candidates in the governor’s race.84  
In addition to giving speeches and writing letters on behalf of Parker’s campaign, Long also 
demonstrated his confidence in his candidate’s abilities by betting on the outcome of the 
election.  His winnings included one hundred dollars and a suit of clothes costing $95.50.85 
However, shortly after the election, Long broke irrevocably with Parker over the governor’s 
‘gentleman’s agreement’ with the oil companies on the severance tax. Parker, in exchange 
for the oil companies’ agreement that they would not challenge a two per cent taxation rate, 
had agreed not to raise the rate during his administration; this act was not only contrary to 
Long’s advice, but it also confirmed to Long that the governor was in thrall to the 
corporations and was “against any little man securing rights in the legislature, if opposed by 
the Standard Oil Company.”86 Schott argues that Long offered such a distinctly different type 
of politician to the Parkerites’ paternalistic style, offering instead the appearance of “rustic 
arrogance, crudity, lack of moral probity, obsession with the exercise of political power, and 
the brashness of an upstart red neck.”87 A fact on which he was able to capitalise, utilising 
his skills to speak and connect with different sections of the Louisiana populace as though 
he were one of them, especially those whom Parker disdained – the poor and the working 
classes. While Schott seeks to argue that the “rise of Long represented something of a 
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backlash against the [Progressive] movement,”88 he acknowledges that Long could be 
“viewed as pushing ahead along certain lines pursued by reformers who preceded him, while 
undoing some reforms which were dearest to the hearts of the Parkerite progressives”89 
including, by creating his own machine, Parker’s attempts to dismantle the New Orleans 
machine. The tactic of pro-actively dismantling the reforms and programmes enacted by a 
predecessor in office may simply represent the delivery on election promises. Equally, 
however, a determined attempt to undermine, destroy or even to appropriate reforms may 
represent a concentrated effort to eradicate the legacy of a predecessor whose personality, 
politics, and belief structures were diametrically in opposition to his own. Long certainly 
extended Parker’s road building schemes, the development of Louisiana State University 
and the severance tax on oil far beyond that envisioned by Parker, thereby enabling him to 
claim these initiatives, and their success, for himself. 
Since Long’s childhood home of Winnfield was at the centre of the populist and progressive 
movements in Louisiana, in an area populated by independent farmers not plantation owners 
or industrialists, the obvious conclusion to be drawn was that Long’s journey in politics was a 
continuation of the tradition of his home environment. Williams suggests two possible 
reasons why, as he puts it “with the usual Long realism, he avoided association with [the 
populist] movement,” the first suggests an unusual degree of prescience on the part of Long 
– that he realised that the movement would “ultimately have to fail.”90 The second resonates 
more closely with Long’s character and personality; he did not wish to be associated with a 
party which did not have sufficient perception to ask him to be one of its leaders. Williams 
also theorised that while Long did not actively support the Populist movement, he did 
sympathise with the movement’s aims and ideas. Certainly there is evidence that Long was 
committed to some of the Populist tenets, such as opposition to big corporations and 
monopolies, and the inclusion of those members of the state’s population whose voices were 
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effectively excluded and ignored by the Louisiana Democratic Party, the poor and the black 
population,91 may be seen in his programmes in Louisiana and in the concepts behind the 
Share Our Wealth movement, although as Hair writes, Long never acknowledged the 
existence of the links between his programmes and those advocated by the Populists. Hair 
suggests that while the racial liberalism of populism may have been a factor in Long’s 
decision to deny the link, as it was likely that Long, the  
“astute politician . . . saw no advantage in being associated with something 
that would remind whites of a troubled time when blacks still played a role 
in state politics and thousands of ordinary white people were momentarily 
allied with them.”92  
In this assessment of Long’s political expediency, Hair concurs with Williams, who noted that 
Long “had no strong prejudices of any kind himself,”93 suggesting instead that such a shrewd 
political operative would seek to avoid alienating any potential voter by keeping philosophies 
and ideologies to himself. As such, Long can be said to have pitched his programmes as 
benefits to the Louisiana electorate rather than as ideological tropes. For example, when in 
August 1929, Long catalogued the improvements he claimed to have made so far, he did so 
by positioning his successes against the failures of previous administrations rather than as 
achievements within the scope of an ideology, “the State’s finances and its institutions were 
never in so good condition as they are now, but that doesn’t tell the whole story, because I 
found them so terribly bad.”94 In this letter to Judge Fred M Odom in August 1929, Long 
summarised his successes so far, including increasing the capacity of the state’s hospitals 
and reducing the death rate; educating children and adults; building paved roads and 
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bridges, concluding “so you can see that my pride is a little high at this time.”95 This list 
articulates a number of Long’s primary tenets, especially the need to improve the lot of the 
people of Louisiana in terms of health, education and infrastructure. However, this letter is 
more suggestive of a reiteration of his campaign pledges than an accurate record of 
achievements, an attempt, perhaps, in the months following the impeachment to re-assert 
his position and power.96 
As mentioned, Louisiana is a diverse state, politically, socially, racially, ethnically and 
religiously.  Despite his propensity to cite the Bible as the source material for his Share Our 
Wealth programme and to regularly use religiously inspired tales in his speeches, Long was 
not active religiously. Although brought up as a Baptist in the Protestant north of Louisiana, 
Long did not demonstrate, beyond his oratory, that his childhood religion had influenced his 
actions. Instead it could be argued that in demonstrating his antipathy by making Baptists 
the butt of his many jokes about religion97 Long saw religion and religious expression as a 
political tool rather than a personal belief system. Both contemporary critics and subsequent 
assessors of Long sought to define him by apportioning labels to him, his political 
programmes and to his tactics. These labels represented the full scope of the political 
spectrum from communist and socialist to fascist, with additional criminal attributes also 
discussed. A newspaper report of his speech at meeting in Winnfield in June 1918 implied 
Long’s allegiance to socialism because  
“The speech was made at Hebron, near the junction point of Winnfield, 
Caldwell and Jackson parishes, and it is said there are registered Socialist 
voters there than in the balance of North Louisiana. The attorney has 
defended several Socialist in law suits against syndicates.”98  
                                                          
95 Letter to Fred M Odom from Huey P Long dated 29 August 1929 Huey P Long Papers, Box 5 
Folder 160 General Correspondence 1929 
96 For Long’s campaign promises see Appendix 3 p306 
97 Notes from interview of Frank Odom by T Harry Williams on 21 May 1958 in Baton Rouge La. T 
Harry Williams Papers, Research Material HPL: Oral History Interviews Box 19 Folder 124 p5 
98 “Hit Socialists’ Hive In W.S.S. Sale Speech – Winnfield Meet Scored and Big Stamp Taking Won” 





President Franklin D Roosevelt called Long one of the two most dangerous men in America, 
the other being Douglas MacArthur. Roosevelt saw that while Long might present a comic, 
often buffoonish, persona, his popularity and ambition were a potential threat to Roosevelt’s, 
and to the Democratic Party’s, hold on power.99 
John T Jost, Christopher M Federico and Jaime L Napier suggest that political ideologies are 
shared frameworks which “result from a combination of top-down socialization processes 
and bottom-up psychological predispositions.”100 If applied to Long, this theory provides a 
potential explanation why Long did not publicly adhere to any philosophical or political 
ideological framework. It is clear that Long did not consider himself to be subordinate to 
anyone, and as such he was unlikely to have permitted himself to submit to the political 
beliefs of another. However, as shown above, Long did exhibit a predisposition to adhere to 
the tenets of populism and progressivism as demonstrated by his programmes in Louisiana 
and the national Share Our Wealth programme, to a degree, which supports Russell Long’s 
assessment of his father as not being entirely derived from hero-worship, and suggests 
therefore that the politics that surrounded him in childhood did have a degree of influence on 
him at a later stage. Even if he rejected an overt allegiance to these causes, in favour of a 
more politically expedient route to power, Long had an affinity to at least some of their 
principles and ideas. 
Long and power 
In his biography of Long, William Ivy Hair suggests that while he may have “feared 
assassination” there was for him “a potential fate as bad as or worse than being killed 
[which] was the loss of center stage, and with it control of all around him. That would be a 
living death.”101 Such was Long’s alleged obsession with the attainment and retention of 
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personal and political power that it was Hair’s view that Long would have been bereft without 
it. 
It is not uncommon for Long to be portrayed as a one dimensional character: the dictator, the 
demagogue, the saviour of the poor, or the man of the people. In reality, as with the majority 
of politicians, Long was a more nuanced individual whose political activities covered the full 
spectrum of all of the one dimensional caricatures laid at his door. However, it should be 
noted that in one respect Long was a one dimensional individual, despite the multi-faceted 
activities and styles, he had a single goal in mind. Ultimately everything Long did was 
focused on the attempt to achieve his personal and political goal: the presidency. Although, 
this specific target had been modified as he climbed the ladder of political office, and with it 
Louisiana’s society, to include the acquisition of power, which in this context, was the ability 
to direct others and influence events through the exercise of a political office.   
In his discussion of the place held in Louisiana society by Winn parish, his family and Long 
himself, Williams suggests that Long had recognised that “patrician Louisianians would 
regard him as a hillbilly or a hick, as somebody who did not quite belong. In the caste society 
of the South, he and everybody else in Winn stood outside, perhaps not very far, but still 
outside the select circle.”102 Williams is unequivocal in his suggestion that this was a 
fundamental influencing factor in Long’s development as a person and as a politician, that 
when he seemed to target the rich and also proposed programmes which attacked their 
interests it was because of his position in the state’s class system. However, Williams also 
argues, contradictorily, that “it is impossible to say what effect the knowledge had on his 
inner self,”103 as if Williams was attempting to nullify his own conclusion that Long’s 
predilection with political power had its basis in a sense of inferiority predicated upon his 
position in the societal make-up of Louisiana and his relative poverty in comparison to those 
he saw as running the state.  
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In their work on the differing approaches to revenge, Peter Strelan, Mario Weick and Milica 
Vasiljevic have proposed that individuals may be categorised as “chronically powerless” to 
the “chronically powerful.”104 By this theory, those who perceive themselves to be essentially 
without power are more likely than the powerful to respond vengefully. It should be noted 
that in this study “members of low socioeconomic status groups”105 are included as being 
amongst the chronically powerless. Echoing the aphorism ‘power corrupts, absolute power 
corrupts absolutely,’ Strelan et al argue that “the extent to which incidental power corrupts is 
dependent on who is using the power.”106 They suggest that “when individuals perceive 
themselves to be chronically powerless, the experience of high incidental power encourages 
negative, vengeful responding.”107 In the context of Williams’ claim above and Strelan et al’s 
work, it may be proposed that as a member of a socially powerless grouping, Long’s 
subsequent activities may be interpreted as an attempt at acquiring political power to change 
the dynamic and to reverse the structure of politics in the state. Irrespective of any sense of 
inadequacy he may have been driven by, Long utilised his position as a campaign tool to 
connect to a wider Louisiana, and subsequently national, electorate than was represented by 
the political elite in the state. As a member of the US Senate, he used his upbringing as a 
rallying cry for his Share Our Wealth campaign. In a speech in March 1935, he lauded his 
social standing, exaggerated the paucity of his education as an explanation for his 
behaviour, and claimed that he was  
“an ignorant man. I have had no college education. I have not even had a 
high school education. But the thing that takes me far in politics is that I do 
not have to color what comes into my mind and into my heart. I say it 
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unvarnished. I say it without veneer. I have not the learning to do otherwise, 
and therefore my ignorance is often not detected.”108 
It was this ignorance, he said that allowed him to speak for the people, since he knew “the 
hearts of the people because I have not colored my own. I know when I am right in my own 
conscience.”109 This affinity with the masses, he declared, had not, and would not, be altered 
until “the lives of these people [had been made] decent and respectable,” after which, he 
promised, “No one will ever hear political opposition out of me.”110 This statement was 
declaration of intent to his opponents that he would not desist from his action until his goal 
had been achieved, whether that goal was wealth redistribution or the White House. 
The factionalisation of Louisiana’s politics not only pre-dated the rise of Long, it also formed 
the basis for his rise through, what Sindler calls, its “tradition of latent class conflict.”111 
Sindler argues that factionalism, combined with a “customary majority support for the 
incumbent administration,” had ensured that the governors of Louisiana had “a control over 
legislation not equalled in most other Southern states.”112 It is therefore not unreasonable 
that in Long’s world view he would understand that to be governor of Louisiana was to hold 
all of the power in the state. A perception which may have led Long to not only seek the 
office but also then, when in office, to seek to ensure that the office of governor reflected his 
interpretation of its prestige, by controlling all aspects of Louisiana life beyond the 
constitutional remit of his own political office: political (executive and legislative), judicial, 
business, media (as represented by newspapers and radio), and the security forces (the 
police and the national guard). It should also be noted that such was Long’s overwhelming 
conviction that the real power in the state lay with the governor, that he never sought any 
career path other than politics. His earlier working experiences, including as a travelling 
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salesman and as a newspaper correspondent, for both the Times-Picayune and the 
Shreveport Times, as well as his training and work as a lawyer, all appear to have been life 
experiences on which he could build as a politician, utilising each one with great effect. 
Although, given his later conflicts with the state’s newspapers, Long’s time as a newspaper 
correspondent cannot be said to have given him a perspective on what individual 
newspapers consider to be newsworthy. As an exchange of letters between the Southern 
States Editor of the Times Picayune and Long in August 1916 demonstrates, he disagreed 
with the editors on what events he should report, suggesting that he was more qualified than 
they were to make that judgement: 
“When there is news I will give it. I am a big booster for this section of the 
country, but not such a booster as to send inflated reports of matters when 
it amounted to nothing. . . . You have failed to publish things of more 
importance. When a crowd meets, not an office force, I will act.”113   
This disregard for the expertise and, notably, the authority of the editors is an early example 
of Long’s refusal to act as a subordinate to anyone. This was a trait which would recur 
throughout his career and would impact on his successes. However, he was more effective 
as a lawyer, with his legal skills and ability to argue a case reportedly drawing praise from 
William Howard Taft, then Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. In his 
autobiography, Long commented “If all the good could but be true!” on Vanity Fair 
Magazine’s report that Taft had “told Congressman Aswell that Huey Long was the most 
brilliant lawyer who ever practiced before the United States Supreme Court,” which suggests 
that he gave little credence to the report.114 Despite this assessment, the report that was 
repeated by Russell Long to Williams115 which led him to suggest that had Long chosen to 
focus on law instead of politics he may have become “one of the great lawyers of his 
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time.”116 It is questionable whether, given his demonstrable disregard for the expertise of 
others and for traditions and principles, he could have acted within the formal structure as a 
career lawyer.  
For Long, political power was ostensibly gained as one progressed up the hierarchical ladder 
of political office. As he reached each successive office, he additionally sought to expand his 
personal power by augmenting those powers implicitly held by each office itself. In a 
demonstration, not just of his growing power, but also his own perception of his growing 
influence in his home town, and ostensibly in reciprocity for support on his campaign for 
Railroad Commissioner, he assured Walter W Allen of Winnfield that “every Long by name” 
would vote for him and that Allen was therefore “the same as elected Assessor today.” 
Long’s letter also included a message to other Winnfield inhabitants, especially Talmadge 
Caldwell, which was an explicit instruction to vote for Allen: 
“I have done a great deal for Talmadge. I have stood by him, helped him 
and have been a friend to him when he needed a friend, and am his friend 
yet, whatever he has needed he has always received from me, and if he 
and his father want to do a favor to Huey Long in return for what I have 
done for them they could not do it more appropriately than by voting for 
you. Trusting that I may hear of your election, and assuring you that you 
may show this letter to my close friends without making it so conspicuous 
as to do myself and yourself harm”117  
Before Long was elected to the three man Louisiana Railroad Commission it was relatively 
inactive with a limited remit. Following Long’s election, the profile of the commission and, 
especially that of Commissioner Long, rose significantly across the state. In a similar vein, as 
governor, Long used legislative tactics to extend the power of his office beyond anything 
previously envisioned. This included the creation in 1928 of the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification, which reported directly to the governor and was empowered to make arrests, 
without warrants, anywhere in Louisiana for any and all violations of the law.118 Long used 
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political patronage and threats to gain legal control of the Board of Health, the Department of 
Conservation, the Highway Commission and in New Orleans, the Charity Hospital and the 
Levee Board.119 Key to Long’s control of these bodies was his power of appointment, which 
when combined with his tactic of requiring each appointee to sign undated letters of 
resignations, ensured he maintained complete control of the office holders and through 
them, the offices. 
Once elected to an office, the quest for power became for Long an exercise not just in 
retention and expansion but also in control. Once elected as governor, this need for control 
extended to all levels of the state. Long created in Louisiana a political machine which would 
counter the power of any of the factions existing within the state’s Democratic Party. 
Following the 1929 impeachment, Long sought to bypass one of the more intransigent 
strands of his opposition, the anti-Long newspapers, by publishing his own journal, the 
Louisiana Progress. Publication of the Progress gave Long a degree of commonality with 
other “mass leaders” of the era. In common with LaFollette’s Progressive in Wisconsin, the 
Free Lance in Mississippi, the Ferguson Forum in Texas and the Blue Valley Farmer in 
Oklahoma, the Progress gave Long a mouthpiece to speak directly to the electorate. Initially 
funded by ‘voluntary’ subscriptions (deducts) from state employees, the Progress later 
become self-sufficient through the sale of advertising space.120 Although the Progress was 
self-funding, the system of ‘deducts’ remained in place. Having, by legislative tactics, 
brought under his authority thousands of state jobs, Long further extended the imposed 
allegiance of these employees by requiring each one pay a deduction from their salaries to 
the Long organisation.121 
Long did not seek only to exercise his power and impose control on his political supporters 
and followers, but also on his enemies and political opponents. In an interview with Betty 
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Carter,122 Cecil Morgan, an anti-Long member of the Legislature, described incidents which 
demonstrated how Long viewed his position as governor as authoritarian and how he dealt 
with those political opponents who would not submit to his rule. In the early days of his 
governorship, Long had sent instructions to the Legislature to elect his candidate as 
speaker, John B Fournet, and as Morgan explained, “he was now elected, and expected 
everyone, no matter whether they supported him up to that time or not, to follow his 
leadership, since he was elected.”123 At that early stage in the governor’s term, Morgan 
reports, he and others were beginning to be concerned that Long was “building up too strong 
a machine and dictating who should be elected,” so they chose to disregard this instruction, 
voting instead for the candidate from their own area.124 Fournet was elected by 72 votes to 
27. A second incident demonstrates that Long would not restrict his political activities, tactics 
and acts of revenge to the individual opposing him; he would consider any opportunity for 
manipulation or coercion as a valid tactic in bending an opponent to his will. Just as in the 
Manship blackmail incident which triggered the impeachment proceedings,125 Long targeted 
Morgan’s father when he had refused to follow the governor’s request to vote in favour of 
one of his bills during the first session of the Legislature.126 Additionally, having identified a 
pressure point which he could use to punish non-compliance, Long, via his floor leaders, 
was not averse to using it again as bribery to ensure continued conformity. 
It was not only his political opponents that Long sought to have under his total control. He 
retained his own political allegiance solely to himself. While an informal system of reciprocity 
exists within American politics, the specific system which operates in Louisiana has baffled 
political operatives from across the nation and led US Senator Tom Connally (Texas, 
Democrat, 1929-1953) to advise anyone who wanted a postgraduate course in politics to 
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head to Louisiana.127 Most puzzling to outsiders was the lack of consistency of support 
between the many factions within the Democratic Party. With short term coalitions dissolving 
into enmity, alliances could be limited to single issues. Long’s attitude to this fluctuating 
support system was two-fold.  
Throughout his career Long was prepared to campaign on behalf of other politicians, 
because of the benefit he would derive from this type of activity, whether through their rallies, 
which provided him with opportunities to showcase his talents as a public orator and to 
promote his programmes, often more so than the candidate themselves, or through their 
subsequent support. For example, he undertook a whirlwind tour of Arkansas on behalf of 
US Senator Hattie Carraway’s re-election campaign, not only because she had voted in 
support of his income limitation resolution, but because her re-election in the face of 
overwhelming opposition would demonstrate to the Democratic Senate Minority leader, 
Joseph T Robinson, also from Arkansas, and the Democratic Party leadership, that Long’s 
influence and power base now extended beyond the borders of Louisiana. Long’s activities 
on Carraway’s behalf drew substantial attention and support for the candidate and ultimately 
won her the election, since without Long’s intervention she did not have a viable campaign; 
but his speeches barely mentioned the candidate, focussing instead on Share Our Wealth. 
In a flyer issued in support of Carraway, Long’s focus is clearly on his own agenda, although 
Carraway’s re-election is the vehicle used to promote it: 
“Whoever takes the side of the people against the combined power of 
finance is marked for destruction by them. Uncle Trusty will not stand for it. 
That’s all. 
Senator Hattie W. Carraway is one of those marked persons . . . She voted 
for the government to take as high as 65% of all any one man made in one 
year over $1,000,000, and to thereby take taxes off of the little fellow.”128 
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Evidence also demonstrates that during the early stages of his political career, Long 
campaigned on behalf of senior members of the state party, including for John M Parker 
during his 1920 gubernatorial campaign,129 Joseph E Ransdell in his US Senate re-election 
campaign in 1924, and Edwin Broussard during his US Senate re-election campaign in 
1926. However, as earlier letters indicate, Long was actively engaged in the factional aspect 
of Louisiana’s politics and was working to support candidates against Ransdell’s re-election 
in 1918. He believed, at that time, that his section of the state would “go for whoever runs 
against Ransdell. We are going to support whoever runs against him unless it be one of 
those obnoxious characters who are less likable than he.”130 Among the potential 
candidates, Long sought, as early as May 1917, to persuade Judge Charles A O’Niell to run 
for Ransdell’s US Senate seat, claiming that O’Niell’s candidature “would meet with a great 
deal of approval from the people of this state.”131 Long later worked to create a coalition of 
the factions behind Harry P Gamble, confidently stating that “it would appear that we have 
already driven the field of Ransdell opposition to you alone.”132 Ultimately, however, 
Ransdell was re-elected to the US Senate in 1918. These actions suggest that Long’s 
participation in electoral politics on behalf of others in the state were political expedient 
moves, as was his later support for Ransdell in 1924, for which he anticipated reciprocal 
support for his second gubernatorial race in 1928.    
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During the 1920 gubernatorial campaign, Long stated that he had paid his own expenses to 
work for Parker because he wanted “to see the man elected in order that the common 
citizenship of this State can have some chance.”133 He claimed that a  
“reform movement never has any money, they are not in with the gambling 
and hellish element that usually contribute sums of money to degenerate 
the human race. Of course the New Orleans ring has a flush pot and 
naturally can always raise money for anything when we cannot.”134  
However, subsequent to the split with Parker over the severance tax issue, Long articulated 
his frustration with the status quo in Louisiana politics in a letter to Leland Moss, a Parker 
supporter: “I am not worrying about my own political future. I am disgusted with public life 
and with many of the public men. I do not need a sinecure to live.”135 For Long, the provision 
of support was an exercise in control and influence. He expected to benefit from his support 
for other politicians and he often had specific goals for this reciprocal exchange, such as an 
agreement on severance tax with Parker prior to the 1920 gubernatorial election or support 
for Share Our Wealth programme from Roosevelt, since, as he claimed, the main reason on 
“which President-elect Roosevelt was nominated for the office of President of the United 
States, was the decentralization of wealth.”136 However, what becomes evident from these 
deals is that only one party seemed to be fully cognisant of the details of the arrangement: 
Long. His subsequent disappointment at his failure to receive that which he deemed to be 
owed to him laid the groundwork for disintegration in his relationships with these politicians 
and, ultimately, created a state of hospitality between them.  
In comparison to the lack of allegiance that he would give to others, Long did, however, 
expect unconditional loyalty and obedience from his followers. In a letter sent just over a 
month before the impeachment in March 1929, Long articulated his strategy in response to 
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opposition. Writing in reference to a “joke resolution that was sent to the House by Mr Arras” 
during the attempt to impeach him during his term as Public Service Commissioner, he said 
“the resolution came at a time when it could only have been reasonably 
anticipated to effect me as though it were for no good motive so far as 
concerned me. Anyone introducing a resolution of the kind can never 
expect any favourable consideration under an administration which I am 
heading. I can’t go that far. I am very sorry, but that is the situation which 
makes it absolutely impossible for me to subside in the views which I have 
taken.”137 
Any disagreement with or opposition to Long’s opinions, programmes or techniques was 
perceived by Long as a disloyal attack. Even personal friends such as Harley B Bozeman, a 
childhood friend and loyal Long supporter, were deemed traitorous if they contradicted 
him.138  
When Long wrote to Harvey Fields in 1933 that the “lying newspapers and the low brow 
politicians” had seen an opportunity to join the “big interests, who have also to pay good 
taxes in Louisiana, have the money to spread against me wherever it will do their cause 
good,”139 he was articulating his increasing sense that such opposition, especially among 
those he had previously supported, validated both his programmes and his actions, claiming:  
“When you see a new traitor, one of these men I have helped in the past, 
you can know what has happened. The Nation wide fight against Huey 
Long by the super rich who want to injure me before we can succeed in 
spreading some of their wealth among the people, looms as a mighty good 
chance for some political elements to grab off a few very big stakes to 
continue their lying propaganda. One charge there is not made, however. 
No one says I have failed to vote and do as I said I would if sent to the 
United States Senate.”140 
When Senator Huey P. Long died aged 42 on 10 September 1935, as a result of a shooting 
two days earlier, he was at the zenith of his political career and preparing to run for the 
Presidency of the United States. Despite no longer being the legal executive officer of 
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Louisiana, he was in the State Capitol building in Baton Rouge to ensure that the Legislature 
passed the latest aspects of his political agenda, including legislation to “preserve and 
protect the powers reserved to Louisiana by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution”141 
and a specific item to restructure the judicial districts. Both of these bills had caused 
consternation amongst members of the Legislature and were clear examples of the lengths 
to which he would go to retain, maintain and exercise the full extent of his personal and 
political power in Louisiana. The first, was to prevent attempts by the Roosevelt 
administration to bypass Long and his machine in distributing federal patronage in the 
state;142 although aspects of the legislation were deemed to be unconstitutional by George 
Wallace, his legal assistant, Long insisted the measure be proposed since any challenges to 
it would take an inordinately long time to proceed through the courts, and in the meantime he 
would have achieved his goal: a snub to the Roosevelt administration.143 The second was 
specifically aimed at removing the anti-Long judge, Benjamin Pavy, from the office he had 
held for twenty-eight years.144 It has been speculated that the redistricting proposal was one 
of the reasons why Dr Carl Austin Weiss shot Long on the evening of 8 September 1935; 
Isom J Guilliory, Sr, State Representative for Saint Landry Parish and a patient of Dr Weiss, 
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indicated that he was “very much upset at the prospect of his father-in-law losing his job as a 
result of the so-called gerrymandering.”145   
A personal belief system 
However, to categorise Long solely as a tyrant, whose only interest was in the accumulation 
of personal and political power with the aim of promoting his own political career, would be to 
ignore a number of factors which belie this assessment. The most obvious contradictions are 
his determination to challenge the political status quo in Louisiana and to work against the 
big corporations in the state, most notably Standard Oil. 
A logical step for someone determined to achieve the highest possible political office, at 
state and national level, would be to work within the existing system, first with the Louisiana 
Democratic Party and then through the national party, rather than in opposition to it. If his 
only ambition was the acquisition of political and personal power, his tactic of going against 
the corporations, which would have been able to assist him in acquiring his target, through 
financial and political support, appears to be counterintuitive. It is this aspect of Long which 
clarifies why academics and contemporary commentators have been unable to easily 
categorise him. There were a set of beliefs and principles to which Long held throughout his 
life and career, and while these did not constitute a conventionally identified ideology, they 
did form the backbone of Long’s political life.  
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It has been said, most notably by Long himself, that he did not adhere to any specific 
political philosophy except that which he created for himself to achieve his personal and 
political ambitions. Although he did declare himself to be “a democrat” who had “always 
contributed democratic campaign funds”146 in a telegram to U S Senator Hiram Johnson in 
April 1918, attempts to distil a deeper philosophical meaning from Long’s politics were 
dismissed by him: “I haven’t any program or any philosophy. I just take things as they 
come.”147 While this reflects Long’s view of his own political affiliations, his programmes and 
techniques owed much more than he acknowledged to the influences which surrounded him 
as he grew up, as he worked towards the achievement of his ambitions, and throughout his 
political career.  
Long’s early letters provide an insight into his views on state and national politics. 
Throughout Long’s career there is a consistent theme against the corporations, a letter to 
Skipwith W Adams, a member of the Arkansas Legislature, in January 1917, called for him 
to stand “for the cause of reform and against the corporate control of your state”148 since 
Long himself was convinced, by 1920, that the fight against the corporations was “firmly 
established in Northern Louisiana. They are being whipped and routed by larger and larger 
majorities.”149 In this letter to his former college friend, Charles Orr in Oklahoma, Long 
anticipated that with “a little attention given there for another year [the corporations would] be 
in bad shape in” the south of the state also. He was convinced that “a fight for the real right, 
for the people and against a capitalistic outlaw can never recede if actively waged. I happen 
to be the beginner and began only two years ago. The State is coming out fast.”150 This letter 
to Orr also provides an insight into Long’s appraisal of the state of national politics at that 
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time, based on his experiences during time spent in Louisiana, Oklahoma and New York. He 
gives his opinion that based on the rise in Republican votes in Louisiana in the latest election 
that “within the next decade, we may not have a dear-dear old ‘Solid South,’” since there 
were “so many autocratic things to explain that we could not keep them all lined up as they 
usually vote.”151 However, Long anticipated that an increase in taxation under a Republican 
government which would necessarily be borne by the “common people” and as such would 
lead to a resurgence by the Democratic Party within a few years.152 Yet, while Long looked 
to the national scene, his perspective on these issues was naturally parochial. e linHe       He 
tended to link broader themes to specific circumstances in Louisiana, such as the 
prevalence of an elite leadership within the state’s Democratic Party and the Ring’s control 
of politics in the state. This aspect of Long’s political focus is clear in the text of a speech in 
which, while linking the benefits of widening suffrage, specifically women’s suffrage, to the 
progress of the country and the overthrow of corruption in politics, he dwelt on the need to 
overcome corruption in politics, suggesting that “wherever the ballot has been granted to 
woman, the polluted politicians have been thrown out of office and shorn of power.” He 
claimed that it was the “opponent of moral reform, democracy and civilisation” who would 
cast “his vote against humanity” and that while the  
“political ringster is only too glad to grant the ballot to the illiterate foreigner, 
who knows and has but little interest in the country’s progress, for it is by 
the use of such vote that they destroy moral progress. They oppose 
Woman Suffrage, because they realize that the ballot of women can only 
be cast in favor of human principle.”153 
In a statement issued to the Daily States, the Times-Picayune, the Item and the Shreveport 
Times, in early August 1923, Long explicitly stated his determination to adhere to his 
principles which, while including doing any man who had supported him any favour, he 
would not extend this to “impose him on the people, for to do so would require me to 
sacrifice every principle for which I have stood, even the suit now pending in the courts 
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against the Standard Oil Company.”154 In this instance, the subject for his condemnation was 
Judge James G Palmer, Long’s attorney during the Parker libel case,155 who, as a lawyer for 
the Sinclair oil trust, needed to “choose between his masters, either the people or the 
Sinclair oil trust, which we all know to be a Standard Oil enterprise.156 In his 1924 
gubernatorial campaign message, Long clearly demonstrated that, despite his previously 
apparently conciliatory support, he was determined to work against the established elites of 
the party: 
“Long is against the Parker administration. 
Long is oposed [sic] to religious strife and discontent and unrest. 
Long is forever and always opposed to the return of the open saloon. 
Long is opposed to J.Y.Sanders and the kind of government he stands for. 
Long will be the Governor of Louisiana in fact as well as in name. 
Good Roads. Get Louisiana out of the mud.”157 
The phrase ‘in fact as well as in name’ was a clear demonstration and warning that he would 
not allow others to determine the path of his term of office. Long planned to control the 
governor’s office, and with it, the state. In a letter to Col Robert E Ewing, following his 
election as governor, Long clearly summarised his primary principles for his term of office, 
“we may prosecute our whole work of human uplift, a better administration of justice, and an 
expansion and constructive advancement of our industry, commerce and agriculture.”158 His 
determination to deliver on his promises, most notably the free school books which were to 
be funded by a severance tax, however created divisions of opinion across the state. While 
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in a circular to all Parish School Board members, Parish superintendents and high school 
principals, T H Harris, the state superintendent of education, urged them to support Long’s 
severance tax legislation when it came before the state Legislature, since the monies raised 
through this tax would bring promised benefits to education in the state, especially to 
“finance a plan of free textbooks and at the same time provide as much money for the 
Current School Fund” as had been raised by “the Tobacco Tax, perhaps more,”159 others 
were vehemently opposed to it. C W Lane called the severance tax a “class legislation that 
would put a burden on” the people.160 Long’s plan to use increased taxation, especially that 
targeted primarily at corporations such as the oil tax proposal in March 1929, to fund 
programmes, guaranteed his opponents would fight his programmes. Meanwhile his image 
as a politician for the people of Louisiana grew, with A F Whitney, president of the 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, writing that it was due to Long’s reputation “as a 
progressive and a faithful public servant” that their members had been urged to support 
Long in the September primary and also to “exert any and all influence in behalf of his 
candidacy among their friends and relatives.”161 
Conclusion 
Rather than being assessed as conforming to one of the established or clearly defined 
ideological movement of his time, Huey P Long’s political and personal activities may be 
more accurately appraised as being part of a personal, individualistic, belief system; a 
personal political ideology. Contemporary commentators attempted to classify Long 
according to the prevailing political ideologies of the time. However, these attempts failed to 
produce a convincing or consistent assessment; with Long variously designated as a 
communist, fascist, socialist, progressive or populist. One of the primary reasons for this 
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inability to assess Long’s political inclination was that his activities and programmes 
appeared to have been inspired by differing aspects from within each of the prevailing 
ideologies. Another reason was that Long himself was determined not to be labelled as 
anything which would allow him to be considered as being part of a wider group or faction; 
hence his claim to be sui generis. Long saw himself as separate from others and as such 
any attempt to classify him within the context of the ideological tropes created or adhered to 
by other politicians was contradictory to this self-image. By acting outside of the existing 
system, in particular the political norms in Louisiana, he reinforced, for himself, his own 
identity while undermining the status quo. 
As would become evident during his planning for his run for the presidency, Long had no 
loyalty to party. In an interview with Forrest Davis, Long had apparently claimed he would 
“rule . . . as president for sixteen years, and in the process destroy both the Democratic and 
Republican parties.”162 As had been previously demonstrated by Parker in 1916 and then 
1920, allegiance to the Louisiana Democratic Party could be the difference between an 
unsuccessful and successful gubernatorial campaign, but Long’s affiliation to the Democratic 
Party in Louisiana rests solely on the precept that no other party was electorally viable in the 
state during the 1920s and 1930s. Having created, in the Long machine, a body which could 
rival the autonomy of the Democratic Party in the state, and having acquired significant 
control over the state’s political power, Long represented a potential threat to the status quo 
in the national Democratic Party for 1936. Whether Long did actually believe his claim that 
“Of course I have no chance being President – what will be the next thing they will want to 
throw me out of?”163 is probably unlikely, although it is a claim which not only speaks to his 
growing fixation with impeachment as a validation tool, but it also emphasises his 
determination to fulfil his long held presidential ambition, irrespective of opposition. An 
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ambition which others within the party were also beginning to suggest might become a 
reality, when as a secret Democratic National Committee’s poll taken in 1935 suggested, his 
growing influence meant that Long, a Long candidate or a Republican candidate with Long’s 
support, might poll sufficient votes to prevent Roosevelt from winning another term in the 
White House in 1936.164 
The multifaceted aspects of Huey Long suggest that there was a dichotomy in the forces 
which drove him throughout his career. While the discussion in this chapter has revealed 
that he incorporated some of the ideological tenets of populism and progressivism into his 
programmes, and had been inspired by the class conflict engendered in him by the political 
classes in Louisiana during his rise to power, ultimately it was Long’s obsession with 
personal and political power, its acquisition, retention and expansion that motivated him. 
One of the key factors in the impeachment was Long’s behaviour and attitude towards his 
fellow politicians, traits which were influenced by his obsession with personal and political 
power. For Long, Louisiana politics, rather than being a manifestation of a specific belief 
system, was the means which provided him with an outlet and a challenge for his intellect, 
and the opportunities to achieve the power and positions he desired. The acquisition of 
power was represented by his achievement of elected office. His perception was that the 
power and influence attached to these offices would allow him to impose his will and 
programmes on the people and state of Louisiana. When the reality of the authority of these 
offices did not fulfil his expectations, Long actively sought to alter the paradigm, so that 
reality became more aligned with his perceptions and expectations. Perceived failures, such 
as legislative opposition to his programmes, perpetuated the need to increase his levels of 
control over other actors in the state, especially politicians. Evident amongst the articles of 
                                                          





impeachment brought against Long on 26 March 1929 was his opponents’ objection to the 
disproportionate control and power which Long was wielding in Louisiana.165  
The inability of his contemporaries to identify with Long on an ideological basis and to 
comprehend the causes and sources of his politics ensured that they were also unable to 
identify the political drivers for his programmes. The apparent lack of an identifiable and 
consistent base upon which his programmes were built called into question the underlying 
doctrine which motivated Long. Without a common basis for allegiance such as a shared 
doctrinal adherence, Long’s motivations were incomprehensible and therefore deemed to be 
questionable by those around him. Later Long may have outwardly deplored the necessity of 
the methods by which he imposed his will, authority and programmes on Louisiana, claiming 
that “you sometimes have to fight fire with fire . . . I would do it some other way if there was 
time or if it wasn’t necessary to do it this way,”166 but the methods which he would use to 
retain gubernatorial control of Louisiana while in Washington DC as the state’s senator were 
already evident by 1929, as he sought to control the state’s judiciary and Legislature as well 
as the executive office. By specifically designating himself and his programmes as 
something apart from the norms of political intercourse, Long created the foundation for 
opposition and subsequently, impeachment. 
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Enemies, enmity and impeachment 
 
 
One of Long’s consistent traits throughout his life and political career was his ability, not 
simply to provoke political opposition, but to incite hatred and aggression amongst those 
who disagreed with him. Harry S Truman, who was elected to the United States Senate in 
1934, considered Long to have had “one of the keenest minds” in the US Senate but that he 
was “crooked as a ram’s horn [and] had no moral code.”1 Once in the Senate, Long did not 
appear to be willing to curtail his verbosity to that which was appropriate for his audience 
and venue. Having attacked other members of the Senate with such vindictiveness that 
many senators would leave the chamber when he began to speak, he would approach his 
victims afterwards to say it was not personal, just politics. After one such incident, Carter 
Glass (D-VA 1920-1946) responded, “Huey, you’re the worst SOB in the Senate, and if I can 
get my knife out I’m going to cut your heart out.”2 As demonstrated earlier, Long was not 
motivated by an established ideology but by a more personal belief system, the fulfilment of 
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which had resulted in his actions becoming increasingly predicated upon a desire for the 
acquisition of political and personal power, and one from which he would not turn, 
irrespective of opposition against him, as he clearly stated in the United States Senate in 
March 1935: 
“Nonetheless my voice will be the same as it has been. Patronage will not 
change it. Fear will not change it. Persecution will not change it.”3 
For him, opposition equated to enmity. For Long, an enemy was anyone who offered any 
degree of opposition to him, someone who refused to adhere to his will, or someone who did 
not accord him the respect to which he believed he was entitled. Although he utilised 
opposition to big business and corporations, most notably the Standard Oil Company, in 
tandem with his Share Our Wealth programme as a means to attract popular support, the 
primary force of his enmity, and therefore his enemies, was of a much more personal nature. 
While Standard Oil may have supported some of the individuals whom Long designated as 
his enemies, and it provided Long with a convenient target, understandable to his 
supporters, it was in his relationships with, and behaviour towards, individuals rather than 
with the monolith corporations, that the circumstances were created that would lead to his 
impeachment in March 1929.    
This chapter will explore through a series of case studies, the evolution of Long’s personal 
and political relationships with those individuals whom he would characterise as his 
enemies. It examines how this trait manifested itself throughout Long’s life and career, how 
his political opponents developed into implacable enemies who advocated his assassination, 
and the progression of his enmity towards others. The case studies will explore his 
relationships with family members as well as his political opponents, and also his propensity 
to impulsiveness, revenge and violence, and how this led to impeachment. 
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In summarising the impact of the 1929 impeachment on Long, in his 1973 presidential 
address to the Organization of American Historians, “Huey, Lyndon, and Southern 
Radicalism,” T Harry Williams stated his opinion that the question, that the impeachment had 
either no effect on Long’s personality or that he had become harder and more vindictive as a 
result, “cannot be settled but there is probably truth in both views.”4 Williams’ assessment, 
both in this address and in the 1969 biography, is problematic because of its open ended 
nature and because it limited the discussion of the impeachment to its effect on Long’s 
emotional personality, eschewing any deeper examination of its impact on his political 
behaviour. Williams’ conclusion that “those who think the impeachment did not change Huey 
are probably right. But their opinion needs some modification: the experience affected him 
but did not alter him appreciably”5 is too broad, therefore to advance our understanding 
significantly, since he offers few explanatory insights into how this experience affected his 
political outlook and behaviour or, indeed how Long contextualised the impeachment crisis 
within his own mind. As a result, the entire impeachment episode is somewhat underplayed 
by Williams, in stark contrast to Long’s own frequent references to it. While Williams’ 
discussion was in the context of a biography and therefore an appropriate format for a 
debate on the impact of events on the personality and character of the subject, his work 
largely ignores Long’s references to impeachment in Every Man A King, and the assessment 
is further restricted by being reliant on the opinions and observations of those 
contemporaries of Long willing to be drawn on the subject. It is not surprising that supporters 
of Long would suggest that his impeachment had a profound effect on the man, while it is 
equally unsurprising that his political enemies would claim that little had changed. Williams’ 
conclusion is therefore restricted by the scope of his discussion. By focussing on whether 
the impeachment had triggered changes to Long’s inner character, and by failing to fully 
contextualise the process with regards to Long’s past behaviour and political self-image, 
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Williams minimises the impeachment crisis as a whole. As a result, in this portrayal Long 
emerges as a politician who has simply overcome a challenge to his leadership by the use of 
superior political tactics, but not as one whose career was under threat. 
The Standard Oil Company 
First it is necessary to address Long’s animosity to corporations, which he claimed stood to 
gain financially at the expense of the people and the state. The corporations were a 
significant part of his legal work and formed part of his political agenda for his campaign for 
the Railroad Commission. As a newspaper article, advertising Long’s campaign, highlighted, 
his efforts on behalf of “the masses” had he claimed “brought down upon him powerful 
opposition, [but he remained] the friend of the common people, and is yet making the same 
fight.”6 A consistent factor throughout Long’s political career was his opposition to the 
Standard Oil Company. While the origins of this enmity lay in the Pine Island incident,7 which 
had resulted in financial losses for Long at the hands of the big oil corporations, including 
Standard Oil, the continued enmity was a politically expedient one for Long. Although there 
were the perquisites available to a lawyer or a politician who would work with a large 
corporation, such as Standard Oil, Long took a contrary approach, probably because he 
viewed Standard Oil as being specifically connected with the political elite of the state, as 
exemplified by John M Parker. For Long, there were immeasurable benefits to having a big 
corporation as a target, especially one which could be portrayed as having profited at the 
expense of the population of Louisiana, and which could be blamed as the power behind the 
actions of any political enemies, so providing him with a potent stick with which to beat all of 
his opponents. When asked by Chick Frampton why, after he had introduced legislation to 
bring all of the power in New Orleans under the auspices of the governor’s office, he had 
allowed Mayor T Semmes Walmsley to remain in post, Long justified his technique of not 
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destroying a weakened political opponent, since it provided his own people with a “perfect 
target,” while also distracting them from fighting amongst themselves.8 In a similar vein, 
Long’s pursuit of Standard Oil stood not only as an effective reinforcement of his image as a 
champion of the people in the face of corrupt corporations, it also provided him with a target 
to blame for the ills of the state, essentially a distraction for the population of Louisiana.  
In his analysis of a letter from Long to Leland H Moss, dated 11 November 1920, William Ivy 
Hair placed the focus of the letter on Long’s claim that Standard Oil was now controlling a 
weak governor, John M Parker.9 However, if one reads Long’s letter in its chronological 
context, there is an alternative interpretation to that proposed by Hair. The letter examined 
by Hair was a response to the one Long had received from Moss, dated 9 November 1920, 
which addressed the defeat of Long’s movement against the call for a Constitutional 
Convention. In his letter, Moss admonished Long for his “personal resentment toward 
Governor Parker [which] should not have been allowed to drive you into a position inimical to 
the best interests of the State.”10 Although Moss appears to have attempted to soften his 
tone of reprimand and instruction, by stating that the letter was “written in the friendliest 
spirit,” his view was that Long should not have taken the stand that he did. The proposal that 
Long would in time “probably regret the line”11 he had taken, was unlikely to have been 
favourably received by Long, who always demonstrated a reluctance to submit to the advice 
of others. With this in mind, the opening of Long’s response reads as one of barely disguised 
contempt, couched as a reciprocal response to an equal. It does not read as the defensive 
response to someone who has just administered a reprimand to a novice: 
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“Your kind letter of November 9th is gratefully received. I have expected 
such a document from you for the past several days. I note that you say 
that you could not allow the opportunity to pass without pointing out certain 
things. In this respect you are very much like myself. I could not let the 
opportunity for spreading knowledge to the public pass”12 
The closely typed two page letter does, as Hair suggested, link Governor Parker’s actions to 
the influence of Standard Oil, specifically condemning Parker for going back on his 
campaign pledges to make all pipe lines into common carriers and a specific agreement to 
support Long’s plan to “[divorce] pipe lines from producing companies,” by accepting the 
imposition of terms and conditions “as the Standard Oil Company’s Attorneys saw fit.”13 
However, in his personal accusations about the character of the governor, Long portrayed 
Parker not just as “an egotistical weakling,”14 but also a delusional one, who would readily 
believe that he was capable of changing the “course of the Northern Star,” if his advisers told 
him so, and who would only have kept to his campaign promises if paid a “cash security.”15 
Possibly the most emphatic insult hurled by Long at Parker, is his claim that the voters of the 
congressional districts within the territory he represented were the “true, tried and consistent 
advocates of reform government,” not the “great reform Governor.”16 The accusation that 
Standard Oil was controlling the Parker administration was a distraction from the personal 
antipathy that Long had felt towards the governor since he had failed to follow Long’s plan. 
The main focus of this letter to Moss is Long’s condemnation of Parker for reneging on 
campaign promises, although he did attribute this to the influence of Standard Oil. Long 
specifically focused on Parker’s failure to honour his promise to “support the plan which 
[Long] outlined to him, divorcing pipe lines from producing companies,”17 and, in a comment 
designed to cause mischief, his failure to use Moss and Robert H Marr to determine the 
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constitutionality of the proposed legislation. Long took the opportunity of this letter, not only 
to condemn Parker, but to emphasise that the governor had used lawyers, including one 
from the “Railroad Company owned by Kuhn, Loeb & Co., a Standard Oil ally, if there is one 
in the world,”18 rather than his own friend, Moss, thus seeking to imply that Parker had acted 
dishonourably in all aspects of the matter. For Long, Standard Oil was a symbolic, as well as 
a real enemy. One which could embody what was wrong with the status quo of politics in 
Louisiana and which could be blamed for the actions of members of the political elite, who 
Long saw as the opponents to his own progress in state politics. 
Family19  
The starting point for a discussion on Long’s tendency to create fractious personal 
relationships, and to maintain and foster grudges throughout his career, is his relationship 
with the members of his family, especially with his siblings.  
Except as a tool for the purposes of election campaigns, Long was not concerned with 
maintaining or presenting the image of a ‘family man’ to the world. For example, a 
newspaper article from October 1932, in which the folksy quality of the family’s relationship 
is emphasised, describes Rose ‘smiling and twinkling’ at her husband while he “listened to 
her with an occasional grin and wink,” and their children eat their “generous and successive 
helpings” of breakfast.20 The primary function of the article was to review Rose’s involvement 
in Long’s recent campaign across North and South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas on behalf 
of presidential candidate, Franklin D Roosevelt, although it also underscores her limited 
involvement in his previous campaigns. This campaign came at a crucial point in Long’s 
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career, when he was beginning to move his focus from politics in Louisiana to the national 
arena, in preparation for his own run for the presidency. The campaign itself allowed him to 
demonstrate his effectiveness to both Roosevelt and the Democratic National Party, but it 
coincided with the point at which he evidently recognised the need to present a specific 
image to the American electorate, that of the successful, traditional family man. The article 
seems to fulfil its remit, by positioning Long as the family man and focussing on the 
conventional nature of the family unit, with Long expressing his pride at son Russell’s 
musical skill, “‘that boy won’t be a politician. He’ll be a band master.’”21 However, it is in the 
article’s final paragraph, in a passing observation on the lack of shared hobbies between 
husband and wife, something that Rose states she hopes will be rectified when they both go 
to Washington, that it instead highlights, and, therefore, questions, the lack of cohesion 
between them, the time spent apart and the dysfunctional relationship Long had with 
members of his family. As previously mentioned, once in the Senate, Long began to 
perceive the necessity of presenting a specific image to voters, however, with newspaper 
coverage of his previous behaviour on record, it was perhaps an inescapable fact that his 
attempts at change would attract further unwanted media attention.  
Throughout his life, Huey Pierce Long Jr never willingly used the suffix ‘junior’ as part of his 
name, as demonstrated in a letter to The Associated Trades’ Law List in response to their 
enquiry, regarding a vacancy on their list to advertise his commercial practice: 
“Nevertheless my official position does not interfere with my practice of law. 
. . . In publishing my name please be certain that it is published: “Huey P. 
Long.” Quite often heretofore my name has been published in various 
misspelled fashions and is no satisfaction to always be annoyed with 
making explanations regarding your correct name.”22  
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While William Ivy Hair believed that this was simply another demonstration of Long’s inability 
to be second to anyone, least of all the “loser who embarrassed him by running last in 
elections,”23 Long’s rejection of the naming convention pre-dates his father’s emphatic defeat 
in the Winnfield alderman elections in 1910. Long had already replaced the suffix with a 
prefix in his grade school books, preferring the term “Hon Huey P Long” as a demonstration 
not simply, as Hair believed, of his innate sense of superiority,24 but also as a way of 
disassociating himself from the large Long family. His later appropriation of the sobriquet 
“Kingfish” and his self-identification as sui generis, as well as being a way of characterising 
himself as separate and unique, both demonstrate a need to detach himself from the 
restrictions of familial responsibilities and obligations, and a need to sever the restraints that 
he felt these placed upon him. Long’s rejection of the connection and obligation made 
implicit by the suffix was further demonstrated in the naming of his eldest son. Russell Long 
was, at his birth and in the absence of his father, named by his mother, ‘Huey P Long III.’25 
On his first visit to see his son, Long objected to the name, changing it to Russell Billui Long. 
This action is further evidence of his unusual lack of affinity for family. Long is unusual in a 
patriarchal society in that he did not seek to perpetuate his, or his family’s, name through the 
repetition of an inherited name. Such was the impact of his father’s decision that it was only 
when Russell enlisted in the Navy during World War II that he became aware of his officially 
registered name. In contrast to his father, Russell chose to honour his father’s decision by 
continuing to use the name Long had given to him rather than his official one, especially 
when he went to the United States Senate. For Russell, this move also offered the added 
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benefit of allowing him to avoid any claims that he was seeking to profit politically from the 
use his father’s name.26 
A study of Dutch politicians has confirmed that first born children are overrepresented in 
political office, but it is unable to fully determine whether the child’s relationship interactions 
with its siblings, or its relationship with its parents, is the reason for this phenomenon. An 
additional observation from this study, is that a high number of politicians are only children, 
which suggests that the parental relationship may be the key factor.27 The study also 
recognises that with an increasing tendency towards smaller families, a greater number of 
children are proportionally more likely to be a first born or only child.28 Long was born the 
seventh of Huey Pierce Long Sr and Caledonia Tison Long’s ten children, and was the third 
of their four sons.29 The relationships between Long and each of his surviving siblings is best 
described as challenging, although with the exception of Caledonia (Callie), his relationships 
with his sisters appear to have been ones of mutual tolerance and ambivalence; while 
Long’s relationships with his brothers, Julius, George (known as Shan) and Earl can be 
characterised as being fraught with varying degrees of personal, financial and legal conflict 
interspersed with periods of personal, political and financial support. Key to Long’s 
relationships with his siblings is Julius’ assessment that Long would not tolerate being in 
second place to anyone.30 Long’s letters to, from, and about Callie, demonstrate a 
relationship with his sister, which was based on the extremely reluctant financial support to 
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aid her recovery from tuberculosis in Arizona.31 The majority of letters from Callie are 
handwritten, undated and addressed to “Dearest Huey” and invariably include requests for 
her brother to send money, for example:   
Dearest Huey – 
Will you please send your May and June checks to me right away? For I 
need them very much - I know you sent $75 twice - but I need the extra 
$30.00 for the months Earl did not send any checks. He said you would 
send for him one month - Please do this right away as my board will soon 
be due - 
As ever 
Callie32 
The above letter elicited a response from Long, in which he enclosed the requested $30, and 
stated, “I think I will possibly sue Earl in the next few days.”33 In another family, one would 
assume this comment to be a joke, but amongst the Long siblings, given their often fractious 
interactions, it is more likely to have been a realistic threat. Interwoven with the handwritten 
notes from Callie are typewritten letters from Long to her, their brothers, Julius and Shan, 
and older sister Lottie. In these letters, Long expressed his frustration at the demands from 
members of the family on his purse, suggesting that his contributions were disproportionate 
to those being made by other members of the family,  
“It seems that every member of my family thinks if I get 15c I should send it 
to some member of it; they all want to borrow; want gifts. In fact they want 
every darn thing I make, and they offer on top of this to write me any kind of 
ridiculous and insulting letter . . . It seems . . .  that I am a source from 
which any one can draw all that I have and upon my failure to yield 100 per 
cent of what I have I must stand any kind of talk.”34  
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Disputes about money are a prominent and repetitive feature of Long’s exchanges of letters 
with his siblings, most particularly those with Julius and Shan. For example, an exchange of 
letters between the three brothers in April 1920 is a catalogue of accusations about who 
gave or loaned what, how much, to whom and whether it was repaid. Part of this bitter 
exchange is Shan’s response, dated 17 April 1920, beginning “Dear Brother: Your very 
hostile letter written by your stenographer, dictated in the presence of all your friencs [sic] to 
a brother, received.”35 In this letter, Shan highlights a consistent feature evident throughout 
Long’s correspondence, an idiosyncrasy which clearly antagonised family members. The 
archived collection of Long’s papers contains copies of both sides of his correspondence, 
most often the original of the letter from his correspondent and a carbon copy of Long’s 
letter. His letters in the archive are almost exclusively typewritten carbon copies, most of 
which were dictated to and then typed by a secretary. Each letter ends with the initials HPL, 
together with the initials of the secretary.   
There are a number of possible reasons why Long would have chosen this method for 
handling his personal correspondence: a simple explanation may have been the 
questionable clarity of his own handwriting, although a sample from 1923 appears to be 
reasonably comprehensible;36 or that he may have wished to maintain a record of all his 
correspondence against a future need, such as a potential legal claim, especially when 
many of the letters to his siblings included details of financial transactions; or as a record for 
posterity. A more plausible reason for Long’s use of a secretary when communicating with 
his family and the retention of both sides of his correspondence, may have been his inability 
to distinguish between the personal and the professional, combined with his need to be in 
control, and to be subservient to no one. His partial explanation for the formal tone of his 
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personal letters was that he often dictated a number of letters, but rarely instructed the 
secretary which forms of address should be used.37 However, this response only explains 
the formal tone of his letters, not the reasons for his use of this tactic. In the light of Shan’s 
objections, it is clear that Long’s family was not privy to the reasons for using a secretary for 
his personal correspondence and, importantly, that they did not understand or condone it. 
Since he died intestate, there is no indication what his intentions were regarding the disposal 
of his papers after his death. The lack of a will is somewhat anomalous in view of both 
Long’s conviction that he would be assassinated38 and his profession as a lawyer, but 
although a search was made for a will, it proved to be unsuccessful.39 The absence of a will, 
while perhaps appearing to contradict Long’s determination to set out his political legacy in 
Every Man A King (1933) and My First Days in the White House (1935), and through the 
Share Our Wealth scheme, it is not entirely incomprehensible for a Louisiana lawyer. With 
the civil law of forced heirship enshrined in Louisiana law by the 1921 state constitution, 
Long would have been confident that in the event of his death, his legal heirs would have 
inherited his estate,40 although this does leave unexplained his intentions regarding his 
papers. 
A fourteen year age gap,41 between Long and his brother Julius, had led the latter to develop 
an almost fatherly interest in his younger brother, and he maintained a special interest in his 
development, with the intention of creating not just a great man, but one whom he, Julius, 
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could control.42 It is clear from the letters exchanged between the two, that while Julius 
clearly expected Long to adhere to his advice and to respect his seniority, Long never 
considered himself to be the junior one in their relationship, whether as brothers or partners 
in their law firm. In an unusual letter to Julius, dated 24 January 1920, Long explicitly 
demonstrated that he did not consider his older brother to be a source for political or 
personal advice. On the surface the letter appears to be one in which Long is expressing his 
frustration with politics, “I think that I [am] now in political retirement for the balance of my 
lifetime.”43 However, it is instead a letter in which he offered advice to Julius from a position 
of superiority. He suggested that Julius was a fool to continue to seek political office at the 
age of forty and advised that he would be better placed to focus on improving his legal skills:  
“By this time I have learned what I am sure you have long since learned, 
that politics is the sorriest of all sorry games. There is nothing to it and a 
lawyer is a fool who accepts a position which places him in retirement for 
usually he must emerge from that position broke, defeated, without a law 
practice and the best years of his life spent. . . If you would devote one-half 
the time, energy and thought in the study of broader principles of law that 
either you or myself have devoted to politics, for just a period of two years, 
your knowledge of the law and procedure in general would be wonderful. . . 
It is useless for you and I to ever talk about practising law together of 
course, that is something we cannot do.”44    
On a number of occasions throughout his career, Long expressed his disillusionment with 
politics, however, at no point did he actually plan to turn his back on his chosen career. 
These expressions were in reality his way of conveying his disappointment at not achieving 
a specific goal or that he had been thwarted by a political opponent. By claiming to be 
finished with politics, he sought instead to emphasise the machinations or corruption of his 
opponents.    
Despite the brothers’ failed attempt at a joint law practice in 1915, Long proposed a new 
partnership with Julius in 1920. Julius had failed to be elected as district judge earlier that 
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year and Long was now clear in establishing that he would have the “leading say in any firm 
to which I might be a party,” although he did promise that when it came to politics, the 
brothers could go their own ways.45 The partnership survived less than a year. While Julius’ 
letter to Long on 7 September 1921 is a catalogue of complaints, its primary focus is his 
brother’s “animosity” in the face of everything that Julius claimed to have done for him. The 
letter is an unrestrained outpouring of resentment at Long’s lack of appreciation for the 
financial and political support Julius had given to him, from the selection of his law courses 
to paying his grocery bills. Julius had been humiliated by his younger brother, who had 
“publicaly [sic] announced that my influence with the firm was negative” when, as Julius 
claimed, the law practice had been built and expanded on his work and talent, and that it 
was Long’s “head [which had] expanded far faster than the practice.” Julius also goes on to 
refute Long’s superiority in legal actions, “I have had reasonable success as an attorney in 
all the courts, and particularly in the supreme court, where you have never won an important 
case.” On the subject of politics, Long’s promise that they would maintain their 
independence had not been honoured, for he had actively sought to prevent Julius from 
supporting his candidate of choice in an election to the state supreme court. Julius claimed 
that in an attempt to dictate his brother’s political allegiance, Long had “almost broke my 
door to my private office down in order to prevent me from writing letters in the interest of the 
candidacy of Judge Porter,” and suggested that without his advice, his brother would have 
voted for the telephone rate increase and faced his “destruction.”46   
Long’s response to Julius is a vitriolic one, but he claimed he considered it a necessary one, 
“in order that you may not truthfully be able to say that you wrote me things which I never 
denied.” He refuted Julius’ claims as “a damnable lie,” “false,” and “a malicious, personally 
forced, derogatory and slanderous falsehood, throughout, and you know it,” and 
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characterised Julius as “a broken-down, impoverished and past-handed politician” to whom 
he had “given an opportunity by which you have materially profited.” He, dramatically, 
expressed his wish that the brothers not see or communicate with each other and 
maliciously added,  
“There is a peculiar fondness which one may create for you when you are 
at a satisfactory distance, of some hundred miles, or any, at least, the 
fourth floor away.”47 
Despite an apparently conciliatory letter two months later, in November 1921, in which Long 
expressed his wish to pass cases to Julius in response to support recently received, and in 
which he acknowledged that their “mutual faults and temperaments” prevented them from 
supporting each other,48 their personal relationship did not recover despite, or perhaps 
because of, continued contact between the two of them. In October 1922, Long wrote in 
response to letters from Julius,  
“this, of course, is about the thirtieth letter of its kind that I have received in 
the past few years. It is the only one that I have read lately, others have 
been consigned to the wastebasket. . . . I, however, request that you write 
me no further. I don’t care to receive any letter from you. You have 
promised to abstain from this letter writing to me several times in the past. 
You would oblige me if you would keep your word in this particular.”49  
In spite of poor relations with his siblings, Long did exchange letters with one member of his 
extended family without the relationship descending into a series of financial demands or 
accusations and counter-accusations, his sister-in-law, Aline McConnell. Although Hair 
suggests that Aline was the sole member of Long’s family who did not demand spending 
money from him and was the one family member who brought out his “latent sense of 
chivalry,”50 Aline did ask Long for funds. Certainly, her requests were couched more 
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pleasantly than those of Callie, whose requests were generally worded as demands: ‘please 
send your check right away.’ Aline’s requests, while less forceful, were more manipulative in 
tone: 
“I have paid Mrs Black $20 so far. When convenient for you, hope you can 
send me another installment. Will be all right not to pay until end of month, 
but I believe it is better, if possible, to pay a little in advance.”51   
Instead of mirroring his relationships with his own sisters, this relationship most resembled 
the one which Julius intended to have with his younger brother, that of mentor and student. 
In his letters, Long sought to provide guidance to Aline on subjects as varied as her reading 
material, recommending she continue with Les Misérables and that she begin Ridpath’s 
History of the World, and her marital prospects. Long suggested that her convalescence was 
not the best time for her to look for a prospective husband, as her 
“sphere is too confined, and your minglings, too limited. Victims of the 
divorce courts, ex-rounders, would-be greasers and old age bachelors are 
among the last group in which a person might be expected to find a 
desirable husband. After you have again entered the ordinary sphere of 
human activity, you will see the wisdom of my calculations.”52 
Long’s letters to Aline are extraordinarily candid. In one, which Hair calls “one of the most 
revealing he ever wrote”53 Long gloried not just in his independence from Julius, “only the 
name of ‘Huey P. Long’ adorns the windows and doors of these offices. I am Governor, 
Mayor, King and Clerk,” but he also revels in his ability to get his preferred candidate elected 
without assistance or collaborations. He acknowledged that “there is some resentment over 
the fact that I do not need any help or combination to allow my man to be elected in this 
district,” but dismissed as jealousy Julius’ concerns that Long was now a “more or less 
dangerous power,” since his brother and his associates were unable to “change the honors 
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of the ‘Almighty’,”54 suggesting that his success was in some way divinely inspired. Although, 
the references in Hair’s biography indicate that this letter was written on 21 September 
1921,55 it was in fact written on 1 September, and while it is a revealing declaration of 
independence by Long, reflecting his determination to act alone, it is a subsequent letter to 
Aline which offers an even greater insight into Long’s psyche. Written two weeks later, 
Long’s letter of 13 September 1921 is a clear expression of his intended modus operandi for 
his future legal, and especially, political offices,  
“I have concluded that so long as I am able, any office which I occupy will 
be solely and exclusively under my jurisdiction, and there will be no 
associate to be considered, or opinion to be regarded in any maneuver. No 
successful activities in which I have ever been engaged have ever been 
sanctioned, or countenanced by the ones who, ordinarily, would be 
purported advisers. I think I would rather take my own deliberate counsel 
for a few more years.”56 
It is through these two letters together, that Long articulated not just his plan for a solo law 
practice, but he also confided his inability to trust or to work with, or for, others. His later self-
identification as sui generis was not simply a deflection tool for journalists seeking to 
categorise him, it was a fundamental part of his personality, as was exhibited in his 
behaviour, from his dysfunctional relationships with family members through to his 
identification as the Kingfish, the leader of the lodge,57 the person who ruled over everyone 
else. Following the breakdown of their law practice, Long’s relationship with his eldest 
brother had descended into disintegration. Harry Gamble’s58 description of the indefatigable 
energy exhibited by the members of the Long family, when working for their own interests, “it 
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is a day and night proposition,”59 is a key insight in understanding the relationship of the 
brothers. Each one saw his own interests and activities as of the prime consideration. 
Although members of the family publicly gave the appearance of constituting an effective 
familial support network, none of them resented the commitment required, and rejected their 
involvement in the family, more than Long. For him, his family was the original basis for what 
would become his political machine, a structure which was created to support his career and 
his accumulation of power. It is evident that he expected the family network to act in the 
manner he would later demand of the Long machine. He expected his siblings to support his 
political career irrespective of any altercations, no matter how serious, which may have 
occurred in their personal interactions. From his viewpoint, his interests were paramount and 
should take priority in their relationships, as such, any attempt by the network to act outside 
of this remit represented a challenge to the development of Long’s career, his independence 
and power.   
In contrast, Julius felt that Long owed him both respect and gratitude for the support that he 
had provided him during his early legal career and, especially, during the impeachment 
period. Their father had visited Long in Baton Rouge during the early days of the 
impeachment, and asked Julius to visit his brother, as he feared Long might commit 
suicide.60 Julius later claimed that it was he who had suggested the Round Robin letter as 
the solution to the impeachment, and that Long had failed to acknowledge this crucial piece 
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of advice.61 Despite the deterioration of the brothers’ personal and political relationship, 
Julius provided support for his brother’s campaign in the US Senate race, reinforcing the 
assumption that the family was perceived by Long to be part of his political machine. During 
this race, Julius continued to offer advice on the matter of the Irby and Terrell kidnapping 
accusations62 and on the content of his brother’s speeches, suggesting that Long should 
focus on his achievements and “make reference to some of these major slanders in casual 
way.”63   
The toxicity of the relationship with Julius was made evident in his article in Real America, 
“What I Know About My Brother, Senator Huey P. Long.” The article was primarily a 
response to statements made by Long on the floor of the US Senate when, protected by the 
privilege of the chamber, he had denounced both Julius and their younger brother, Earl, for 
acting as witnesses during the Senate’s investigation into the Overton-Broussard Senate 
election campaign.64 But the article was also a means by which Julius could publicly 
unburden himself of all of his frustrations, grievances, and resentments against Long. Many 
of the accusations raised by Julius in this article were expanded discussions of the same 
assertions he had made in his letter to Long in September 1921. 
Julius claimed that Long’s career had only been successful because he had benefitted from 
the activities and support of Julius and Earl, which, he said, were not only unacknowledged 
by Long, but their support had been repaid with his opposition to their own bids for office. 
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Julius specifically highlighted Earl’s financial and campaign support of Long during the races 
for Railroad Commissioner and Governor. When, subsequently, Earl announced that he 
would run for lieutenant governor in 1932, he did so without Long’s knowledge. In a phone 
call to Julius, Long threatened to destroy Earl, if Julius did not persuade him to withdraw; 
Julius claimed that he responded with a “few appropriate remarks,” before hanging up and 
campaigning across the state for Earl and other opponents of the Long ticket.65 In his 
autobiography, Long portrays this episode as one in which his family’s actions, by their 
unreasonable demand that he add a brother to his ticket to succeed him, had provided his 
“alert opponents,” especially those amongst the press, with an opportunity to target him for 
having provided a number of family members with state jobs.66 While Long claimed that it 
was only reasonable that he would reward those among his “political supporters of longest 
and most arduous service . . . under the fair rules of politics as practiced everywhere,”67 it 
was Julius’ assertion that the jobs promised to his supporters were instead allocated to 
political opponents to guarantee their future support.68 As governor, Long appointed many of 
his supporters to state jobs as rewards, but rarely was an appointment made without 
conditions or restrictions. Many were obliged to sign undated letters of resignation, thereby 
ensuring their posts were entirely subject to Long’s control. Others were required to agree to 
specific terms in exchange for their posts, including Earl Long, who was appointed as the 
attorney for the inheritance tax collector. In return for the post, Earl was required to assume 
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financial responsibility for Callie and their father, so releasing Long from what he perceived 
to be an unreasonable burden.69  
Long’s disregard for the concept of family was not limited to his relationships with his siblings 
or even to his own family. When he was interviewed by T Harry Williams, it is clear that 
Seymour Weiss’ primary focus for their discussion was to promote the image of Long as an 
exceptional politician. However, in his anecdotes, he not only demonstrated that Long’s 
abilities were inconsistently applied, but he also emphasised his own role in the Long 
organisation, by enumerating a number of occasions in which he claimed he had influenced 
or attempted to influence the actions of Long. In one instance, Weiss claimed he had 
persuaded Long not to use the contents of a potentially damaging letter sent by T Semmes 
Walmsley’s mother during the New Orleans mayoral election campaign in 1934, in which 
Walmsley was a candidate. The story is consistent with Long’s practice of utilising anyone 
and any means to attack his opponents, and it also emphasises his lack of, and empathy for, 
familial feeling. It was necessary for Weiss to explain to Long that, just as targeting the 
brother of Charles Manship prior to the impeachment had been a breach of accepted 
societal and behavioural norms, so to target the mother of an opponent was not an 
appropriate campaign tactic.70 Long’s belief that it was acceptable to target and threaten the 
family members of his opponents in the pursuit of his own political power and success, is 
most likely to have both been derived from his dysfunctional relationships with his own 
family.  
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Long’s relationship with his secretary Alice Lee Grosjean, whom he later appointed, at the 
age of 24, as secretary of state, was the subject of rumour and innuendo.71 As with stories of 
other extra-marital affairs, those in closest contact with Long were divided as to the validity 
of these rumours. Some of those interviewed by Williams claimed that Long did not have 
sufficient time to engage in affairs and even that he was disinterested in sex, whilst others 
assured Williams that the affair did occur.72 Mason Spencer claimed that James Terrell, 
Grosjean’s former husband, had sold her to Long for $2500 and a Buick coupe.73 Rose Long 
is reported to have taken the children and returned to Shreveport after the inauguration, and 
to have threatened Long with divorce because Grosjean was living in the governor’s 
mansion.74 Shortly after, Grosjean moved out of the mansion and into a hotel, at which Long 
also had rooms.75 Irrespective of whether it was an affair with Grosjean or if it was, as 
Williams suggests, Long’s lifestyle that drove Rose away, the outcome was that the Longs 
did not regularly occupy a common residency during his time as governor.76 It was this 
situation which Long sought to address, and change, when he began his drive towards 
creating an effective national profile in 1932.  
It is also clear from the interviews Williams undertook for the biography, that Long did 
engage in inappropriate behaviour towards women. He was, as Williams claimed, prone to 
“sudden, violent sexual impulses” which he would act upon “even if he was in a public 
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place.”77 Richard W Leche, a member of Long’s organisation, and later governor of 
Louisiana (1936-1939), spoke of Long’s affairs stating that he “had relations and affairs with 
all kinds of women,” as well as Alice Lee Grosjean, including a woman in New York who 
became pregnant and had been paid $10,000 by Seymour Weiss. Leche also described an 
occasion when Long was travelling with his associates by train. He was invited to join a man 
in his carriage and “assaulted [the man’s] daughter.”78 On being reproached by his 
companions, he said “You gotta try, don’t you.”79 Whilst not explicit, Leche’s context for this 
particular story, ‘Huey and women,’ suggests that Long’s assault was of a sexual nature. It 
also highlights Long’s propensity for aggressive behaviour, as well as a belief, given his 
unabashed response at being called to task over his actions, that the rules of normal societal 
behaviour did not apply to him. His proclivity for acting on his instincts, however 
inappropriate the behaviour, applied not just to incidents such as this, and to social 
interactions, such as eating food from other people’s plates, drinking alcohol despite a 
limited tolerance,80 but also his legal and political activities. Despite any intentions he may 
have had of reforming his behaviour, Long tended to revert to type. An incident at the Sands 
Point Bath and Country Club in Long Island, New York, in 1933, not only exposed him to 
national ridicule and condemnation, but it also illustrates how his behaviour triggered 
aggressive responses. Following an altercation at the club, during which Long sustained a 
cut and a black eye, newspaper coverage reported on both, Long’s claims, that he had been 
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accosted by three or four men and that one of them had struck him with a knife,81 and the 
various alternative explanations of the event proposed by other witnesses. These included 
that he “was subjected to a good punching for an indignity he put upon a man who was 
peacefully minding his own business when the senator insulted him;”82 and that the injury 
had occurred as a result of “an argument in the washroom with a gentleman,”83 which had 
been triggered when “the senator became so hilarious and playful, jostling people on the 
dance floor, that some of the guests objected to his conduct.”84 Long himself claimed, 
through the American Progress, that the assault had been instigated by “the House of 
Morgan” in response to his Share Our Wealth campaign, as “a warning” for those “Senators 
who have persisted in voting to place taxes on the big man at the top so as to relieve and 
help the little man at the bottom.”85 The New York Daily News compiled a list of members of 
the “I. D. S. H. (I Didn’t Sock Huey) Society”86 including Alford J Williams, Clarence 
Chamberlin, J Nelson Kelly, Steve Webber (Chief of Police of Port Washington) and Kenneth 
M Murchison, all of whom denied actually throwing the punch, despite having been present 
in the washroom at the time of the incident. Despite their denials, many of the men 
applauded the action of the so-called mystery man, and as Murchison put it “I’d like to shake 
the hand of the man who did.”87 In actions designed to further humiliate Long, a press agent 
offered him $1000 a day to appear in a Coney Island sideshow,88 and Colliers Weekly, a 
publication owned by J P Morgan, announced that it would issue a medal to commemorate 
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the incident, a gold version of which would be presented to the man who had struck the 
blow, should his identity be revealed.89  
Officially the man’s identity was never revealed, however, in what appears to be an eye-
witness account, R H Bruce wrote to Harvey Fields confirming that Alford Williams was 
Long’s assailant. Bruce’s version of the incident begins with Long, who had been “going from 
table to table abusing your President,” and bragging “about his power in Louisiana,” before 
tipping 
“a high ball glass into Mrs Alford Williams lap – then up stepped Williams 
and gave him the beating of his life  - Crook Long blubbered, cried and 
bellowed. . . Not a soul up in this county took his part but all were glad to 
see an uncivil rough neck get what was coming to him.”90  
Bruce is equally dismissive of Long’s claim that “‘the House of Morgan’ set thugs upon him,” 
stating that, “Thugs can’t enter that exclusive club,” and in an assessment which castigated 
his behaviour, sought to disparage him and emphasised the gulf of the social divide which 
existed between Long and his opponents, both in Louisiana and in New York, claimed that,  
“It is a place for gentlemen, hence Hooey was out of his sphere. Such 
characters as he come up for a little while and are then silenced for God 
don’t permit them to succeed.”91 
Bruce ends his letter with a determined attempt to persuade Fields, who was both a 
supporter of Long and had been his law partner in Shreveport from 1928, to recant his 
allegiance, warning: “You know they are not clean so you can’t do better than get away from 
them. Be Governor – Don’t be a puppet”92 
It was this determined disregard for socially acceptable behaviours and conventions which 
had attracted many of his supporters to him and which formed the basis of the animosity 
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which Long’s opponents felt towards him. Evidence from his associates and political 
contemporaries suggests that in some instances, his disregard for societal norms of 
behaviours was due to a lack of understanding of what was acceptable; however, many 
were deliberate challenges to the status quo. While the infamous incident in which he 
greeted the commander of the German cruiser, Emden, and the German consul, dressed in 
green pyjamas, may have been an accident due to a lack of knowledge of protocol and poor 
timing, the subsequent publicity and public support for his actions created a caricature of 
Long which could be used to push the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, and which could 
be capitalised on for further media attention. He was later interviewed by reporters in 
Washington DC wearing lavender pyjamas93 and subsequently naked.94 During his first 
meeting with Roosevelt in the White House, his straw hat remained on his head, except 
when he used it to tap the president’s leg to emphasise a point. These breaches in protocol 
demonstrate an escalation in Long’s behaviour, and were calculated attempts by him to set 
others at a disadvantage. The result was to antagonise and revolt his opponents. This 
revulsion at Long’s behaviour and the subsequent judgements that were made based on his 
actions are demonstrated by the strong antipathy felt by legislators. 
Legislative opposition 
As Railroad Commissioner (1918-1928), Long accumulated the experience, programmes 
and support that would ultimately gain him the governor’s office. At the same time, he 
cultivated his taste for power and fostered his enemies. In a letter in June 1920, Long 
condemned Julius’ support of James B Aswell, accusing him of “fealty to the Ring . . . in the 
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face of every personal harm he has done to me and yourself.”95 Long reminded Julius that it 
was Aswell who, in the winter of 1916-1917, had prevented his appointment as Assistant US 
Attorney, a circumstance which Long would continue to brood upon in his 1933 
autobiography Every Man A King, stating “Once disappointed over a political undertaking, I 
could never cast it from my mind.”96 This animosity towards Aswell was later extended to his 
son, when Long refused to appoint James Jr to the unexpired term of his father’s US 
Congress seat:  
The governor has decided to call no election, saying he would not do so 
unless it should be necessary to have your father’s successor present for 
the organization of the House when Congress next meets. I infer from that 
statement that the governor is waiting to find out whom he wishes to 
support and who, of course, will be loyal to him. Then, when he gets that 
information, some reason will be given for calling an election and his 
candidate will be elected.97 
John H Overton, Long’s lawyer during the impeachment, was subsequently elected to the 
seat with his support. 
The absence of what might be termed a conventional moral code, as noted by Truman, was 
one of the most significant behavioural traits demonstrated by Long throughout his political 
career. It led him to act, deliberately, in ways which did not conform to accepted societal 
mores: in the United States Senate, it caused him to behave in ways which contravened the 
traditions of the chamber, most notably verbally abusing fellow senators from the immunity of 
the floor of the chamber; and in Louisiana it allowed Long to utilise any method, anything or 
anyone to ensure that his programme was enacted. To influence Donald Labbe, the state 
senator from Lafayette (1928-1932), the security of his father-in-law’s job was threatened, 
unless Labbe voted with Long. Long’s collection of information, about both his opponents 
and his supporters, enabled him to identify which weaknesses could be manipulated to 
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guarantee compliance. Under the circumstances of this persistent threat, Labbe chose not to 
contest his seat in the 1932 election, as he believed Long would have ensured his defeat.98  
The Dynamite Squad 
The Dynamite Squad was formed in 1928, as an informal caucus during Long’s first regular 
session of the Louisiana Legislature, to plan strategy and to exchange information and 
ideas.99 Cecil Morgan and the other leaders of the Dynamite Squad were members of the 
state’s political elite, which was bound to the political machine that had previously ruled 
Louisiana and, Williams claimed, they had an “excessive devotion to principle,” which was 
tied to the societal norms of their class. It was this latter trait that Williams believed drove all 
of their interactions with Long.100 Formed initially to obstruct Long’s plans to finance his road 
building legislation by a bond issue, which they believed included a significant amount of 
graft, the primary function of the group became to meet each evening during the session to 
determine how they would obstruct or “dynamite the next day’s legislation.”101 The group’s 
membership was a loose affiliation of between ten and fifteen anti-Long members of the 
Louisiana House of Representatives, with a further ten to fifteen representatives acting as an 
additional ad-hoc cohort.102 Although Morgan insisted throughout his interview with Betty 
Carter in 1985, that the Dynamite Squad was by nature an informal group, he identified J Y 
Sanders Jr as the political strategy “brains” and Mason Spencer as the chair of the group, 
roles which suggest that the group had a functional structure and formality.103 Other 
members of the group included Pike Hall and Harney Bogan of Caddo, George J Ginsberg 
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of Alexandria, George Perrault of St Landry, Norman Bauer of St Mary, and in the New 
Orleans contingent Paul Chasez, Lavinius Williams, A P Frymire104 
J Y Sanders Jr, the son of the former Louisiana governor J Y Sanders (1908-1912), had 
been elected to the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1928 for East Baton Rouge, 
despite the active opposition of Long, who “didn’t want a Sanders in the legislature” which, 
Sanders stated, “was the opening of warfare between” the two men.105 In comparison to 
Morgan, Sanders asserted his belief that the impeachment had been building for months 
prior to the special sessions in March 1929, and that Long’s behaviour since he had become 
governor had been intolerable: he “got the swell head.” He “was horrible” and had been 
using his office to vent “his personal spleen.” However, despite this assessment of a broader 
cause for the impeachment, Sanders specifically believed that Long’s driving force, “his 
particular spleen was his feud with the Standard Oil Co.”106 Speaking with Williams in 1959, 
Sanders said that he was “one that believed that [Long] meant what he said. I didn’t approve 
of what he was doing. I thought he was a very adroit politician and a very dangerous factor 
from the beginning.”107 Morgan Spencer confirmed Sanders’ assertion that the opposition 
had met and decided to impeach Long before the incident with the jammed voting 
machine.108 
A summary of the 1929 impeachment of Huey P Long 
In his biography, Williams preludes the impeachment chapter with a short paragraph, which 
seems to summarise Long’s reaction to the impeachment. While somewhat dramatic, it may 
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also be said to be a not unreasonable summary of any politicians’ reaction to the threat of 
impeachment: 
The Kingfish had been going from one triumph to another, treading the 
peaks. Now in the session that was about to meet he would encounter 
sudden and frightening defeat. He would enter a dark valley that seemed to 
lead to political oblivion.109  
Less than ten months after his inauguration on 21 May 1928, Governor Long issued a call 
for a special session of the Louisiana Legislature to meet for six days from 18 March 1929, 
with the express purpose of legislating on six subjects: 
1. Severance tax, revising the act of 1928 
2. Severance tax, providing for the return of taxes paid in error, without 
nullifying the effect of the law. 
3. Occupational tax on oil refining. 
4. Revision of the inheritance tax act of the state, so that 80 per cent 
allowed by the federal government will come to the state. 
Two City Subjects 
5. Amending the drunken drivers act, in conformity with the 
suggestions of District Attorney Eugene Stanley. 
6. To empower the commission council of New Orleans to expropriate 
and pay for rights of way for highways.”110 
It was the proposed introduction of the occupational tax, Williams claimed, that “shattered 
overnight the amity that had recently prevailed in state politics.”111 While ‘amity’ is perhaps 
too strong a word to describe the state of relationships between the political factions, it is 
clear that the introduction of the occupational licence tax or ‘oil tax’ brought about a 
fundamental fracture beyond which neither side could agree nor be brought to a 
compromise.112 Faced with the prospect of defeat on this item, Long adjourned the special 
session and immediately called a second session, to convene on 20 March for a period of no 
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more than eighteen days (to end on 6 April) for the “consideration of and action upon . . . 
specifically enumerated objects,” including, notably, the oil tax bill, which was introduced on 
the first day of the session.113 In addition to facing strong opposition within the Legislature, 
resistance to Long’s programme was simultaneously growing in the local newspapers, with, 
in particular, the Baton Rouge State-Times and the Morning Advocate publishing editorials 
against the oil tax. Long’s attempt to get Charles Manship, owner of these two publications, 
to support the bill by first threatening to expose, and then actually revealing during a radio 
broadcast on KWKH in Shreveport, that Manship’s brother, Douglas, was residing in a 
mental institution, rebounded on Long. Manship’s editorial on the front page of the State-
Times entitled “This, Gentlemen, Is the Way Your Governor Fights” not only revealed Long’s 
attempt at blackmail but also helped to create support for those “more determined than ever 
to defeat the destructive policies of the governor.”114 The attempt to blackmail Manship 
ultimately formed the basis of the impeachment charges in the upcoming trial. 
During the special sessions of the Legislature in March 1929, the Dynamite Squad had met 
each night and, as Morgan claimed, it was in these meetings that the impeachment 
“proceeding was born.”115 The timeline, as presented by Morgan, indicates that the Dynamite 
Squad believed that “as Huey had lost his bid for the oil tax”116 during the second session, 
he was determined to save face by adjourning the Legislature. They were equally intent on 
preventing the adjournment, thereby forcing Long to face the legislative defeat of his 
measure. A concurrent revelation that Harry ‘Battling’ Bozeman, Long’s former bodyguard 
and until recently a member of the Louisiana Highway Commission, had sworn out an 
affidavit stating that Long had attempted to hire him to kill J Y Sanders Jr, further 
encouraged them to work to prevent the adjournment. Bozeman’s affidavit focussed on the 
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corruption of Long’s administration, specifically that which occurred under the auspices of 
the Highway Commission and the complicity in that graft by the head of the commission, O K 
Allen, including overpayments to employees, the resale of materials and payments for non-
existent work.117 Bozeman’s motivation for making his accusations can be called into 
question. He had been sacked from his post on the Highway Commission only days 
earlier,118 indeed Mason Spencer later claimed that he had not believed the accusations 
made in the affidavit, but acknowledged Bozeman was “a wonderful witness”119 for the 
opposition’s case. The accusation that Long had attempted to hire him to murder Sanders 
was a small part of the claim, however, it represented a fundamental aspect of Long’s 
character, his propensity to incite violence. Retrospectively, the affidavit and the subsequent 
testimony during the impeachment hearings provide contemporaneous evidence of Long’s 
propensity for intemperate outbursts in the face of uncontrollable events and opponents. 
This aspect of his character resulted in a pervasive atmosphere of intimidation in Baton 
Rouge throughout the impeachment proceedings. In a turn of events which would have been 
farcical, had not a brawl ensued on the floor of the House, the session on Monday, 25 March 
began with Morgan determined to present his call for an investigation into Bozeman’s 
accusations, while J Cleveland Fruge, a Long supporter, was equally determined to call for 
an adjournment sine die. Speaker John Fournet’s decision to hear Fruge’s proposal rather 
than Morgan’s, and to call for the adjournment based on a vote of the members, was the 
cause of the brawl. A failure of the voting machinery to clear the record of the previous vote 
was later determined to be a technical error and not a deliberate falsification of the vote, as 
claimed by some anti-Long members. The injury to Representative Clinton Sayes, who was 
cut on the forehead during the ensuing scuffle, has variously been ascribed to a ceiling fan 
above the desk on which he had stood and, in the opinion of Morgan, the knuckledusters 
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wielded by Lorris Wimberly.120 It was fortunate that no one had been shot that evening since, 
as both Sanders and Morgan recounted, the majority of the members of the House were 
carrying firearms. It was Sanders’ opinion, that such was the atmosphere in Baton Rouge at 
the time, it would have taken little for the situation to have escalated into greater violence.121 
The events of Monday, 25 March prompted the Dynamite Squad to actively start drafting the 
impeachment resolution to be introduced the following day. 
On 26 March, in House Resolution number 8, the House of Representatives resolved that 
Long had “been guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, incompetency, corruption, 
favoritism, oppression in office, gross misconduct,” and that he was “impeached for said 
offenses.”122 The resolution detailed nineteen articles of impeachment, including accusations 
that he used his appointive power to influence and control the judiciary; bribed legislators; 
required undated resignation letters; misused state funds; contracted illegal state loans; 
removed school officials for political purposes and intimidated teachers; illegally used state 
militia to pillage private property; persuaded parish-governing bodies to follow his dictates to 
get the legislation they wanted; carried concealed weapons; used abusive language to 
citizens and officials; engaged in immoral behaviour at a night club; usurped the powers of 
the Legislature and its committees; forced the state penitentiary to build a refrigeration plant 
without tendering for bids; attempted to intimidate Charles Manship; destroyed the executive 
mansion; destroyed and disposed of property and furniture in the mansion, the capitol and 
state offices; illegally paroled a convict; intruded and interfered with the Legislature and its 
business; and tried to solicit the murder of Representative J Y Sanders Jr.123   
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With a gap of over half a century since the last gubernatorial impeachment in Louisiana and 
a relatively new constitution in place, both sides of the proceeding looked outside of the state 
for the terms of reference for the case, rather than rely on precedents from Louisiana’s 
political history. Additionally, since both previous Louisiana cases of gubernatorial 
impeachment had ultimately proved unsuccessful, it would also have been unlikely that the 
anti-Long faction would look to those examples, if they wished to guarantee the removal of 
the governor from office. Long’s team would be equally unlikely to rely on these examples, 
since both had relied on the Republican / Democrat political divide to establish the outcome, 
a divide which no longer existed as a functional entity in Louisiana politics. As a result, both 
sides focused on the recent impeachments of Oklahoma governor, Henry Simpson Johnston 
(Democrat). 
Oklahoma 
The Oklahoma cases each held an attraction for the two parties. Both sides perceived 
advantages to referencing, as precedent, one of the two most recent incidents of 
impeachment. Not only did Oklahoma represent the most recent case of gubernatorial 
impeachment in the country, Johnston had been found guilty of incompetency only weeks 
previously, but it was also the second attempt by the Oklahoma Legislature to convict their 
governor within a year. The earlier impeachment was of the greater interest to the Long 
defence team, since Johnston had been acquitted on that occasion. 
The impeachment of Johnston presents an example alongside which the impeachment of 
Long may be contextualised and compared. As Cortez A M Ewing notes, Oklahoma had a 
proclivity for gubernatorial impeachment. The House of Representatives of Oklahoma had 
sent eleven messages of impeachment to the state Senate in the twenty three years since 
statehood in 1907. Ewing further demonstrates the Oklahoman preference for impeachment 






“Governor Williams (1914-18) has been the only one of six elected 
governors against whom House investigations were not ordered, and he 
may have been spared by the unusual House rule which declared any 
members guilty of perjury who swore to charges that were not 
substantiated in an investigation.”124 
Of the eleven attempts, three governors had faced impeachment trials, with only two being 
successfully convicted. The discrepancy between the number of impeachment messages 
and trials indicates not just the prevalence of impeachment as a partisan tool, it further 
emphasises the problem in identifying impeachment cases.125 The propensity for 
impeachment in Oklahoma, for such a young state, speaks to a peculiarly antagonistic 
political culture in which competitive and vitriolic election campaigns set the precedent for 
the subsequent behaviour of the Legislature. While there is a clear pattern of behaviour 
within the politics of Oklahoma, which perpetuates throughout the early decades of the 
twentieth century, it is clear from the Louisiana daily press that the reporting of the Johnston 
impeachment in particular had reached a much wider geographical audience than state of 
Oklahoma. The Johnston impeachment and trial had formed part of the political and cultural 
atmosphere of the period and, as such, had an influence on the consciousness of the 
political personalities of Louisiana. Reports throughout March 1929, of both the trial and the 
final guilty verdict, in the Louisiana newspapers, formed a precursor to the special sessions 
of the Legislature called by Long for March 1929.126 
The Louisiana daily newspapers’ coverage of the impeachment of Governor Johnston, in the 
weeks prior to and during the March 1929 special sessions of the Louisiana Legislature, 
alone suggests an atmosphere in which the idea of a Louisiana governor’s impeachment 
could be suggested, considered, cultivated and may have appeared to be inevitable. Trist 
Wood’s cartoon in the New Orleans Item emphasised the link between the two governors 
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and suggested that Long had even more to fear from an impeachment trial than Johnston.127 
The timeline of the Johnston impeachment and the progression of the events of the 
Louisiana special sessions interweave. The first special session assembled on 18 March, 
the day before the Johnston defence team had rested its case; the second special session 
assembled on 20 March. On 21 March, the same day that Charles Manship published his 
open letter in the State-Times, Johnston was found guilty of a charge of general 
incompetency.128 The following day, the Shreveport Journal called for the impeachment of 
Governor Long. Morgan’s account of these events suggests that the Dynamite Squad did not 
meet to discuss impeachment until days later, after the events of what he called “the ‘Night 
of the Hullabaloo’ and which others referred to as “Bloody Monday” (25 March 1929),129 
although others, including Mason Spencer and J Y Sanders Jr, asserted that the plan to 
impeach Long was already underway. Certainly, the newspapers’ coverage of the Johnston 
trial and guilty verdict suggests that impeachment was sufficiently embedded in the zeitgeist 
as to ensure that it formed a palpable backdrop to the run up to the special sessions, and the 
meeting of the Legislature itself. While Morgan’s recollection emphatically states that the 
Long impeachment resolution was based on “the format from the impeachment of President 
Andrew Johnson,”130 he also refers obliquely to “hurriedly summoned help.”131 This is 
probably a reference to Representative Charles Moon of Oklahoma, who was retained by 
the anti-Long forces to offer advice on impeachment as a result of his involvement in 
successfully prosecuting the case against Governor Johnston.  
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As a result of this experience, Moon was invited to Louisiana to advise those interested 
impeaching Long only weeks later.132 The records of the Official Journals of both chambers 
of the Louisiana Legislature indicate that enquiries related to Moon’s involvement, 
particularly as a paid adviser, were registered in the Louisiana daily press in March 1929.133 
An enquiry into the issue by a five-person committee, made up of three members from the 
House and two from the Senate, elicited a response from Moon in which he claimed that, 
since his employment was in a private capacity, the Legislature’s enquiry was outside of its 
jurisdiction.134 The committee was disbanded subsequent to this response and it appears 
that Representative Moon also discontinued his involvement in the Long impeachment at 
this time, since, having provided the “citizens’ investigation committee” with advice on “what 
procedure should be taken, [he] had collected his fee and expenses” and returned to 
Oklahoma.135                                           
While Moon’s presence demonstrates that the impeachers were looking to Oklahoma’s 
example, John Holmes Overton’s letter to Long in April 1929 also provides clear evidence 
that events in Oklahoma had an influence on the defence’s case in the Louisiana 
impeachment. In his role as Long’s legal counsel for the impeachment, Overton uses his 
letter to recommend the use of not only “the Articles of the Constitution of Louisiana 
pertinent to the question,”136 but also comparative cases from outside of Louisiana and 
references to Louisiana’s historical legal statutes as part of Long’s case for the defence. 
Overton proposes to include the texts of these items as part of the defence’s brief to ensure 
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that those judging the case are “in a better position to decide promptly and intelligently”137on 
the issues. While Overton suggests appending impeachment cases from New York, Texas 
and Oklahoma, he is emphatic in his view that it is the Oklahoma case which most clearly 
demonstrated the precedent which would be most useful to the Long case:  
In the brief the Texas and New York cases can be very easily differentiated, 
and the reasoning in the Oklahoma case, which is the only decision really 
applicable, is so strongly convincing that any fairminded person must 
regard it as convincing.138   
The first impeachment case against Johnston had been dismissed when the state supreme 
court ruled that the Legislature had no authority to convene and instigate impeachment 
proceedings. Long’s case rested on the defence that since impeachment was not specified 
in the governor’s call for the special session, the Legislature was unable to initiate the action. 
Amongst the Long papers held at the Hill Memorial Library at Louisiana State University is a 
copy of the defence brief, which includes copies of the aforementioned contemporary 
impeachment cases, further indicating that Overton’s advice and proposals were accepted 
by Long.  
Cecil Morgan139 
In 1985, Cecil Morgan was asked what he believed had been Long’s greatest failing. Morgan 
stated that Long had lacked good judgement; that while he understood people, their 
weaknesses and how he could use them, he went about achieving what he wanted “bluntly, 
crudely, and without any diplomacy or smoothness.”140 It was this trait of Long’s that Morgan 
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believed “strengthened his enemies,”141 suggesting that Long’s behaviour and activities not 
only antagonised, it also reinforced the determination of his opponents to act against him 
and his programmes. 
Williams does not explore the enmity that existed between Long and Morgan or its origins. 
The animosity between them pre-dates Morgan’s entry into political office, and was not, as 
Williams implies, restricted to the events of the regular session of the Legislature in 1928 or 
to the special sessions of March 1929. Although Morgan was Long’s junior by five years, 
they were contemporaries, and in the early 1920s, both men practiced law from the same 
floor of the Merchants’ Building in Shreveport. It is likely, therefore, that their antipathy had 
its roots during this period in Shreveport rather than, as Williams suggests, as part of the 
battle between the “adept conservative faction” and Long’s “inexperienced leaders.”142   
In his descriptions of Long’s legal practice in Shreveport in the early 1920s, Morgan testifies 
to the intertwined nature and relationship of the courthouse and political culture in 
Shreveport. Morgan’s opinions were based on his own observations of Long’s performances 
in the court room, as well as on the comments of other members of the bar and the 
community. He had a reputation for engaging in unethical practices and demonstrated 
“rambunctious” behaviour in court.143 Morgan reports that he was “frowned upon as most 
undignified and a show-off in court by the judges because of his conduct. He was often 
reprimanded.”144 In view of this behaviour, when in 1921 Long asked Morgan to come to 
work with him, he declined, telling Long that he would make other plans; Morgan later 
explicitly stated that he had refused because he did not wish to be associated with someone 
with a reputation as “an unethical lawyer.”145 At the time, Long claimed that his reason for 
seeking an associate was the volume of work then coming into him, but as the letters 
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between him and his brother Julius have shown, it was the acrimonious dissolution of their 
law partnership in September 1921 that was a primary factor in both Long’s increased 
workload and his need for a new partner.146    
Despite Morgan’s refusal to go into partnership with him, and most likely too distracted in 
May 1923 by his campaign for the 1924 gubernatorial election to focus on his law practice, 
Long’s relationship with Morgan appears to have remained sufficiently cordial to allow him to 
pass cases to him.147 Long’s motivation for doing so was most likely his feud with his brother 
Julius, rather than a concerted attempt to persuade Morgan to work with him. These 
exchanges benefited Long in two ways, it offered him an opportunity to appear 
magnanimous, but it also represented a less humiliating option than passing work to Julius, 
who would probably have interpreted the action as an admission by Long that he could not 
cope with his workload.  
Morgan’s own run for state representative for Caddo parish was, he claimed, at the 
instigation of others rather than at his own volition. According to Morgan, a change in 
demographics due to an influx of oil workers meant the “old staid politicians” in the northern 
section of the state were increasingly having to interact more with “the ‘hoi-polloi’ than they 
had with the farmers, planters, and the merchants in the city, as they had in the past.”148 This 
change in the make-up of the population, combined with the rise of Long, whose legal 
practice had attracted business from the new workers, led a group of young political 
operatives, Harney Bogan, Joe Hamiter and Morgan, to plan to join an established 
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representative, Reuben Douglas from the north of Caddo parish, with the explicit intention of 
going 
“to that Legislature with some youth and vigor and new ideas and not let 
this wild man take over and run this state to suit himself, because Huey 
might get elected governor.”149 
They sought to take advantage of a “pervasive sense” in north Louisiana that it was time “for 
some changes to take place,”150 a sense that was most probably inspired by Long’s youth as 
it contrasted to the existing political representation for the parish, who had all been in office 
for several years. Their strategy was a pre-emptive action in response to Long’s run for 
governor, a decisive attempt to ensure that if Long were to be elected, he would face an 
effective opposition in the Legislature. Morgan was elected to the House of Representatives 
of the State of Louisiana in February 1928 and, despite his overt intention that he would be 
there to offer opposition to Long, he later claimed that he planned to act in best interests of 
his constituents by remaining strategically independent of the Long and anti-Long factions, 
and by voting on legislative bills on their merits. However, his first action was to vote in 
opposition to Long’s choice for speaker of the House, John B Fournet, supporting instead 
Clark Hughes, a representative from a neighbouring parish and who was personally known 
to Morgan.151   
During the 1928 regular session of the Legislature, despite a personal request from the 
governor, Morgan refused to support one of Long’s bills, because he believed it would 
centralise power in Baton Rouge. As a result, his father was removed from his job as a state 
bank examiner. The State Bank Commissioner, J S Brock, was ordered to dismiss Morgan’s 
father by Long. Technically, Brock was not subject to Long’s authority, since he had been 
appointed by the previous governor to a post which overlapped the governor’s term of office, 
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however, he had been put under pressure by Long, and had submitted to his edict. 
Throughout his legislative career, Morgan claimed, the restoration of his father’s job was 
held over him, as an enticement, if he would cooperate with the governor. His law practice 
also suffered as result of his refusal, because clients took their business to other firms, ones 
which would agree to work with Long.152 Letters from his constituents during the summer of 
1928, less than two months after Long’s inauguration as governor, indicate that Morgan’s 
refusal to bend to the will of the governor was an acceptable stance to the electorate of 
Caddo parish. These letters also demonstrate that there were concerns about Long’s 
acquisition of power, even at this early stage in his term, as well as his proposed tax on oil. 
On 6 June 1928, two weeks after Long’s inauguration, J M Foster, a lawyer from Shreveport, 
wrote to Morgan of his concerns that a bill providing the governor with the power to appoint 
judges on short term basis would “restore more power . . . to the governor.” Foster also 
noted the irony that this attempt to accumulate power had come from 
“a man who has gone about the State crying, if not from the housetops, 
from the fields and bushes, that power must be restored to the people and 
government must be restored unto them, even though the heavens fall.”153 
Foster believed that someone appointed to fill a short-term appointment would be elected to 
a full term, with the result that the courts would be filled with Long’s men. However, he also 
expressed his doubts as to the inevitability of this scenario, since Long had failed to get the 
men who had also run on his ticket elected. His support, Foster believed, would therefore, 
most likely be a “liability instead of an asset.”154 Foster remained reassured that his concerns 
regarding Long’s quest for power would be ameliorated by his belief, one held by many 
among Long’s opposition, that even with Long as governor, politics in Louisiana would 
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continue “as usual.”155 In contrast, the president of the Robinson-Slagle Lumber Company, 
Inc of Shreveport, W A Robinson, was in no doubt that Long was supporting a number of 
“demagogic measures,” by which he seemed to be “H--- bent on wrecking this state.”156 
Robinson’s specific complaint related to the introduction of a bill, which he believed would 
profit the “ambulance chasers” rather than compensate workmen. As a lumber merchant, 
and therefore at risk of having to pay out compensation to injured employees, Robinson’s 
complaint was self-serving, but his accusation that the bill would be more profitable for the 
lawyers than the injured is a realistic assessment, especially when viewed alongside Long’s 
own record of representing injured workers in the oil fields. His law practice in Shreveport 
had, according to Morgan, dealt with a number of such compensation cases, and local 
rumours suggested that Long had used unethical practices to bring in the business of injured 
workmen.157 Long’s own campaign materials had emphasised his involvement in writing the 
Harper amendments to the Jordan Bill,158 which was intended to “[protect] the lives of 
Louisiana workingmen against defective machinery.”159 
For Cecil Morgan, opposition to Long had resulted in both of his parents losing their jobs, in 
him becoming the sole provider for his parents and younger sibling, in damage to his law 
practice, and it had impacted on his ability to carry out his duties as legislator.160 Morgan 
also felt that subsequently any proposed legislation sponsored by him stood little chance of 
being approved by Long; as a result, his constituents and his colleagues either by-passed 
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him when it came to proposing new bills or required that he relinquish any personal credit 
associated with instigating or promoting legislation.161  
Given the outcome of his opposition to Long during the 1928 regular session, it is not 
unsurprising that, rather than remaining strategically independent, Morgan aligned himself 
with those who were actively seeking to discredit Long by exposing “some of the 
shenanigans that were going on.”162 Utilising his contacts in the offices of the State Auditor 
and the State Treasurer,163 Morgan focussed his investigations on Long’s misuse of state 
funds, most notably the funds appropriated for the entertainment at the National Governors’ 
conference in New Orleans in November 1928 ($6000), and those funds appropriated for 
repairs to the State House and the governor’s mansion in late 1928 ($11015.09), since full 
accounts had not been received in respect of these sums.164 Ahead of the special session in 
March 1929, Morgan had drafted the results of his investigations into resolutions, which 
requested that the House investigate Long for the misappropriation of state funds. As a 
member of the Dynamite Squad, Morgan’s statement to Betty Carter, that he “had no idea 
[the investigation] would be for impeachment. This was all done prior to the impeachment”165 
was at best disingenuous. Throughout the Carter interview, Morgan downplayed the 
importance of his role in the impeachment of Long. He acknowledged that he was the floor 
leader in the House during the impeachment, but denied being involved in the planning for 
the day-to-day activities, which was “all being done by my very able colleagues.”166  
Cecil Morgan’s recollections of, and reactions, to the Huey Long era in Louisiana differed in 
intensity over the years since these events. His 1970 review, in the Tulane Law Review, of T 
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Harry Williams’ biography, though moderate in tone, clearly demonstrated his anger at what 
he saw as the whitewashing of the impact of Long and of the tensions in the state at that 
time. In comparison, his interviews with Betty Carter and Ken Burns, both in 1985, are 
restrained, measured and diplomatic.167 In his review of the biography, Morgan condemned 
Williams’ pro-Long stance, which he believed had minimised “the impression of fear [in the 
state] to the point of its practical obliteration.”168 During the impeachment, not only did 
members of the anti-Long faction avoid going out alone in Baton Rouge, because of a group 
of “thugs” that Long’s bodyguard, Jim Moran, had brought into the city, but Morgan claimed, 
they were also at risk of tactics intended to discredit them as individuals and the faction as a 
whole. On one occasion, Morgan was invited to a meeting at a hotel room in the Heidelberg 
Hotel, but he was dissuaded from going until a friend had checked out the room. The friend 
reported that it was a set-up, “there are cameras and women.”169 Although Morgan was not 
married at that time, the suggestion was that someone, presumably Long or one of his 
supporters, was intent on compromising him and through him, the anti-Long faction.170 
Morgan’s interview with Carter suggested a more nuanced side of Long’s relationships with 
his political opponents, which is sometimes missed in the black and white assessments of 
his administration. Morgan’s recollections revealed a Long who categorised his opponents: 
there were those whom he could bribe or force to support him; those, such as Cecil Morgan, 
who would never adhere to Long’s will and were therefore punished; and finally, there were 
those, such as Mason Spencer, whose independence, opposition and, perhaps crucially, 
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lack of fear appeared to draw Long’s respect.171 With this third category, Long appears to 
have maintained a mutually respectful relationship throughout his career; he was seen 
exchanging a joke with Spencer as he left the House chamber on 8 September 1935, shortly 
before he was shot.172 If, however, as Morgan suggests, Long’s behaviour was predicated 
on his ability to identify the weaknesses of his opposition, it is possible that unlike Morgan, 
Spencer did not demonstrate an exploitable weakness. Although he had been threatened by 
Long if he did not vote with him, Spencer continued to oppose him and was, as a result, only 
assigned to one committee (Federal Relations) together with a number of other anti-Long 
legislators. This however, Spencer perceived to be a tactical error on the part of Long, since 
placing his legislative enemies on a single committee allowed them to manipulate the 
legislation that was steered through the committee so that amendments could be made 
during second readings.173 An ineffective tactic, which calls into question the assertion that 
Long was an expert political operative. 
Irrespective of whether his actions were accidental or deliberate, Long was not inclined to 
act within acceptable norms, his behaviour was such that he consistently wrong-footed his 
opponents. When dealing with Long, his opponents had failed to recognise that all that they 
had abhorred when he was flouting societal norms before he won the governor’s race had 
indicated that once in office he would not deal in “politics as usual.” Their failure to recognise 
this inevitable change in the status quo of Louisiana politics, meant that they were not 
prepared, sufficiently united or organised, to effectively oppose or restrain Long.  
Political opposition to Long was fraught. Not only were opponents subjected to intimidation 
and threats, their political careers were also limited by their resistance to Long. Labbe’s 
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involvement in the impeachment process, which included signing a declaration deploring the 
signatories to the Round Robin letter,174 had resulted, not just in threats against members of 
his family, but also in a demand by Long that the voters of Lafayette recall him for allegedly 
receiving a car from Standard Oil in exchange for his actions.175 Since he had chosen not to 
run for re-election as a direct result of Long’s vindictive response to his opposition over the 
impeachment, it can be argued that Labbe was ultimately driven from political office by Long.  
Contrary to Morgan’s assertion, Long’s behaviour in respect of political opposition suggests 
that, rather than a calculated assessment of his opponents, on occasions he lacked the 
ability to discriminate between an enemy and an opponent, with individuals who had 
opposed him on a political issue invariably categorised and treated as implacable enemies. 
Legislators like Lester Lautenschlaeger (1928-1932), who owed allegiance to neither Long or 
to his opponents, found themselves under pressure from both sides, to commit their support 
during the impeachment. During a 4am visit on the morning of the trial, Long promised he 
would give Lautenschlaeger anything he wanted throughout the rest of his political life in 
return for his support, provided Long survived the impeachment; but if Lautenschlaeger did 
not come over to his side, he would never receive anything from Long. Lautenschlaeger 
declined to commit himself to either side, stating he needed to hear the testimony first; at 
which point Long offered him his hand and said they were “finished politically.”176 Such 
bargaining and intimidation tactics were not, however, limited to Long and his supporters. 
Using tactics which they condemned in Long, Lautenschlaeger, who was at that time the 
backfield coach at Tulane University, was fired from his job for offering the anti-Long forces 
the same answer he had given Long.177 This demonstration of a lack of discrimination 
appears to contradict the widely held perception that Long was a highly skilled and 
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experienced political operative. However, there is sufficient apparent inconsistency in Long’s 
treatment of political opponents to suggest that while he had the ability to discern the 
difference between contrary opinions and active opposition, not just in the field of politics but 
in all general interactions, he often deliberately chose to act as though there were no shades 
of grey; that there was either opposition or support, with nothing in between, a tactic which 
confused his opposition by its inherent unpredictability. 
Testimony in the impeachment hearings was heard before the committee of the whole house 
from Wednesday, 3 April. Simply because it required the fewest witnesses and least debate, 
the House voted on article 14 (the Manship charge) first;178 the resulting vote (yeas: 58, 
nays: 40, absent: 1),179 ensured that the charge was passed to the Senate on 6 April 1929. 
On receipt of this charge, the Senate was ordered to “resolve itself into a Court of 
Impeachment for the trial of Huey P. Long, Governor of the State of Louisiana.”180 Ultimately, 
only seven additional charges were passed to the Senate over the following weeks, with the 
final charge sent across on 26 April.181 In his interview with Williams, John Nuckolls, the clerk 
to the secretary of the Louisiana Senate, reported that Long carried a letter of resignation in 
a pocket during the impeachment.182 This is indicative that he had so little confidence in his 
ability to overcome the action against him that he was willing to resign rather than face the 
humiliation of a guilty verdict. A tactic which has since become one of the staple responses 
in impeachment cases, although, as previously discussed, it has yet to be seen whether a 
resignation would deter a Legislature determined to pursue a politician to the fullest extent of 
its power. Ultimately, however, the delays in passing the resolutions to the Senate, as a 
result of the procedural debates over the charges, favoured Long and his defence team, 
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rather than his opponents.183 Although Long’s objection that the impeachment proceedings 
were outside of the terms of the call for the special session had been dismissed by the 
speaker, John M Fournet, as being contrary to Section 14 of Article V of the state’s 
constitution,184 ultimately it was this argument which formed the basis of the action that 
stopped the impeachment process.  
From a position of utter despair,185 Long, with his supporters (notably Robert S Maestri, a 
New Orleans business man, who provided the funding for much of the defence’s response 
and publicity materials)186 and his legal team, established a robust defence to the charges 
which culminated in persuading fifteen senators to signing a Round Robin letter in which 
they refused to try the Governor on any charges due to the illegality of the proceedings, 
irrespective of the evidence presented.187 The signatures were placed in a circular pattern to 
ensure that the order in which it had been signed could not be inferred.   
In a tactic which echoed that used in Oklahoma in 1927, the defence claimed that in 
resolving itself into a court of impeachment and sitting beyond 6 April, the Legislature had 
exceeded the terms of its session, as determined in the Governor’s summons of 20 March 
1929. The only charge which met this deadline was the Manship charge, which was tried by 
the Senate and defeated by 21 votes to 18; the defence having claimed that the incident was 
a personal rather than political offence, and therefore outside the remit of an 
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impeachment.188 The Louisiana constitution required a two thirds majority vote on 
impeachment charges, i.e. 26 votes from 39 senators. While the remaining twenty four 
senators condemned the action of the Robineers, because they believed it was “in the 
interest of the Governor, as well as all of the people of Louisiana, that these charges should 
be heard and tried to conclusion;”189 in the face of the seemingly insurmountable opposition, 
as represented by the Round Robin letter, the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, 
was adjourned on 16 May 1929.  
The political opposition to Long was so disparate, diverse and competitive however, that 
coordinated opposition to Long was ineffective and ultimately impossible. While each 
legislator had their own reasons for their opposition to Long, their differences and factional 
allegiances did not necessarily allow for a cohesive opposing force. When the Round Robin 
letter gave Long a way out of the impeachment, the opposition collapsed and failed to follow 
political procedure to defeat Long’s strategy. The impeachment can be seen as a 
transformational event for Long, after which he may be seen as acting more ruthlessly than 
previously, but it was also a turning point for his opponents. It was the point at which, with a 
better strategy and a cohesive approach, they might have won. After 1929, the anti-Long 
cause became more desperate, less effective and more vitriolic. That there was never, 
thereafter, a coming together of anti-Longs at which the wish for his death was not 
articulated, is strongly indicative of the powerlessness of their cause.190 Errol Laborde’s 
assessment that the number of Long opponents “diminished once the governor squelched 
[the] impeachment attempt”191 is flawed since it suggests that it was the numbers of 
opponents rather than their effectiveness which declined after 1929. In 1929, Long’s 
opponents failed to capitalise on their best chance to defeat him. Afterwards their attempts 
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were persistent but less effective, allowing Long to depict their opposition as validation rather 
than vilification. 
Although many of the impeachment charges were linked to Long’s exercise of power over 
the state, the special sessions of March 1929 and the fact that the impeachment was 
possible actually demonstrated that Long’s organisation and his hold on power in the state 
were still weak in places, and that, at that time, he still underestimated the will of his 
opposition and their determination to act against him. However, the Round Robin tactic 
demonstrated the ability of Long, and specifically his defence team, to improvise, and to 
manipulate both individuals and the political process to the end that the impeachment trial 
collapsed. In Every Man A King Long articulates, in a way that echoed his determination to 
be perceived as separate and not bound in any way to others, not just his thanks to 
Robineers, but also his resentment that he must be grateful to them: “You fifteen bullies are 
always reminding me of what you did for me.”192 
Long’s interpretation of the impeachment 
When relating his disappointment at not being appointed as Assistant US Attorney early in 
his career, Long claimed in his autobiography, “probably that was my evil day. Once 
disappointed in a political undertaking, I could never cast it from my mind.”193 This statement 
is perhaps the most honest and revealing point of his autobiography. It provides evidence of 
the extent to which Long could, and would, maintain and cultivate a sense of grievance, and 
how he would use grudges as motivation and justification for future actions. Since the 
impeachment of 1929 is a running theme throughout Every Man a King, this statement about 
an earlier “disappointment” in politics should be seen not just as his credo in respect of the 
impeachment, its impact upon him and his justification for his subsequent actions, but also 
as a clear indicator of his guiding tenets. 
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Every Man a King was Long’s 1933 self-aggrandizing autobiography and, specifically, a 
political campaign tool to raise his national profile in preparation for his run for the 
presidency. Burton L Hotaling’s assessment of the distribution of the 100,000 copies that 
had been printed, supports the argument that the autobiography was a political campaign 
tool. In excess of 20,000 copies were sold for the price of $1 a copy (a price set by Long to 
ensure that his natural constituents could afford to buy it) and “nearly 70,000 copies were 
given away on Long’s request” primarily to the Share Our Wealth societies.194  
Long’s language throughout Every Man a King is consistent with the use of autobiography as 
a political promotion tool. Specifically, Long’s references to impeachment, which seek to 
suggest that he was the blameless victim rather than the provocative offender, established a 
viewpoint calculated to resonate with a target audience inclined to sympathise with an 
individual subjected to the threats of big business, the oil companies and the newspapers. 
His references to both of the cases in which he was faced with impeachment are such that 
the reader is left with an impression of a talented but beleaguered individual under attack 
from an undemocratic and vastly superior force, but also one whose enemies are ultimately 
brought to see the justice in his cause. This interpretation is notably evident in his recitation 
of the events in 1921 when, as a member of the newly renamed Public Service Commission, 
he faced another call for impeachment.   
Long wrote of his tactics in response to that earlier threatened impeachment which, he 
claimed, had “kept the caucus in confusion.”195 He had claimed in a mimeographed circular 
to both houses of the Legislature that Standard Oil was in control of Governor Parker’s 
administration and in the press that his fellow commissioners had been bribed by the 
Cumberland Telephone Company. Despite expressions of outrage at the accusations, the 
Legislature struggled to determine how they could legally act against Long, finally 
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determining to examine the Commission’s actions in the phone rate case, with the intention 
of finding sufficient cause to bring impeachment charges against Long. Having previously 
created doubt about the honesty of the other two commissioners, by implying that both were 
in the pay of the telephone company, Long proposed that all members of the commission 
should resign their offices and submit for re-election, thereby allowing the public to 
determine whether or not they were all fit to continue in office. As such, no effective action 
could be taken against Long; he had implicated both Shelby Taylor and John T Michel, and if 
the Legislature wanted to act against him, it would first have to determine that both of the 
other commissioners were innocent of his charges.196 Long’s interpretation of the 
subsequent events not only suggests that his enemies had recognised that the will of the 
people would overcome any alleged wrong-doing, but emphatically states that even his 
opponents were cognisant of the inequity of the attempt to charge him: 
I immediately had it stated from the floor that I was there and then 
personally ready to tender my resignation and make my appearance before 
the people for reelection. One member shouted: 
“Sure he will, but he is the only one that can be re-elected!” 
The opposition forces began to react. 
We got a break. The floor leader of the House for the Parker administration 
arose. 
“I am no Huey Long man, but apparently you are not willing for anything to 
be done here that is fair. I am taking my hat and walking out of this damned 
session.” 
Near pandemonium reigned. Any kind of a yell would result in a general 
confusion. Someone gave the yell. 
That ended the impeachment effort in my career for eight years.197 
In fact, as William Ivy Hair reports, the Legislature did investigate the claims and recommend 
that all three commissioners be impeached, but this recommendation was not acted upon.198 
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As Williams highlights, and in contradiction to Long’s version, it was Long’s manipulation of 
events which prevented his impeachment on this occasion, rather than any recognition or 
perception of misconduct by his opponents or of actual innocence on Long’s part.199 The 
benefit to be derived from a trial which may convict Long, and so remove him from office, 
could not be outweighed by the risks associated with an investigation into his accusations 
against his fellow commissioners.  
In his references to his impeachment experiences and by his use of language in describing 
these incidents in Every Man a King, Long sought to portray each incident in ways which 
emphasised his position as a victim targeted unfairly and unreasonably by his political 
opponents. By the same methods, he also sought to minimise the perception that the 
impeachment had had an effect on him, either personally or politically. However, his initial 
references to the 1929 impeachment contradict this objective. In his introduction to the 1964 
paperback edition of Long’s autobiography, Williams explained that “to conserve space Long 
cut out a proposed index,”200 instead of which each section of Long’s tale was given a page 
header as an identifying mark. Under the section, “The Clogged Machine” Long refers to the 
call for adjournment, made on 25 March 1929, in chaotic terms, dehumanising his opponents 
with references to  
“highly intelligent animals temporarily bereft of reason and milling wildly 
about. Blood and fire shone from every pair of eyes and the most trivial 
untoward incident might have caused them to run amuck.”201  
In his interview with Betty Carter, Cecil Morgan used much less emotive language, referring 
to the same scenes as the “Hullabaloo.” Given this dramatic tone, it is surprising that it was 
Morgan, rather than Long, who explicitly referred to the single incident of bloodshed which 
provided the sensational headlines of “Bloody Monday.” Long omits this aspect of the tale 
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completely, although as it was a member of the opposition who suffered the cut to the head, 
it is probable that he would have struggled to maintain his moral high ground as the ‘victim’ 
to justify the incident.202 
 In the pages prior to his section on the 1929 impeachment, the headers include the 
description “Hell Breaks Loose,” while the text itself takes on an ominous tone with Long 
referring to “the hand of Fate”203 and the gathering forces of impeachment.204 In his use of 
language in this section of the autobiography, Long appears to be seeking to build up the 
inevitability of the opposition to himself, comparing it to the force of a flooding Mississippi, an 
apposite comparison since the river had flooded with devastating effect in 1927.205 As Long 
reports on his recognition of the size and make-up of the force which was combining to act 
against him, notably those individuals he had previously supported, the text takes on the 
quality of a lull in the action, with Long speaking of the “peace of quiet and solitude for which 
I had so often longed,”206 a description in stark contrast to that given by his brother, Julius, 
who would later report that, at this point, the family had feared that Long was at risk of taking 
his own life.207 This change in tone is momentary. As the charges begin to emerge, first at a 
mass meeting, then in the press, Long energetically apportions the blame for the crisis to the 
Standard Oil Company. In an itemised rebuttal of the 1929 impeachment charges, Long not 
only denies the charges, but ridicules them and the impeachment process itself: “the law of 
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impeachment is such that if the legislative body impeaches a man for walking the streets and 
the Senate will vote guilty on the charge, it is an impeachment nonetheless.”208 In a 
discussion of the illegality of the impeachment proceedings, Long refers to the involvement 
of Oklahoma State Representative Charles Moon with the opposition. Based on Oklahoma’s 
experience of impeaching three governors, Long describes Moon as an “impeachment 
expert whom my enemies paid and brought from Oklahoma.”209  
In his autobiography, Long also revealed his continuing sense of injustice and persecution at 
the anti-Long contingent’s on-going efforts to pursue the impeachment, despite the 
adjournment of the special session. In the section entitled “The Never Relenting 
Impeachers,” he suggested that an effort to further pursue the impeachment was backed by 
business opponents, the newspapers and specifically the Rockefeller Foundation. These 
efforts, he claimed, were spearheaded by a professor from Tulane University who had 
declared “that charges were still pending.”210 The article in question was published in the 
Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly in March 1930 by Newman F Baker, a 
year after the impeachment proceedings had begun, and in advance of that year’s regular 
session of the Legislature in May. Baker’s article is a detailed discussion of the impeachment 
events in Louisiana and a refutation of the defence’s case that the impeachment 
proceedings were unconstitutional. Baker’s arguments that the charges remained 
outstanding rest on the unusual events which he said had brought the impeachment trial to a 
stop without a resolution. It was, Baker asserted, “something unheard of in legal annals” for 
senators to acquit “regardless of the evidence” and for the court to be adjourned “leaving the 
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defendant at the bar ready for trial, and an indictment still outstanding.”211 It is Baker’s 
contention that “in Louisiana, it seems that the machinery of justice has broken down and 
that the constitutional right to try public officers in power has not been effective in this 
instance.”212 Despite his introductory assertion that  
“It is not our purpose to discuss the confusion in Louisiana politics. This 
article would be more interesting, perhaps, if the disorders in the House of 
Representatives were discussed and partisan quotations taken from the 
speeches of politicians and from editorials were injected here and there to 
give touches of ‘local color.’”213 
The language of the article is strongly anti-Long and was specifically targeted at reminding 
legislators that they still had the opportunity to try Long on the impeachment charges, an 
opportunity which Baker believed they were duty bound to act upon. Irrespective of his 
claims regarding the iniquity of Baker’s claims, Long took steps to ensure that the 
impeachment charges were officially quashed during the special session of the Legislature in 
September 1930. 
Long was being deliberately disingenuous in his assertion towards the end of the 
autobiography, when he describes the impeachment as “my near impeachment in 1929.”214 
As previously mentioned, Long had also used Every Man a King to ridicule the concept of 
impeachment, claiming that the Legislature could impeach the governor for even the most 
ridiculous reason, such as “walking the streets.”215 He also deliberately confuses process 
with outcome, in order to downplay the significance of the impeachment as a blot on his 
record. Constitutional language makes it clear that impeachment is the process by which an 
alleged corrupt or inept official may be removed from office. As such, once charges are 
brought, impeachment becomes an established fact. It is clear from the constitution of 
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Louisiana that it was the responsibility of the Louisiana House of Representatives to bring 
the charges to impeach a governor. The Senate was responsible for trying the governor on 
the impeachment charges and to determine, in its role as a court of impeachment, whether 
he was guilty or innocent.216 Therefore, once charges were brought by the House against a 
governor, he was formally impeached. Despite his attempt to twist these definitions for his 
own purposes, Governor Huey P Long was impeached by the Louisiana State Legislature on 
6 April 1929. The autobiography also refers to the “impeachment assault,”217 by utilising a 
term synonymous with a physical attack, Long was seeking to emphasise the perception that 
the impeachment was an unlawful, possibly even a criminal, attack upon him. Indeed, part of 
Long’s defence, and ultimately the justification for the wording on the Round Robin letter, 
was that since the Legislature had been called to a special session to address specific 
legislative programmes it was ineligible to discuss, propose and act on impeachment 
charges against the governor. As such, the action against him was not the constitutionally 
mandated culmination of a political crisis, but a random opportunistic act of political ‘violence’ 
against the elected representative of the people of Louisiana. 
Long’s portrayal of the impeachment in his autobiography is contrary to another of his 
descriptions of his reactions. In an interview with Jerome Beatty in January 1933, he said the 
“night the House passed the impeachment bill . . . I wanted to die. I thought 
the end had come. I walked around Baton Rouge calling everybody all the 
names I could think of, hoping somebody would shoot me. Nobody even 
answered back. They would just look at me and walk away.”218  
This version of events not only adds a degree of credibility to Julius Long’s story, one which 
could otherwise easily be dismissed as spite in view of the antagonistic relationship between 
the brothers, but it also confirms the reason that Long published his autobiography, as a 
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political campaign tool, with which he could tell his story, in his way. Every Man A King was 
published in October 1933, nine months after the interview with Beatty was published.  
The impeachment clearly frightened Long and he would not forgive, not just those who had 
impeached him, but also those who had advised him to submit to the charges. It took until 
mid-May 1929 to overcome the impeachment process and during that time Long’s 
organisation was on the defensive. Retrospective evidence, primarily from Long opponents, 
including Julius Long, whose relationship with his brother had broken down irrevocably, 
indicates that he was stunned by the impeachment, that he suffered a physical depression in 
response to the attack, but in contemporary newspaper reports Long is said to have laughed 
on hearing of the impeachment, stating that he expected it and that also there were attempts 
by his supporters to ameliorate the action and to have him rebuked instead.219 His actions 
afterwards demonstrate a determination not to be put at risk of being under someone else’s 
power in future. Long’s revenge was personal not simply political, beginning with the 
instigation of recall actions against those legislators who had sought to impeach him, and 
replacing those members of state boards who had either not supported him or were a 
potential future risk.220  
Impulse, revenge and aggression 
A dichotomy existed in Long’s political character, he was simultaneously both a reasonable 
and relatively able politician, and a dictatorial bully. He was capable of acting both rationally 
and impulsively, with compassion and also with implacable vindictiveness. He would also 
react to hearsay or conjecture, rather than wait for explanations, facts or the confirmation of 
stories. An ultimately benign example of this type of hasty response, was described by E P 
Roy, the head of the state police. Based on an assumption that William Green, the president 
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of the American Federation of Labor, would not want Brigadier General Louis F Guerre to be 
the head of the Bureau of Criminal Identification, Long was prepared to fire Guerre; he was 
persuaded by Roy to speak with Green first. Green stated that he did not object to Guerre if 
Long wished to appoint him; as a result Guerre retained his position.221 In comparison, his 
break with Harley B Bozeman was anything but benign. A key figure throughout Long’s life, 
Bozeman is described by Williams as Long’s boyhood friend and by Hair as his “most helpful 
friend.”222 It was Bozeman who was credited with finding Long his first jobs as a travelling 
salesman, with identifying the Railroad Commission as his first opportunity for political office, 
and for providing him with campaign support.223 Elected to the state Legislature in his own 
right in 1928, as the representative for Winn Parish, he was also appointed as the chairman 
of Louisiana’s Tax Commission by Long. Bozeman was a consistent presence in the Long 
entourage. Convinced that the impeachment would succeed, Bozeman advised Long to 
resign.  
Having survived the impeachment, Long was unable to forgive this advice, which he 
interpreted as a betrayal. He forced Bozeman to resign from the Tax Commission and later, 
when Bozeman ran for a seat on the Public Service Commission, Long supported another 
candidate, Harvey G Fields.224 The extent to which their previously close relationship had 
broken down was dramatically demonstrated during the US Senate’s Special Committee on 
Investigation of Presidential and Senatorial Campaign Expenditure’s investigation into 
corruption in the 1932 US Senate race between incumbent Edwin Broussard and John H 
Overton. Although the investigation centred on the Overton campaign, it focussed on the 
campaign activities of Long and his machine. In a reversal of their roles during the 
impeachment proceedings, when Overton had acted as legal counsel for Long, Long now 
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acted as Overton’s lawyer. This role allowed Long to interview the witnesses testifying to the 
committee, including two of his brothers, Julius and Earl, and Bozeman. The transcript of the 
Bozeman cross-examination demonstrates Long’s antipathy towards his former friend: 
(Long to HB Bozeman) “You testified that when you were asked to resign 
after the impeachment proceedings you didn’t know why. Didn’t you come 
to my bedroom in the early hours of the morning when I was just out of the 
bathroom and while I was putting on my clothes, and if you didn’t sit down 
in a chair and say to me ‘You ought to be willing to save your friends, and if 
you will resign now you can save us.’” 
“No. That’s either a dream or a hallucination.” 
“Do you deny coming to my room later and telling me there was no chance, 
that they were going to take senators like Boone and send them to the 
Pacific coast?” 
“I never did any such thing. “ 
“Do you deny having come to my room and while I was putting on my 
clothes having said to me ‘By resigning today, you can save some of your 
friends,’ and did I not ask you if you were one of them and you said yes, 
and didn’t I say, ‘You dirty traitorous thief;’ and say when this was over you 
would have to resign?” 
“You know there is not a scintilla of truth in that!” 
“You are a lying scoundrel! You lying thief – “ 
General Ansell jumped to his feet and asserted that Senator Long was out 
of order and was in contempt of the investigating committee. 
Senator Long: I apologize to the committee but not to the witness. I am only 
human and remembering facts. It is very hard for me to refrain from 
spontaneous exclamations, especially when he leans over and shouts at 
me. Please tell him to keep his seat in his chair. I will ask you if you didn’t 
make a deal in case of my impeachment you would be retained as 
chairman of the tax commission. 
Mr. Bozeman: I positively did not. 
“Didn’t you tell me that it had been told to you by the big interests of the 
state that you didn’t need to worry, that in case of my impeachment you 







A number of Long’s contemporaries were reluctant to be interviewed by Williams for his 
autobiography, including Bozeman. However, the two men did speak on two separate 
occasions in 1959 and 1961.226 During the second interview, Bozeman was unwilling to 
discuss the impeachment, but he did claim that he had not known “how low humanity could 
sink”227 until the impeachment. Given the circumstances, this is probably a direct reference 
to the disintegration of his friendship with Long. 
A further example of Long’s use of targeted measures against his former associates resulted 
in one of the initial impeachment charges, his inappropriate use of the National Guard to 
conduct raids of illegal gambling establishments on 11 August 1928 (St Bernard parish) and 
12 November 1928 (Jefferson parish) on the outskirts of New Orleans. The perceived 
illegality of the raids lay in Long’s innovative methods rather than the action itself. He had not 
approached a judge for a search warrant or used police personnel, instead he provided 
written instructions to General Raymond H Fleming of the National Guard instructing him 
“to raid all places in said parish where gambling may be in process, and to 
gather all gambling material, appliances, and paraphernalia, including the 
money and safes and send said money to the Treasury of the State of 
Louisiana for deposit in the State Treasury and destroy all other such 
gambling equipment found.”228  
While members of civic organisations, who had appealed for something to be done about the 
gambling, praised the action; gamblers and patrons, including most notably a number of 
political enemies of Long, condemned the raids as illegal and criticised the crude methods 
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used to carry them out. What had incensed these critics most was that the military forces 
had been used to search patrons, including women, during the raids. The levels of bitterness 
experienced, by both sides, as a result of the impeachment is demonstrated in contemporary 
newspaper editorials regarding this episode. Among the archived papers of Cecil Morgan is 
an undated newspaper clipping of a critical contemporary editorial. In the piece, which 
emphasised the degree of opposition to Long throughout the state, and its frustration at the 
failure of the impeachment, the editor condemned the failure of the Legislature to impeach 
Long on “the charge of illegal use of the state militia” in the raids on gambling joints, 
suggesting that, by its failure, there were no lengths that the Legislature would not go to 
“give Mr Long the benefit of every doubt” including having “women stripped – women [who] 
were doing nothing more than eating an evening meal.”229 The editor concludes that Long’s 
strategy in the raid was “the act of a tyrant” and suggests that the Legislature had failed to 
do its duty in a “perfect” case. The vitriol expressed in the editorial at the Legislature’s failure 
to impeach Long on this specific charge was symptomatic of the anger of Long’s opponents 
at the Legislature’s decision. 
In his autobiography, Long linked Colonel Robert Ewing, publisher of the New Orleans 
States and The Shreveport Times, with a New Orleans ‘New Regular’ leader who had 
interests in gambling clubs, John P Sullivan, stating that he had to have Sullivan on his 
campaign to get Ewing’s support, but that the promised support had not been forthcoming in 
the city.230 Long characterised his break with Ewing, as being due to the publisher’s support 
for Sullivan’s determination to merge with other aspects with the city’s machine. Long 
claimed to have “publicly denounced [the merger] and declared I would not accept its 
support or give it support,”231 and so, Long stated, the break with Ewing was made public. 
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He also referred to a ‘gloating’ cartoon titled “Dropping the Pilot” in the New Orleans Item, 
which marked the break.232 
As shown earlier, Ewing had mistakenly believed that he would be the power behind Long’s 
throne.233 In the context of the association between Ewing and Sullivan, and Sullivan’s 
gambling interests, Long’s raids on the gambling houses in St Bernard and Jefferson 
parishes, may be seen to signal to both men the break, and to Ewing, specifically, that no 
one controlled Huey Long’s political career. Long had revealed himself to be both a better 
political manipulator than Ewing himself and a more independent one than he had expected. 
Ewing had failed to comprehend that Long would not serve as a subordinate to anyone, that 
he would use any tactic to eliminate a political opponent, even if that person was a de facto 
supporter, and that he would impose his will and power at a time and place that suited him, 
without warning or consultation. Ultimately, the charge that Long illegally used the state 
militia was not included in final eight articles of impeachment. 
In 1932, Anne Ector Pleasant, wife of former governor, Ruffin G Pleasant sued Long for 
damages, alleging that he had referred to her as a “‘drunken, cursing woman and that R. L. 
Whitman, superintendent of the State Bureau of Criminal Identification, grabbed her by the 
arm and held her for a time.’”234 In a subsequent petition, she charged that Long’s use of the 
BCI was designed to “strike terror [in her] as a tax opponent, through the use of the hostile 
presence of several of his henchmen, the physical force of one of them and the threatened 
violence of all.”235 A vocal opponent of Long since he had removed her husband from a state 
post in 1928, Pleasant was also involved in the campaign to oust both Long and John 
Overton from the US Senate in 1934. Cross-examining her testimony to the Senate, Long 
focussed on her previous mental health issues, a tactic she claimed would not deter her,  
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“If Senator Long thinks he can break down my morale by subjecting me to 
mortification through insinuating questions and remarks, he has reckoned 
without his host. Death alone can stop me in the determined course that I 
shall continue to pursue against him and his methods.”236  
The investigation into Long and Overton dismissed the charges. At the time of her death in 
September 1934, the damages suit against Long was still pending.237 
From the anecdotes of Seymour Weiss, it is clear that some members of Long’s organisation 
did attempt to restrain some of Long’s aggressive and reactive instincts. Weiss, in particular, 
acted not just as one of Long’s managers, but he also tried to manage Long himself. He 
portrays himself as having acted as a buffer to some of Long’s more extreme and excessive 
impulses, making attempts to manage the results of Long’s rages. When the discussions of 
a confidential conference on the banking crisis were leaked, and immediately published by 
the Times-Picayune, Long demanded, in a drunken fury, that Fleming, commander of the 
National Guard, destroy the newspaper’s presses. Aware of both the imprudence of the 
order and the potentially serious results if the order was carried out, not just in terms of law 
and order, but also in terms of a state-wide financial crisis, Weiss did not use the telephone 
in Long’s suite to summon Fleming, but left the room to make the call. Fleming took an hour 
to reach Long’s hotel from the barracks, which had allowed time for Long to sober up, but he 
still demanded that his instructions were to be carried out. Fleming did not act, claiming later 
that he would only have declared martial law at the newspaper office and that by reviewing 
the content of the paper, he would have ensured that the resulting publication was not 
damaging.238  
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Tales from Long’s childhood offer an insight into a youth who was willing to engage in verbal 
disputes but who would leave his younger brother, Earl, to engage in physical altercations on 
his behalf. In later life, the stories of Long’s reluctance to personally physically engage with 
opponents was reinforced by the tale of a fight in adulthood; with his opponent, J Y Sanders 
Snr, the former governor, some twenty five years his senior, it can be inferred that Long had 
seen him as an easy target. Long had made defamatory accusations about Sanders during 
the 1928 gubernatorial campaign. When Sanders came across Long in the lobby of the 
Roosevelt Hotel, he was determined to confront him.239 Long ran away and they ended up in 
“a clinch” in the elevator. Sanders later told his son, that he was out of breath from the chase 
and had to hold on to something, and Long was the only available support. During this 
incident, Long “got hold of his sleeve and tore off a cufflink,”240 which he would later brandish 
as a trophy. Both men emerged from the scuffle dishevelled, but given the age of his 
opponent, Long could hardly have been described as the victor. Personally, Long generally 
avoided physical violence, but he inspired it in others, both on his behalf and in active 
opposition to him. A physical attack on him in September 1926 was, the assailant claimed, in 
response to comments made by Long during the US Senate campaign: 
“Mr. Prophit stepped forth swinging a heavy walking stick and hitting Mr. 
Long a heavy blow on the head. Mr. Long retreated and Mr. Prophit 
following him, struck him again. The blow was so severe that the stick was 
broken. . . . Later a warrant was issued for the arrest of Mr. Prophit on a 
charge of lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill. Mr. 
Prophit declared his action was due to remarks made by Mr. Long in 
speeches during the senatorial campaign.”241 
A number of contemporary observers of Long have noted the sense of urgency which 
appeared to pervade his activities. Some have described him as worried that he would not 
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have sufficient time to achieve all of his goals, whilst others talk of his frustration, at different 
stages of his life, that he was not yet old enough for certain political offices, most notably that 
of Governor of Louisiana. Common to the anecdotes of Long, are the tales of his fear of 
physical violence and his conviction that he would be assassinated. While Harry Gamble242 
believed that Long did not really fear assassination and that he used bodyguards to protect 
himself from being beaten up,243 his habit of walking ahead of the bodyguards nullified any 
chance they may have had to effectively protect him. However, there is evidence from a 
number of sources, which speaks to Long’s preoccupation with his own mortality, including 
stories such as that told by John J O’Connor: 
“He was highly suspicious of strangers. When he sat in a group in my 
apartment, and a new person, male or female, came in, he immediately 
became suspicious that that person was spying on him in some way. One 
Sunday afternoon, while we were driving out in my open car to play golf at 
the Columbia Country Club, two young ladies passed us in a car and 
seemed very interested in looking at him, whereupon the Senator was 
convinced that they were people who had been sent up from Louisiana to 
follow him and “get something” on him. He may have had some 
premonition of what finally happened to him.”244 
While observations like O’Connor’s suggest that Long was paranoid, in particular regarding 
his personal safety, his actions tend to preclude this as a definitive assessment. Long was 
clearly aware that his activities and his behaviour antagonised some of his opponents to 
such a degree that they may wish to seek to physically harm him. However, his response 
indicates that either he was not entirely convinced that such an attempt would occur to him 
or he believed he was impregnable to the consequences of such attacks. His use of 
bodyguards, therefore, served as a defensive strategy. The phalanx of men which 
surrounded him, whether it consisted of bodyguards, state police, the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification or the National Guard, provided not just the illusion of protection, it also 
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projected an image of intimidation and aggression.245 Additionally, they also served as a 
barrier between the governor and the people he purported to serve. Long had begun to 
surround himself with a troop of guards during the 1928 gubernatorial campaign.246 This 
action alone is demonstrative of Long’s detachment from the mass of Louisianians who had 
believed, and elected him for, his promises to improve their existence.  
While Long frequently demonstrated a lack of a sense of proportionate response, his actions 
could, and were on many occasions, driven by conventional political tactics including 
debates, negotiations, persuasion and graft. A degree of corruption was deemed to be an 
acceptable norm in Louisiana politics before, during and after the period in which Long ran 
the state. Long himself, predicted that his subordinates were too greedy to continue to run 
the state without his guiding hand and skilful balancing of corruption and graft with 
programme delivery; he accurately suggested their greed would send them to the 
penitentiary.247 Of Long’s closest associates, few eluded criminal charges and prison terms 
after his death. 
Conclusion 
Long’s behaviour ensured that responses to him were polarised in nature; one either liked 
him or abhorred him. His character ensured that his relationships, at a personal and political 
level, were restrained by his need for others to be subservient to him and his determination 
that he would never be subordinate to another. Throughout his career, Long’s style of politics 
and his personal interactions tended to antagonise and repel those whose allegiance he was 
unable to attract and to secure. He chose to see these relationships in absolute terms, 
individuals were either for him or against him.  
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Irrespective of the constitutional restrictions on impeachment, some degree of opposition to 
the activities, actions and behaviours of the officer under review is necessary for there to be 
the will in the House of Representatives to initiate an impeachment process. Although not 
exclusively a partisan tool, impeachments do tend to be initiated by members of the 
opposition party. While political opposition is a necessary factor for impeachment, Long’s 
opposition may be described in the stronger terms of enmity and enemies.   
Long did not anticipate the impeachment action in 1929, possibly because he either did not 
believe that his methods and programmes were wrong, or he believed that his position was 
unassailable. The degree to which the reality of the impeachment shocked him is evidence 
that he did not comprehend the depth of the prevailing atmosphere in Baton Rouge at that 
time, in particular the mood amongst his opponents and those politicians who had not 
aligned themselves with either faction. He was also not confident in his ability to survive the 
action and had turned first to self-destructive actions, including, as previously noted, 
attempting to instigate fights in the street, before writing a resignation letter. For Long, the 
impeachment action and its potential to succeed should have provided not only the need for 
a robust defence, but also an opportunity for reflection, with a degree of self-recognition, an 
acknowledgement that others might see him and his actions as egregious. His initial reaction 
to the impeachment process suggests that he lacked the confidence that he would be able to 
defeat the action, and that he was being forced to acknowledge that the view of him held by 
others may be correct. However, this potential opportunity for self–reflection was only a 
fleeting one; the rallying resources of those around him provided instead the solution to the 
crisis and the opportunity to not only defeat the action, but also to chronically damage the 
fragile nature of the cohesion of the opposition forces.  
Throughout his career, Long’s inward looking focus on his politics and career at the expense 
of all other relationships, whether with members of his family, his friends, associates or 






resulting conflict would escalate exponentially. This chapter has explored, through a series 
of case studies, the development of Long’s personal enemies, and concludes that the origins 
of impeachment in 1929 lie primarily in Long’s propensity to convert political opponents into 
personal and political enemies. 
In Williams’ opinion the impeachment produced a more focussed political operative; it had  
hardened him only in the sense that it gave him a greater awareness of the 
dangers he faced. He would try to see to it that his enemies could never 
again place him in danger.248 
The outcome of Williams’ minimisation of the impeachment’s impacts can be seen in its 
subsequent treatment in the historiography of Long. In contrast, in Every Man a King, Long 
emphasises the impeachment and seeks to present the crisis of 1929 in the best possible 
light for him, his personal and political image, and to his constituency, and as such it is a 
running theme throughout the book. The impeachment builds on and supports Long’s battles 
with his political, business and media enemies. It also appears to have developed into a 
validation of his programmes and activities, with Long, in essence claiming that since his 
opponents had tried so hard to prevent him from fulfilling his agenda, he must have been 
doing something right.  
The overarching trajectory of the Long career plan did not radically change as a result of the 
impeachment; his proposed run for the presidency was on schedule for 1936. Although, it is 
Williams’ conclusion that  
“had there been no impeachment [Long] would have followed much the 
same course that he did. He had chosen his way long before 1929, the way 
of the artist in the use of power – the way of the great politician.” 249  
The ordeal was more significant than Williams allows. It was a response to a cumulative 
impact of Long’s behaviour, actions, and policies, and became a consistent factor and threat 
                                                          







throughout his career. For Long, the attempt to remove him from office was neither a 
moment of weakness nor a temporary, if worrying predicament from which he struggled to 
extricate himself. Rather, it was a crucial moment of validation for the political worldview he 
went on to construct for himself. Williams’ claim that Long would have continued along much 
the same lines is, of course, speculative, but it overlooks several factors. Even if, as 
previously discussed, Long was not the expert political operative he has been previously 
credited as being, he would have realised that impeachment, successful or not, would have 
an impact on his image and status, both in Louisiana and nationally. It was this aspect of 
political baggage that, in part, he was rhetorically seeking to manage through his references 
to the impeachment in Every Man A King, hence the reinterpretation of events positioning 
himself as the victim of a concerted effort to remove him by the corrupt elites and vested 
interests in Louisiana. However, in his persistent references to attempts to remove him from 
office throughout his career, Long clearly indicated that the 1929 impeachment had a 
profound and lasting impact on him. Without the impeachment, it is possible that Long’s term 
as governor may have become less confrontational and antagonistic, perhaps even resulting 
in a more acquiescent accommodation of interests in the state. However implausible this 
option may be, the jolt of impeachment, and Long’s response to it, ensured that such 
alternative avenues were closed. The political atmosphere in Louisiana in March 1929, 
influenced as it was by Johnston’s impeachment in Oklahoma and by the menacing 
atmosphere cultivated by Long’s determination to impose his programmes, ensured that the 
impeachment in Baton Rouge in 1929 was both predictable and ultimately a transformational 












A wide variety of academic, journalistic and other works have been written on the career and 
life of Huey P Long, however the focus of these works has tended to be biographical in 
nature or focussed on the later stages of his career in Louisiana and at the national level. 
Ten months after his inauguration as governor of Louisiana in May 1928, Long was 
impeached. Previously this impeachment has been examined only within the context of a 
biographical assessment of Long, treatments which have been restricted to a recitation of 
the event and an attempt to ascertain whether Long was significantly affected by the effort to 
remove him from office. The outcomes of these enquiries have not conclusively identified 
impacts beyond that of an apparent possible change in the nature of his character; with there 
being as many observers suggesting that Long did not change in the wake of the 
impeachment, as there were those who were convinced that he became harder and more 
ruthless as a result. To suggest, as T Harry Williams did, that Long continued in the same 
vein after the impeachment as he would have had it not occurred is an untestable 
hypothesis, since the impeachment did occur. As a result, it is not possible to look at the 
impeachment as a discrete and isolated event within the career of Long. This thesis has 
examined the impeachment within a broader context of Long, his career and his personality, 






By omitting to examine the impeachment as a separate issue, biographers and historians 
have not considered whether the impeachment was caused by a broader spectrum of events 
and factors than simply the political contests and environment in Baton Rouge in March 
1929. In addition, these writers have failed to determine the degree to which the 
impeachment had a wider impact on Long, his behaviours and activities than simply an 
unsubstantiated change in his character. This study has taken a broader view of Long, his 
character and his techniques, his personal and political belief systems, his position within the 
state of Louisiana and the South, and the environment in which he came to prominence. By 
taking this broader approach it has been possible to trace the origins of the impeachment to 
a set of factors which have their genesis at earlier stages of his political career. It has also 
been possible to identify Long’s emerging viewpoint that the attempts to remove him from 
office, including via impeachment, validated his programmes, and therefore, his political 
modus operandi.  
When Long was impeached in March 1929, it was as a result of a convergence of factors. 
Long considered himself to be incomparable and an exceptional political operative. In this 
context, “Just say I’m sui generis and leave it at that”1 was not simply a throwaway line in 
answer to an oft-repeated journalistic question, it was a characterisation of how Long saw 
himself as well as a calculated attempt to manage the way in which he was viewed by the 
national electorate. Since even his political and personal enemies agreed that Long was a 
charismatic and intelligent politician, it was perhaps not entirely unreasonable that he would 
seek to position himself outside of the conventional norms of political behaviour. However, it 
was a factor of this characterisation of uniqueness that also empowered Long to act in a 
manner that generated repugnance, disapproval and revolt amongst a significant proportion 
of the general populace, politicians and press of Louisiana. These reactions fuelled the 
movement to impeach. While the action itself was primarily triggered by Long’s attempts to 
impose an oil tax, the movement to impeach had its origins in the behaviour, activities and 
                                                          





programmes which had been the foundation of Long’s personal and political career. The 
factors which formed the basis for Long’s political career and which created the 
circumstances for impeachment have been examined in detail in the chapters of this thesis: 
his governorship in comparison to other Louisiana and southern governors (chapter two); an 
identification of Long’s motivations, at an ideological or pragmatic level or within a personal 
belief system, which combined with an obsession with power and his determination to 
accrue and retain power (chapters three and four); and his propensity for making enemies or 
creating enmity (chapter five).    
Long’s self-applied designation of sui generis, an apparently off-the-cuff response to 
reporters who had sought to define him within the context of current national politics, was an 
attempt designed not only to evade definition, but also to emphasise and claim for himself a 
characterisation as unique. However, as a member of a cohort of governors from the twelve 
southern states, Long’s experience in office demonstrated his similarities as well as his 
differences to his contemporaries. From a biographical point of view, Long had a great deal 
in common with the majority of his contemporaries. As a lawyer with experience in political 
office, who was a member of the Democratic Party, there was very little to differentiate Long 
from the other Southern governors. In common with William “Alfalfa Bill” Murray of 
Oklahoma, he was known for his advocacy of programmes which appeared to promote 
benefits for the poorer members of the state’s population. As with other governors in the 
South, Long’s oratory was a key element of his attraction for his constituents. Even the 
impeachment did not separate him from all of his contemporaries. Of the five gubernatorial 
impeachments which had taken place between 1900 and Long’s impeachment in 1929, four 
were from southern states, three from Oklahoma – Henry Simpson Johnston (1927 & 1929) 
and John Callaway (Jack) Walton (1923), and one from Texas – James Edward Ferguson 
(1917).2 The fundamental difference between Long and the other southern governors was 
the degree of power he had over his state. None of his contemporaries in office had the 
                                                          





degree of control over their states that Long had acquired in Louisiana. However, as was 
demonstrated during his campaign for a legalised “cotton holiday” amongst the cotton 
producing states, Long’s power in Louisiana did not equate to influence beyond the state 
boundaries.   
In Louisiana, Long’s level of and acquisition of power was also the fundamental difference 
which distinguished him from his predecessors as governor. However, while he had a 
number of commonalities with his contemporaries amongst the southern governors, he was 
an entirely different person, politician and governor when compared with the other recent 
governors of Louisiana, with his style and his background being the most prominent 
differences. Long introduced a style of politics which, although it appeared to diverge from 
that which had come before, did in many ways echo that which had preceded it – the 
domination of a political hierarchy, but now the ruling class consisted of loyal Long 
supporters. However, it should be noted that while he perpetuated it, he did not introduce 
corruption and graft to Louisiana. These had been a long established part of political life in 
the state for decades, and many of Long’s predecessors had participated in both. Long was 
not a member of the ruling elite in Louisiana, and his behavioural traits highlighted this 
difference. Any sense of inferiority that Long may have experienced as a result of his 
upbringing served to imbue him with a self-identification as both unique and separate. He 
simply did not believe it necessary to involve himself in the existing political structures in the 
state, since, as sui generis, he saw himself as not only equal, but also superior to those who 
had come before. It was Long’s departure from, together with his refusal to adhere to, the 
expected and recognised norms of behaviour for a Louisiana governor which ultimately 
provided the foundation for his impeachment. Previous governors, especially in the years 
immediately prior to Long’s term of office, had come from among the established leadership 
of the political and business communities. With few exceptions, such as John M Parker, 
most governors had been elected at the behest of, or with the support of, the New Orleans 





the governorship in 1928. Although it lacked sufficient power to prevent the impeachment in 
1929, the growth and dominance of the Long machine after, and as a result of, the 
impeachment, ensured that it would be an influential force in state politics for decades and 
thus a threat to the political status quo. 
It would be easy to dismiss as apocryphal, the stories of the teenager announcing his 
intention to be president of the United States and of the young man telling his wife which 
political offices he would take to achieve his ambition of the presidency. While these tales 
added to the mythology of Long, they also demonstrate both his fixation with, and his 
determination to follow a specific, prescribed path, to his goal. The stories add legitimacy to 
the arguments of some pro-Long commentators that he was on track to become president 
when he was assassinated, because they provide an evidentiary basis to his successful 
completion of his goals thus far. By the time of his death, Long had indeed held a minor state 
office, had been governor of Louisiana, was a United States senator, and was talking to the 
press about a possible run for president, even though he had not yet confirmed his timeline 
for this campaign.3 There was no tradition of presidential success from Louisiana on which 
Long could base his ambition, to date a president has not been born in Louisiana or 
considered it to be his home state.4 As such, Long’s ambition to be president was an 
unprecedented dream, but it was one for which he had identified a pathway which, he 
believed, could make it a reality. 
Despite his determination, Long’s ambition was put at risk by the development of his 
obsession with power. While it may be argued that his determination to retain control of 
Louisiana after his move to Washington DC demonstrated an altruistic resolution to complete 
his programme of works in the state, there was an alternative solution to this dilemma, if 
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indeed it existed. Long could have declared his support for a competent candidate for 
governor, one who was politically, strategically and ideologically aligned to him, and who 
was committed to continue his work. However, while his personal career ambition was intact, 
it had become subordinate to his need to dominate politics in the state. By responding to 
legislative opposition to his programmes during the regular session of May 1930 by making 
the contest for the US Senate effectively a referendum on his administration, Long prioritised 
his control over the state over his career. That he was prepared to stake his administration 
and use the Senate race as a popularity contest to prove that he controlled the state 
demonstrates that Long had begun to prioritise his power acquisition. While it is possible to 
interpret this race as an opportunistic move to further his political career pathway, Long’s 
delay in taking up the seat contradicts this assumption. As does his determination to 
guarantee that he would be replaced by a handpicked subservient figurehead, Oscar K 
Allen, while control of the state would remain with Long. Any implied altruism, that Long 
simply wanted to continue his work in Louisiana, is refuted by this determined and continued 
accrual of power. Long’s distinctive style of personalised leadership was a factor in his 
inability to pursue a more normal succession pathway out of the governor’s office. Having 
created an executive office which was bound to him alone, he was unable to identify a 
suitable candidate as a successor, since any politician sufficiently qualified to continue his 
legacy would necessarily be someone whose abilities were equal to those of Long. Such a 
person would, in Long’s view, be suspect since he would invariably seek to remake the 
governorship into his own image. Unlike Long, a more traditional governor, who had worked 
within the state party would have found potentially a number of suitably qualified and aligned 
politicians ready to continue the work.  
It also contradicts his adherence to his planned pathway to the presidency. His specified 
plan implied that he was determined to move up each step of the political ladder by 
accumulating support and gaining experience. It was also a plan which required him to move 





a logical one or an achievable one. Long’s actions were paradoxical, since they both confirm 
his intention, and simultaneously contradict his determination, to pursue and achieve the 
presidency. Long’s ambition to become president was not intrinsically unique, however the 
methods by which he sought to achieve this ambition were. As governor, he ensured that he 
controlled not just those powers constitutionally delegated to him, but also, by the use of 
appointments, bound to him by unsigned resignation letters or by coercion, he held authority 
over a greater portion of the state governmental apparatus than any previous governor. His 
attempts from his earliest days as governor to wield leverage and control over legislators, 
the judiciary and other aspects of state government, as well as the state’s newspapers, 
caused such concern for many of his opponents that it formed a basis for the impeachment 
charges. 
Despite attempts by contemporary commentators to define Long by categorising him within a 
spectrum of prevailing political ideologies, he never fully articulated the political, ideological 
or philosophical belief system upon which he had based his political career and which had 
informed his programmes, preferring instead to position himself as a unique political 
operative. The contention proposed by Miller and Norman, that the American two-party 
system inevitably creates coalitions of political enemies, is one which is compounded in the 
post-Reconstruction single party southern states.5 Since any nascent progress by the 
populist, progressive and Republican parties in the state had been ultimately stifled by the 
Democratic Party’s adoption of their policies or by legislative disenfranchisement of their 
supporters, for a politician to be successful in Louisiana, membership of the state 
Democratic Party was essential. As mentioned in chapter four, Long did declare himself to 
be a Democrat. However, since Louisiana was a single party state, his party allegiance was 
unlikely to have been driven by ideological impulse; it was a pragmatic calculation. 
                                                          





Although not explicitly populist or progressive in nature, Long’s political programmes and 
speeches owed, in part, an unacknowledged foundation to both movements. Certainly, many 
of his programmes had their origins in works proposed and begun by one of his 
predecessors as governor, John M Parker, whose progressive disposition was evident in his 
road building project and the introduction of a severance tax on oil. As governor, Long had 
adopted both of these programmes as his own. Such was his promotion of his road building 
project that Parker’s involvement was substantially overshadowed. Long’s appropriation of 
oil taxation as a means to fund his programmes was the factor which triggered the 
impeachment process.   
Fundamental to Long’s obsession with the acquisition of personal and political power was 
his distorted perception of what political power was and what it could do. Throughout his 
political career, he sought to climb a ladder to what he viewed as the most powerful political 
office in the country, the presidency. However, there is a sense that at each stage of his 
ascent, the reality of each office did not meet his expectations. He sought, therefore, to 
remodel the levels of influence of each office until it fitted his perceptions. As Railroad / 
Public Service Commissioner, he took what was essentially a sinecure position and 
developed the role, as well as the commission, into an effective body, and ultimately into a 
publicity machine for himself. By challenging high profile corporations in the name of the 
poor of Louisiana, Long not only raised his own name-recognition across the state, he also 
developed an image of influence. It was his perception that the governor controlled the state. 
If viewed from this perspective, Long’s frustration with Parker’s deal-making over the 
severance tax, becomes more than a personal or class clash. He was unable to see why 
Parker made deals which compromised the effectiveness of his legislative agenda. Despite 





political practitioner. For him, the ‘sport of kings,’6 politics, had become about the acquisition 
of power and the destruction of opponents, and was not necessarily about working with 
legislators to produce the best legislation for the state, and the people of Louisiana. 
Power also offered Long the means and opportunity by which he could exact his revenge for 
slights and opposition, whether perceived or real. Although he disrupted the status quo in 
Louisiana politics, ultimately at all levels, it was at the executive level that his differences to 
his predecessors were most notable. The politics of Louisiana had previously been run by an 
elite made up of plantation owners and business men; two groups who saw Long as an 
uncouth, flamboyant interloper, but one who could be incorporated into the existing political 
structure and restrained and managed by a more experienced mentor. As Colonel Robert 
Ewing discovered, these groups had failed to anticipate or appreciate Long’s antagonism 
towards them as a class. They also underestimated his shrewd acumen in apparently 
working with them, adhering to their guidance, and accepting their support and assistance, 
only to discard them as soon as they were no longer of immediate use to him.  
Although not articulated within the eight articles of impeachment, Long’s obsession with 
power was a contributory factor to the instigation of the impeachment process, as was 
clearly demonstrated by the original nineteen impeachment charges. While Long himself 
stated that, he had no allegiance to a political ideology, ultimately his fixation with the 
accumulation and retention of political power replaced any political or ideological allegiances 
he may have held prior to taking office, and any personal belief systems to which he had 
adhered before and during his time in office. Power had become the force which motivated 
him and the disruption of the status quo was the method by which it could be attained. A 
corollary to Long’s iconoclasm is that having established himself as a separate entity to the 
existing factions within the Louisiana Democratic Party, he was isolated from established 
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support networks, networks which would, in the case of other more traditional actors, have 
been available to support such politicians in the face of an impeachment attempt. 
Throughout his career, Long apportioned the blame for the impeachment attempts and 
investigations to his political and personal opponents, those individuals and entities that he 
described as his enemies. However, since political and personal opposition does not emerge 
in a vacuum, and enemies and enmities do not manifest without cause, a large degree of 
responsibility for these hostile relationships must be apportioned to Long himself. It is 
evident from reactions of the people of Louisiana that Long’s personality engendered a 
binary response, people either loved him or loathed him. However, these reactions were not 
limited to the Long who inhabited the political environment. Long’s relationships with 
members of his family, especially his brothers, Julius, George (Shan) and Earl, demonstrate 
a disregard for family and a determination to distance himself from any expectations they 
may have of him, while simultaneously demanding their support for him and his activities. As 
mentioned above, Long sought to distinguish himself from other politicians by claiming 
originality. The letters exchanged with his brothers demonstrate that he was equally 
determined to divest himself of the ties of family, except for when they were working for or 
supporting him. 
Long was intensely egocentric, most especially in his reactions to events that occurred 
around him. Impacts of events were perceived only as they pertained to him, not in a 
broader context. For example, when Harley Bozeman advised Long to resign during the 
impeachment, his recommendations were deemed to be a betrayal and resulted in his 
removal from his post on the Tax Commission. Bozeman had been a key supporter and 
long-term friend of Long’s since their school days, and he had offered the advice because he 
could not see a solution to the crisis which would allow Long to overcome the impeachment 
charges and remain governor. The subsequent dramatic and extreme disintegration of their 





Public Service Commission, and ultimately resulted in an angry confrontation during the US 
Senate’s investigation into the Overton-Broussard Senate campaign. Such was the impact 
on Bozeman of the breakdown of the relationship, that he was reluctant to be interviewed by 
T Harry Williams on the subject. Key to Long’s relationships with others was his ability to 
disassociate. It is important to note that it was only after a solution to the impeachment had 
been found and implemented, that Long had set aside years of support and friendship, and 
saw Bozeman’s advice to resign as disloyalty. Bozeman’s failure was that instead of 
providing a palatable solution to Long’s problem, as he had successfully on many occasions 
in the past, he had recommended an option which would remove Long from politics, a 
suggestion which was in Long’s eyes a treacherous action.  
At that time, for the majority of politicians in Louisiana, factional politics meant that today’s 
opponent could, and would, be tomorrow’s ally. Long disregarded this aspect of state politics 
and perceived political opposition as definitive, rather than as gradation of ambiguity. His 
strategies converted opponents into enemies. Rather than accepting that within politics, 
others might adhere to different ideological or political ideas, which would mean that they 
were unable or unwilling to support his actions, ideas or programmes, Long treated 
opposition as confrontational and with implacable hostility. Such was his apparent inability to 
distinguish between normal political activities and deliberate antagonism, the slightest 
resistance was often met with relentless determination to force compliance or destruction. 
Long’s combative and reactionary responses to opposition or challenges to his supremacy 
escalated situations, which in the hands of another politician would not have developed into 
anything more than an exchange of opinions, although perhaps somewhat heated. For 
example, in the face of criticism in the Baton Rouge State-Times and the Morning Advocate 
of his proposed oil tax, Long intensified a political controversy and created a personal attack 
by targeting the brother of the newspapers’ publisher, Charles Manship. His attempt to 
blackmail Manship into curtailing his newspapers’ campaign against the tax was 





criticism was one of the triggers that prompted his opponents to act, at that particular time, 
on their intention to impeach him. 
In general, during his first ten months as governor, Long’s term can be described overall as 
a success. He had organised the Legislature’s committee structure along his preferred lines, 
and been able to persuade the Legislature to approve his initial programme during the 
regular session in May and at the special session in November 1928. These experiences 
had led him to believe that he could not fail to get his subsequent programme passed. 
However, in 1929, with the probability of failure on the oil tax bill, came the realisation of 
fallibility, that he was unable to control the outcome of his legislative programme because he 
could not command the opinions and the support of the Legislature. In the face of an attempt 
to force the adjournment of the session sine die and the resulting skirmish, the opposition 
was provoked into responding, in what they deemed as the most appropriate response; 
dictatorial attempts to control the actions of the Legislature had inspired them to proceed 
with the impeachment action. 
For Long’s opponents, both in politics and in businesses in Louisiana, the specific objective 
of the impeachment was to remove from office a governor whose personality, tactics and 
legislative agenda were a complete anathema to them. As many of the original nineteen 
articles of impeachment proposed in House Resolution 8 indicated, Long’s behaviour and 
tactics, which had characterised his career to date, were as much a factor in the 
impeachment as were the events of the previous day. In comparison to the eight charges 
passed to the Louisiana Senate, the original nineteen articles of impeachment reveal the 
level to which his opponents believed that Long diverged from the accepted norms of politics 
in Louisiana. In addition to representing a fuller and broader catalogue of the offences 
allegedly committed by Long, the original charges also highlight the differences between 
Long and his opponents in terms of his crude behaviour, his morals and his determination to 





For an impeachment attempt to be successful, it does not only need to be justifiable within 
the restrictions of the constitution’s articles of impeachment and sufficiently persuasive to 
legislative members, the elected officials bringing the case must also have the will and the 
resources to follow the process to its end. The charges may be politically motivated and 
biased rather than evidentially supported, but the will of the impeachers is the fundamental 
key to the success of the action. Long’s impeachment failed not just because of the Round 
Robin letter, which may have been overcome through an application of parliamentary 
procedures and a cohesive coalition of impeachers, but also because they lacked a sufficient 
solidarity of purpose to succeed. 
Impeachment is a political tool, not a legal one. The consequences of a successful 
impeachment are both limited and profound; from the political perspective, the outcome of 
impeachment is limited by the terms of the constitution governing the office and the official in 
question. For Long, a successful impeachment as governor would have resulted in his 
removal from office and his being barred from holding any other state office.7 Beyond the 
political environment, the further impacts of a successful impeachment could have been 
widespread, and included the possibility of criminal charges being brought relating to items 
raised during the impeachment. A successful impeachment could have been a career-
limiting event for Long, not just for his political ambitions but also from a legal and personal 
perspective, criminal charges could potentially have resulted in a prison sentence, but would 
at the very least have harmed his law practice. With such possible ramifications, it is not 
surprising that the threat of impeachment had such a potent impact but since it is a political 
tool, it is also, within the context of American politics, a partisan political weapon, which can 
be fought with politics. It is this aspect that blunts the effectiveness of impeachment as a tool 
to restrain politicians and has ensured that the incidents of impeachment, especially at the 
gubernatorial level, have remained low. In many cases, a successful impeachment would 
only be possible as a consequence of a bipartisan effort. With Long’s propensity to create 
                                                          





and collect political and personal enemies throughout his career, a cross-Legislature 
endeavour to impeach him was not an unreasonable expectation in 1929; it was a 
predictable outcome of his actions to date. Having defeated the impeachers, Long’s 
response was in line with his previous behaviour patterns and his propensity to convert 
opponents into enemies. His opponents were subjected to recall attempts, while those of his 
supporters who had, in his eyes, failed in their allegiance during the crisis were ostracised. 
Even his saviours, the fifteen state senators who had signed the Round Robin letter would 
become a burden to Long with their reciprocity claims; in Every Man A King, although Long 
suggested that the continued favours shown to them had developed a joking repartee 
between them, his quip “If ever again you fifteen round-robineers find me drowning, for 
Heaven’s sake, let me drown!”8 is more resonant of his frustration at being beholden to 
them. Just as Long resented the ties that linked him to the members of his family, so he also 
resented those individuals who had helped to save his governorship from impeachment.   
Summary 
As shown at the start of this work, the impeachment of Huey P Long in 1929 has been 
under-explored by academics and commentators. Those who have examined it have limited 
their investigations to a narrative of the events and a discussion of the binary effects that the 
impeachment was perceived to have had on Long’s character, with this latter appraisal 
dependent on the appraisers’ view of Long himself. For many Long supporters, the 
impeachment was a point in his career which had a negative impact on him. As a result of 
his opponents’ actions, he had to become harder and more ruthless from that point on if he 
wanted to achieve his goals. For Long’s opponents, the impeachment had little impact on 
him since he had always conducted his politics in a ruthless manner.   
By examining the 1929 impeachment of Long in broader context than it has previously been 
explored, this thesis has moved the historiography of Long on from the non-committal 
                                                          





assessment proposed by T Harry Williams, and concurred with by subsequent biographers 
and historians. The impeachment action in 1929 did not simply result in a potential alteration 
in Long’s character. It was an incident which since it was presaged by a series of 
behaviours, actions and activities throughout his personal and political career was, in 
combination with the events of both special sessions of the Louisiana Legislature in March 
1929, predictable. One outcome of the impeachment was that it overshadowed Long’s 
perception of his political career for the rest of his career.   
Without the impeachment, it is unlikely that Long would have taken the unusual step of 
running for the US Senate seat with two years remaining of his gubernatorial term; his 
relationship with Lieutenant Governor Paul Cyr may not have been irrevocably damaged by 
Cyr’s support of the impeachment action, and as such, Long would not have felt the need to 
remain in Louisiana after his Senate victory. Without the tipping point of the impeachment, 
Long’s propensity to view political opponents as enemies may have been blunted, and as 
such his determination to work outside of the state Democratic party may have been 
somewhat curtailed. Additionally, without this impeachment, and an apparent pattern of 
attempts at removing him from office, it is possible that Long would have been less inclined 
to seek to validate his ambition and his programmes in the context of opposition. Therefore, 
without the transformational impact of the 1929 impeachment, it is possible that Long’s 
career could have followed a different path to that which actually occurred.  
The examination of the papers of Huey P Long, those of family members and of his 
contemporaries in Louisiana which are held in the archives at Louisiana State University in 
Baton Rouge, at the University of New Orleans and at Tulane University in New Orleans, 
many of which have not been examined in the context of Long’s impeachment and those 
which are previously unpublished, has brought a new and different understanding of the 





and challenged the assessments made by Long’s biographers on the origins of the 1929 
impeachment to further the study of Long and to fill a gap in the historiography. 
It has been shown that the impeachment was based on a broader set of factors than has 
previously been considered. The circumstances of the special sessions in March 1929 was 
the tipping point for Long’s legislative opposition, provoking a response not just to the current 
events but also to the collective impact of previous events, actions and behaviours. This 
thesis has focused on the specific events, factors and behaviours which combined to create 
the circumstances which were instrumental in the impeachment itself, and by exploring this 
gap in the historiography, it has contributed to the further understanding of Long, his 
subsequent motivations and the role of impeachment in American gubernatorial politics. In 
re-evaluating his impeachment, this work has contextualised it as a critically important event 
in the early career of Long. This thesis has widened the knowledge base and the 
assessment of Huey P Long’s gubernatorial career by focussing on a specific incident, which 
has previously been under-examined, and which, therefore, presents the possibility to gain a 
wider understanding of Long’s political career and life.  
Future work 
While exploring this area of Long’s career it became evident that the impeachment had 
come to have a greater impact on Long and his subsequent career than has been previously 
understood. As evidenced by his autobiography, Every Man A King, Long had subsequently 
become fixated by the possibility of impeachment and the threat of removal from office. 
While academics have limited their discussion of the 1929 impeachment, for Long himself 
the threat was an all-consuming obsession and ultimately he came to see it as a possible 
sign of validation. An exploration of Long’s relationship to impeachment throughout the 
remaining years of his life would be a valid future research project. As would further studies 
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Articles of Impeachment against Huey P Long as specified in House Resolution 8 on 26 March 19291 
No. Article of Impeachment 
1 That he has used the appointive power of the Governor with the hope of influencing and in the attempt to influence the 
judiciary of the State; and has publicly boasted that he controls said judiciary. 
2 That he, the said Huey P. Long, while Governor of the State of Louisiana, has bribed or attempted to bribe a member or 
members of the State Legislature, contrary to the Constitution and laws of the State of Louisiana, and especially Article 
XI, Section 20, of the Constitution of 1921. 
3 That in violation of the Constitution of Louisiana, he has habitually required as a condition to appointment to public office, 
signatures of appointees to undated resignations, so as to give him, the said Long, the power of removal of public 
officers whose terms are fixed by the Constitution or statutes of the State of Louisiana. 
4 That he has, through himself and through boards controlled by him, wasted, misused, misapplied and misappropriated 
funds and property of the State of Louisiana. 
5 That he has, through himself and through boards controlled by him, contracted illegal loans for the State of Louisiana, in 
violation of the Constitution of the State. 
6 That, through himself and through boards controlled by him, he has removed school officials of the State for purely 
political purposes: and that he has been and is using said powers for the purpose of intimidating teachers and pupils in 
the schools and educational institutions of the State, to the end of suppressing free thought and free expression of 
opinion and of politicalizing the educational institutions of the State. 
7 That he has, in time of peace, and not in aid of or at the request of civil authorities, and while Governor of the State of 
Louisiana, subordinated the civil authorities to the military, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the State of 
Louisiana, and as Commander-in-Chief of the State Militia, has attempted to impose his own will through the said Militia 
to loot and pillage private property and to take from the person of certain individuals their private property, and destroy 
private property without due process of law, all without legal authority, and contrary to Article I, Sections 2, 7 and 14, of 
the Constitution of the State of Louisiana of 1921. 
8 That he has, as Governor of Louisiana, attempted to force official bodies in the parishes of the State to follow his 
dictation in regard to public litigation as the price of permitting the passage of legislation affecting such parishes. 
9 That he habitually carries concealed weapons upon his person, both in his office and on the public streets and highways 
of the State of Louisiana, in violation of the laws of the State of Louisiana. 
10 That he has repeatedly been guilty of violent abuse of officials of the State of Louisiana, member of public boards of the 
State, and private citizens visiting him upon public business. 
11 That he, the said Huey P. Long, while Governor of Louisiana has been guilty of gross misconduct in public places in the 
various parishes of this State, and particularly in that he did, on or about February 12, 1929, in the City of New Orleans, 
Parish of Orleans, La., participate in an entertainment where intoxicating liquor was served to him and to other guests, 
contrary to the Constitution of the State of Louisiana and the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, at 
which entertainment the said Huey P. Long, Governor of Louisiana, did deport himself in a scandalous and indecorous 
manner, thus holding up the State of Louisiana to ridicule and shame. 
12 That the said Huey P. Long has publicly flouted the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Louisiana, and 
has usurped to himself the powers of the Legislature of the State and of the committees thereof and has on occasions 
commanded the breaking of the quorums of said committees with the purpose in view of preventing the consideration of 
proposed legislation by said committees. 
13 That he has been guilty of favoritism, in that after plans and specifications for a refrigerating plant had been submitted 
and approved by the officials of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, involving an expenditure of $20,000.00, and upon the 
condition that bids therefor should be advertised, he, the said Huey P. Long, ordered the Penitentiary officials to divide 
the order for said plant into numerous orders for separate and inoperative units, the purchase price of which units fell 
below the sum of $1,000.00, rendering public bids unnecessary therefor, and gave the orders therefor to one W. K. 
Henderson, a personal and political friend of the said Long, as is shown and contained in the affidavit of one Bernard L. 
Kiernan, published in the daily press of the State of Louisiana of Monday, March 25, 1929, all in violation of the law and 
in contravention of the requirements of the law with reference to the advertisement by public boards of this State for bids 
on all material and equipment in an amount in excess of $1,000.00. 
14 That the said Huey P. Long did while Governor of the State of Louisiana and in the City of Baton Rouge and in a public 
place on or about the 20th day of March 1929, intrude himself upon, threaten, and attempt to intimidate Charles P. 
Manship, owner and publisher of the Daily State-Times, a newspaper published in the City of Baton Rouge, and did 
threaten to make known and to cause to make publicly known the infirmities of a member of said Manship’s family as a 
punishment and intimidation of the said Manship in the exercise of his rights as a citizen of the State of Louisiana, and in 
an attempt to suppress the freedom of the ress [sic] in lawfully opposing and criticising certain legislation proposed or 
pending in the Legislature of Louisiana of the Special Session of 1929, all of which being in contempt of the laws of the 
State of Louisiana, and particularly denounced as a crime by Act Number 110 of the Legislature of 1908.   
15 That the said Huey P. Long did, while Governor of the State of Louisiana, and in the city of Baton Rouge, Parish of East 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, during the months of February and March, 1929, demolish and destroy the Executive Mansion, 
being the property of the State of Louisiana, and did raze the property to the ground without legal authority and in 
violation of his oath of office. 
16 That the said Huey P. Long, while Governor of the State of Louisiana, and in the city of Baton Rouge, Parish of East 
Baton Rouge, did destroy or dispose of property belonging to the State of Louisiana, being the furniture and fixtures then 
located in the Executive Mansion, Executive Offices, and in the offices of the State Highway Commission, the State Tax 
Commission , and the Supervisor of Public Accounts, and he, the said Huey P. Long, Governor, has made no 
accounting for said property thus destroyed or disposed of in violation of law and his oath of office. 
                                                          
1 Official Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, Fifth Extra Session of the 
Legislature Under the Adoption of the Constitution of 1921 pp33 - 35 
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No. Article of Impeachment 
17 That the said Huey P. Long, while Governor of the State of Louisiana and in Baton Rouge in the Parish of East Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, in violation of the law and of his oath of office as Governor of the State, and over the objection and 
protest of the Board of Parole of the State of Louisiana, the only lawful body authorized to grant paroles to prisoners 
confined in the State Penitentiary, did, on or about the twelfth day of November, 1928, parole and discharge from the 
State Penitentiary of Louisiana, a convict by the name of Elmer Dunnington convicted of the crime of embezzlement in 
the Paarish [sic] of Tangipahoa, Louisiana, on the sixteenth day of March, 1929, the said Dunnington being ineligible for 
parole at the time. 
18 That the said Huey P. Long, Governor of the State of Louisiana, has repeatedly while both branches of the Legislature 
were in open session, appeared within the bar of the House and the Senate and intruded upon the deliberations of each 
of said bodies by personally attempting to impose his own views on the members of the House and Senate s to the 
merits of pending legislation, all in violation of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, which provides for three 
separate and distinct branches of the government, and which prohibits the members of each of those branches from 
usurping or exercising the duties that belong to another, thus using the executive power of the State to interfere with the 
duties of the legislative branch of the government, all in violation of the oath taken by the Governor of the State. 
19 That he, the said Huey P. Long, while Governor of the State of Louisiana, in the City of Baton Rouge, and in the Parish 
of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, did attempt to hire and induce one H. A. Bozeman to kill and murder one J. Y. Sanders, 
Jr., a member of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, as shown and set forth in the sworn statement 
of H. A. Bozeman of date March 25, 1929. 





A copy of the transcript of the Round Robin letter from the Huey P Long Papers held in the 
Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections at Louisiana State University Libraries in 
Baton Rouge, La.1  
 
                                                          
1 Transcript of the Round Robin Letter Huey P Long Papers, Box 37 Folder 1351 Huey P Long – 
Special Impeachment – Legality of Process (round robin). In the original letter the signatures were 
arranged in a circle so the order in which the senators had signed could not be identified.  





The original letter is believed to have been lost.  A document in The Legacy of Huey Long 
exhibition at the Old State Capitol Building in Baton Rouge in 2013 was displayed under the 
title “Impeachment Rules of Procedure” and the description stated “Huey’s opponents fought 
hard to impeach him from the Senate, but no one knew how to bend the rules better than 
Huey. The signatures in this ‘Round Robin’ document stopped the proceedings.” However, 
the names on this document are not those of the fifteen senators who signed the Round 
Robin letter. Instead this document appeared to be a list of the senators who had deplored 
the action of the Robineers.2 
 
 
                                                          
2 Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Louisiana at the Fifth Extra Session 
of the Legislature, Under the Adoption of the Constitution of 1921: Begun and Held in the City of 
Baton Rouge, March 20, 1929  p269 
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